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AN INQUIRY
INTO THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY.

BEING AN
ESSAY ON THE SCIENCE
OF
Domestic Policy in Free Nations.

IN WHICH ARE PARTICULARLY CONSIDERED
POPULATION, AGRICULTURE, TRADE,
INDUSTRY, MONEY, COIN, INTEREST,
CIRCULATION, BANKS, EXCHANGE,
PUBLIC CREDIT, AND TAXES.

By Sir JAMES STEUART, Bart.

Ore trahit quodcumque potest atque addit acervo.

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C O N T E N T S

OF THE

F I F T H V O L U M E.

B O O K I V.

OF CREDIT AND DEBTS.

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AN INQUIRY
INTO THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY.

BOOK IV.
OF CREDIT AND DEBTS.

PART IV.
OF PUBLIC CREDIT.

CHAP. I.

Of the various Consequences of Public Debts.

THE principles which influence the doctrine of public credit are so few, and so plain, that it is surprising to see how circumstances could possibly involve them in the obscurity into which we find them plunged on many occasions.

For the better clearing the way towards the main object, I shall show, from experience, and from the progress of public credit in some nations, that the true principles have been overlooked, and confounded so with extraneous objects, as to be entirely lost.

The true method of deciphering, as it were, the complicated operations of statesmen with respect to

this branch, is to bring back to their native simplicity such plans of administration, as, from the infinite perplexity of them, make people believe, that the principles which influence this district of science lie so involved, as to require a peculiar force of genius even to comprehend them.

By proceeding in this plain track, and by keeping the principles constantly in view, the most perplexed systems of borrowing, funding, stock - jobbing, coining and re-coining of money, changing the weight, fineness, and denominations of specie, circulating paper in conjunction with it, imposing upon mankind with bubbles and bankruptcies, and calling them operations of public credit, may be rendered intelligible to the most slender capacity.

Many of these topics have been already explained, and dismissed. This will enable us to contract the plan of what remains in proportion to the objects it is to comprehend.

Public credit we have defined to be, the confidence reposed in a state, or body politic, borrowing money, on condition that the capital shall not be demandable, but that a certain proportional part of the sum shall be annually paid, either in lieu of interest, or in extinction of part of the capital; for the security of which payment, a permanent annual fund is appropriated, with a liberty, however, to the state to set itself free, by repaying the whole, when nothing to the contrary is stipulated.

In this definition I have put in an alternative, of paying a perpetual interest for the money borrowed, or of paying annually a sum exceeding the interest;

which excess is intended to extinguish the capital in a certain number of years. In both cases, the annual payment is called an annuity. When it is exactly equal to the interest agreed on, it is called perpetual; and determinate, when granted either for life, or for a certain number of years.

The solidity of this security is essential to the borrowing upon the cheapest terms: let me suppose it to be as solid as land-property, and as permanent as government itself: what will the consequence be?

If we suppose government to go on in increasing, every year, the sum of their debts upon perpetual annuities, and appropriating, in proportion, every branch of revenue for the payment of them; the consequence will be, in the first place, to transport, in favor of the creditors, the whole income of the state, of which government will retain the administration. The farther consequences of this revolution will furnish matter for a chapter by itself.

If the borrowings of a state be only in proportion to the extinction of the old capitals, or of what I have called determinate annuities, then the debts will not increase.

When a statesman, therefore, establishes a system of public credit, the first object which should fix his attention is to calculate how far the constitution of the state, and its internal circumstances, render it expedient to throw the revenue of it into the hands of a money'd interest. I say, this is the most important object of his deliberation; because the solidity of his credit depends upon it.

If, all the interests of the state duly considered,

that of trade be found to predominate, less inconvenience will be found in allowing the money'd interest to swell: but in monarchies, where the landed interest is the most powerful, it would be dangerous to erect so formidable a rival to it. In political bodies every separate interest will consult its own; and in the contest between those who pay, and those who receive the taxes, under the denomination of creditors, the security of public credit becomes precarious.

From this we may conclude, *1mo*, That in governments where the swelling of a money'd interest is found to threaten the tranquillity of the state, care should be taken either to establish a sinking fund, for paying off, in times of peace, what may have been borrowed in times of war, or the plan of borrowing upon determinate annuities must be established.

2do, If natural causes be left to work their own effects, without a systematical plan of borrowing, the consequence will be a bankruptcy, and a total failure of public credit, at least for some time.

3tio, If a state should find the mass of their debts to amount to so great a sum as to be insupportable, they might have recourse to a total, or partial abolition of them by an act of power.

4to, If they allow their debts to swell without limitation, and adhere to the faith of their engagements, the whole property of the state will be in constant circulation, from one class of men to another.

5to, If the debts contracted be the property of foreigners, these will either remove into the country, where their funds arise, or the property, that is, the *dominium utile* of the country, will be transferred from the natives.

These and many other combinations will arise from the extension of public credit; and an examination of the most natural consequences upon every supposition, will be the best way to acquire a distinct idea of the subject in general. To pretend to foretel any one certain chain of consequences, which may, in fact, result from any combination, is, I apprehend, impossible; because every one of them will depend upon circumstances totally unknown. These, in our way of examining matters of this kind, are all to be founded upon supposition. To supply therefore, in some measure, this defect, I shall first have recourse to examples of what has happened in the hitherto infant state of public credit; and as to cases which have not as yet taken place, we must have recourse to ingenuity, and endeavour to form the most rational combinations we can.

C H A P. II.

Of the Rise and Progress of Public Credit.

WHILE the policy of Princes directed them to form treasures, there was no occasion for public credit. This policy prevailed until the rise of the Roman empire. Then all the treasures of the world were plundered, and nations were enslaved. On this revolution, the exigencies of that great empire were supplied from the annual tributes paid by conquered nations. Under good reigns, this annual supply swelled the public treasure, until a prodigal Emperor squandered it away; and took to rapine and extortion, to fill up the void.

Upon the total dissolution of that great empire, Europe was over-run by barbarous nations, who, with as little industry as ever, supported their power by the military services of the whole people.

After the establishment of the feudal kingdoms under their chiefs who first laid the foundation of them, arose the Barons, or principal vassals, who, in imitation of their chief, erected small principalities, which by degrees grew independent.

This distribution of power into many hands had the effect of destroying all systematic plans of government. Princes were obliged to act according to the perpetual fluctuation of circumstances, until by a revolution in their favor, the power of the vassals was swallowed up, and confined within the limits of a more regular authority.

In proportion as this revolution took place among nations of Europe, the system of their government resumed a more permanent form. Justice was administered with more uniformity; and from this arose a body of laws, which, in some countries, were called customs: in others, as in England, common law. Wars then became less frequent; and the military services not being necessary on all occasions, insensibly became converted into taxes, proportioned to the exigencies of the time.

During this period, the coin and precious metals of Europe were lodged, in a great measure, in private coffers. If wars brought them forth for a short time, they soon found their way back again. Princes were generally extravagant, and spent money as fast as they got it. In proportion as industry and alie-

nation increased, the coin came abroad, the inhabitants became easy in their circumstances; the state flourished, and acquired reputation. The riches and power of a state began then to be estimated, as they ought to be, not by their treasures locked up, but by what was found in circulation; that is, by their industry. Venice, Genoa, and the Hans-towns, set the example. The Jews, banished from France, on account of their extortions in the time of the holy wars, fled, as it is said, into Lombardy, and there invented the use of bills of exchange, for drawing their riches from countries to which they durst not resort to bring them off. Interest for money began to be considered as lawful in many cases: merchants were protected by Princes, for the sake of the consequences of trade and industry: and from such small beginnings has that mighty engine of public credit sprung.

While Princes mortgaged their lands and principalities, in order to obtain a sum of money, they acted upon the principles of private credit. This was the case in the more early times, before government acquired that stability which is necessary to establish a firm confidence. In proportion as it drew towards a regular system, the dawn of credit put on appearances analogous to the solidity of the fund upon which it was established.

The second step was to raise money upon a branch of taxes assigned to the lender, for the reimbursement of his capital and interest. We shall show the consequences of this plan of credit from some examples, which will fully point out all its inconveniencies.

This plan of administration was attended with so much abuse, and so much oppression, that statesmen began to despair of carrying on public affairs by such expedients; and therefore concluded that the only way to obtain money at the least expense, was to raise it on the subject within the year, or upon what they called short funds.

At length public credit assumed its present form. Money was borrowed upon determinate or perpetual annuities: a fund was provided for that purpose: and the refunding of the capital was, in many cases, left in the option of government, but was never to be demandable by the creditor.

This is a short view of the progress of public credit. The principles upon which it is built are so few, that were I to confine myself to a bare deduction of them, little new or interesting could be said. I shall therefore steer another course: I shall collect the sentiments of some eminent politicians, who have either writ upon, or acted in the administration of this branch of government; and by applying principles as we go along, I shall be enabled to point out the extraneous circumstances which are so apt to involve this subject in obscurity. Had we not before our eyes the numberless examples of this kind, it would hardly be possible to conceive how so great a confusion, and so many calamities, could have followed upon the operations of public credit.

C H A P. III.

Of Anticipations, or borrowing Money upon Assignments to Taxes for the discharge of Principal and Interest.

I H A V E already observed, that by the cessation of the constant wars, in which all Europe was engaged during the feudal government of the barons, nations began to enjoy some sort of tranquillity. Upon this the military services became insensibly converted into taxes; and as Princes extended their jurisdictions over the cities, which had been formerly more under the protection of the bishops who resided in them, taxes were augmented. These impositions were very inconsiderable, with respect to what they brought into the King's coffers. The policy in raising them was bad; the frauds in collecting them were great.

These considerations engaged Princes to begin by contracting debts, and to pay afterwards by temporary assignments to the taxes imposed.

From this again ensued the most terrible extortions on the side of the tax-gatherers, so often complained of by those who have writ on the affairs of France, as we shall see in the following chapter.

Philip *le bel*, King of France, was the first who, in 1301, admitted, with great policy, the inhabitants of cities to have a seat in the states of the kingdom. He formed them into a distinct body, and

called then *tiers état*, or the third estate, after the clergy and the nobility. His view was to facilitate thereby the jurisdiction he wanted to establish over those cities, and engage them to consent to the imposition of taxes for carrying on his wars in Flanders, and for opposing the ambitious views of Boniface VIII. Accordingly, the people began to pay willingly, when once they found that they had a vote in what concerned them.

I take it for granted, that every tax, about that time, was imposed for a particular purpose, and assigned either to creditors, or to people who advanced money upon it: because we are told that the first imposition granted by the states to a King of France as a permanent branch of revenue, was an excise upon spirituous liquors granted to Philip de Valois, in the year 1345; at which time, however, according to Mr. d'Eon's *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire générale des Finances*, there were not less than twenty-two different taxes known in France, which he enumerates as follows:

Tailles, complaints, charges, redevances, coutumes, péages, travers, passages, centiemes, ôtes, chevauchées, subventions, exactions, chevaleries, aides, mariages, toultes, impositions, prisons, servitudes, and nouvelletes.

That all these impositions must have been mere trifles, I gather from a circumstance in the Political History of France, mentioned by the author just cited, which being itself exceedingly curious, and tending greatly to confirm many things which I have advanced concerning the small circulation in former times, I shall here briefly mention it.

In 1356, John, King of France, applied to the States for 50,000 livres, about 9165 *l.* sterling, to pay his army. The States, besides several other taxes imposed to pay this sum, granted him 8 deniers on the livre, or $3\frac{1}{3}$ *per cent.* upon all meat, drink, and merchandize, sold in France within the year; that is to say, upon the whole alienations of France. The tax was levied, but fell so far short of the sum required, that it was made up by a poll-tax.

Can any example be better calculated for forming a notion of the circulation of France at that time?

It may be here alledged that the prices of every thing were then so very low, that no judgment can be formed concerning the *quantity* of alienation from the smallness of the sum. This objection is of no force, as I shall presently show.

We know from the records of the selling price of grain in France, which was then remarkably cheap in proportion to the years which followed and which had preceded, that in 1356, the septier of wheat, or 4 Winchester bushels, sold for 17 sols 8 deniers of the then currency, which was 12 livres to the marc fine silver, and a French soldier's allowance for bread, to this day, is 3 septiers, or 12 Winchester bushels a year. Now let me suppose, that the whole 50,000 livres had been raised by this imposition of $3\frac{1}{3}$ *per cent.*, or $\frac{1}{30}$ of the total value of the single article of corn sold at market, which was far from being the case, and then compare that with the number of men who could have been subsisted with all the corn sold in France at that time.

If $\frac{1}{30}$ of the price was the tax, then by multiplying

50,000 livres by 30, we have the value of the corn sold; to wit, 1 500 000 livres: divide this sum by the value of what a man consumes in a year, to wit, 3 septiers at 17 sols 8 deniers, which make 2 livres 13 sols, and the quotient will be the number of portions for a man, to wit, 566 037. So the whole alienation of France, at that time, fell far below the value of as much wheat as would have fed 566 037 men.

What a poor idea does this communicate of the state of Europe only 400 years ago! It would be in vain to seek for examples to illustrate any principle of our complicated modern economy in the histories of those times: their taxes, their credit, and their debts, resembled ours in nothing but the name.

I now come nearer home, and give an account of the ideas of public credit formed by Davenant, who flourished about the time of the revolution in 1688, which I may take to be the era of public credit in England.

No person at that time, whose writings I have seen, appears to have so thoroughly understood those matters as Davenant. He was a man of theory, as well as knowledge of facts: he had an opportunity which few people have, to be well instructed in the one and the other; and he turned his talents to the best advantage for promoting the interest of his country. He has writ many tracts on political subjects, which, when carefully read and compared with what experience has since taught us, cast great light upon many questions relative to the subject of this inquiry.

Davenant, like other great men of his time, was of opinion that borrowing money upon what he

calls short funds, was much preferable to that upon perpetual interest; and he thought the most advisable plan of all, could it be accomplished, was to raise the money wanted within the year.

Men, at that time, had a terror upon them in contracting debts for the public: they considered the nation as they would a private man, whose interest is one, uncompounded, and relative to himself alone: in this light, creditors appeared as formidable as enemies; they were looked upon by ministers as such; and this general opinion on one side, contributed, no doubt, to make the monied people less interested in the distress of government, and more ready to lay hold of every opportunity of improving such occasions, for their own advantage.

Government was in constant war with creditors: when ready money failed in England, it had nothing to pay with but exchequer tallies, upon the taxes imposed; these were much more easily issued than acquitted. When the first year's amount of a tax was engaged, people considered the security of what was to follow as very precarious; consequently, the value of it diminished.

This method, however, succeeded far better in paying off debts already contracted, than in contracting new ones; and the hardships put upon those who had advanced money to government, and who were paid by assignments upon taxes previously engaged, made people afterwards very diffident, except upon proper security. The limited form of the English government, prevented the violent proceedings between ministers and public creditors, which

were common in France ; and this circumstance contributed, no doubt, to establish the credit of the former upon the better footing. But still the long expectation of payment of the capital and interest, upon a distant fund, made Davenant acknowledge that 700,000 *l.* in ready money, would at any time go farther than a million in tallies; and yet he thought it was better for the state to borrow the million upon a plan of discharging the debt in three or four years, than to obtain the 700,000 *l.* at the expense of a perpetual interest of 8 *per cent.*

There were many more considerations which moved Davenant to prefer what he calls short funds to perpetual interest.

It was the general opinion in his time (not his own indeed, for he endeavoured to show the fallacy of it) that money borrowed upon the anticipation of a fund, *raised and appropriated for the discharge of it*, was not a debt upon the state ; because it did not diminish the former revenue. We have a remarkable instance of the prevalence of this opinion, in the famous memorial presented by M. Desmaretz to Philip Duke of Orleans, after the death of the late King of France; wherein he advances, that during seven campaigns, from 1708 to the peace of Rastad, while he had been at the head of the King's finances, he had not increased the public debts by more than nine millions of livres capital : and yet when he came into the administration, in 1708, the King's debts did not amount to 700 millions ; and we have seen, that at the time of his death, they were upwards of 2000 millions. But Desmaretz did not reckon the

difference of about 1300 millions ; because he had settled them upon funds of his own creation. This was so much the language of the times, that no criticism was made upon it.

It is remarkable , that Davenant, in giving an account of the debts of England, during the period of which he writes, that is, from the revolution down to the peace of Ryfwick, hardly ever takes notice of the sums paid for interest upon them. The minds of men at that time were totally taken up with the payment of capitals ; and providing these could be discharged in a few years , it was no matter, they thought, what they cost in the mean time.

As long as nations at war observe the same policy in their methods of raising money, the ways in which they proceed are of the less importance : but when any one state makes an alteration, by which more money is thrown into their hands than they could formerly obtain ; this circumstance obliges every other state to adopt the same method. Thus while Princes made war with the amount of their treasures and annual income, the balance of their power depended on the balance of such resources : when they anticipated their income on both sides , for a few years , the balance was in proportion still : when, afterwards , they adopted long funds and perpetual interest, the supplies increased ; but still the balance was determined as formerly.

The usefulness, therefore, of an inquiry into the principles of public credit, has not so much for its object to discover the interest of states in adopting one mode of credit preferably to another, as to dis-

cover the consequences of every one; and to point out the methods of making them severally turn out to the best account for the state, considered as a body politic by itself, and for the individuals which compose it.

When so many different relations are taken in, the subject becomes much more complex, and therefore the consequences *which can only be guessed at* must be less determinate: but on the other hand, it opens the mind, and suggests many hints which with time may be improved for the good of society.

People who barely relate political facts, only afford an exercise to the memory: those who deduce principles, and trace a chain of reasoning from them, give exercise to the understanding; and as a small spark may raise a mighty flame, so a hint thrown out by a slender genius may set all the great men of a nation on a plan of general reformation and improvement.

Let us now take a view of the state of public credit in England, at the peace of Ryswick; in order to show how Davenant came to be so great an enemy to long funds, and more especially to perpetual interest. We shall at the same time point out from what causes the great change of sentiments at present proceeds.

At the peace of Ryswick, the debts of England, according to Davenant, in his fifth discourse upon the public revenues and trade of England, stood at 17 552 544*l.* sterling; call it 17 millions and a half, as we have no occasion to calculate with exactness.

Of this debt the capital of 3½ millions was sunk, as he calls it; because 1 300 000 *l.* was on lives at 14 per cent. and what was over to make up the 3½ millions, was

was intended to remain a perpetual burden on the nation.

For paying the interest of this sum, no less than 400 000 *l.* a year was necessary, which makes on the whole above 11 *per cent.*

But then it must be observed, that more than one third of the sum was upon lives at 14 *per cent.*: the debt due to the bank, of which we have spoken in another place, was 1 200 000 *l.* for which was paid 100 000 *l.* a year, including 4000 *l.* allowed for the charge of management: the remaining million was upon lottery tickets, bearing about 8 *per cent.* the price at which the bank had lent.

The second branch of debts was near 11 millions, which, he says, were in course of payment; because they were secured upon branches of revenue engaged for discharging them. A part of this class of debts was to be extinguished in the year 1700: and whenever that was done, then a proportion of the appropriated taxes, amounting yearly to above a million sterling, was immediately to be taken off.

The third class of debts were those not provided for at all; which in the place referred to, he makes to amount to no more than 3 200 000 *l.* but he afterwards finds his mistake, and that they in fact amounted to above 5 millions and a half, which makes the debts of England at the peace of Ryswick, to have been near 20 millions.

Was it then any wonder, that a man who wished well to his country, should prefer borrowing upon short funds at any expense whatever in the mean time, rather than at perpetual interest, when he

found that parliaments could not be prevailed upon to allow any tax to subsist one instant after the discharge of the debts for the payment of which it had been appropriated ?

Besides, there was very little to be gained by borrowing upon long funds and perpetual interest, as long as the lenders considered their advantage to consist principally in getting their capitals refunded.

The plain matter of fact was, that trade at that time was only beginning to take root in England, and demanded funds to carry it on. The use of banks had not then been discovered, for turning property into money. Circulation, consequently, was confined to the coin; and profits on trade were very great. All these circumstances rendered capitals of essential use; and the consequence was, to raise interest to an excessive height.

Compare this situation with the present. Were the capital of 140 millions sterling thrown by Great Britain, in a few years, into the hands of the present creditors; were France, on the other hand, to throw in as much, what trade could absorb it? Capitals now are only of value in proportion to the interest they bring; and so long as the interest paid on public debts is sufficient to keep circulation full, and no more, interest will stand as it is: when that ceases to be the case, as in time of war, we see interest begins to rise; and when, on the other hand, the interest paid, proves more than sufficient for the uses of circulation, as upon a return of peace, then, from the same principles, interest must diminish.

Davenant, like an able politician, who had the state of facts before him, reasoned according to actual

circumstances. Whatever was borrowed on long funds, was charged on the standing revenue of the state, which parliament was very unwilling to increase in proportion to the charges laid upon it. This, of itself, was argument sufficient with him to cast his view upon short appropriations, or upon his favorite object, of raising money within the year, to supply the exigencies of the state.

But in this operation he found great difficulties. In his treatise of ways and means, article *excises*, where he is searching for expedients to provide money for the war, he plainly shows a thorough knowledge of that imposition. It had taken place in England as far back as the great civil war, and formed at the revolution about $\frac{1}{3}$ of all the revenue: but what is very extraordinary, and which at present will hardly be credited, the excise had at that time the effect of sinking the price of the subject excised, instead of raising the price of what was produced from it. Thus the excise upon malt, after the revolution, had the effect of lowering the price of barley, instead of raising the price of beer.

This effect of excises Davenant saw; from which he, and since him many more have concluded, that all excises fall ultimately upon the land.

This circumstance, together with a feeling for the interest of the great number of *idle* poor at that time, who must constantly suffer by excises, engaged Davenant to propose having recourse to the land-property and poll taxes, for raising, within the year, the sums required for carrying on the war.

According to his proposal, there was to be no less than 3 millions raised by a land tax, besides half a

million by a quarterly poll, which was, at that time, above 100,000 *l.* more than all the permanent taxes of England put together.

A propofal of this kind coming from Davenant, fhows the difference of fituation between thofe times and the prefent. On this fubject more is to be learned by comparing facts, than by all the reasoning in the world.

We have feen how credit flood in England during the reign of William III. It was then in its infancy, and was fet upon the principles of a free and limited authority, exercifed by minifters of ftate at all times refponfible to parliament at the risk of their heads, in cafe of any open violation of the public faith. This is the beft of all fecurities againft the bad exercife of power.

Whoever reads the admirable writings of Davenant, and compares his ideas with what experience has fince taught us, concerning the nature of taxes and public credit, will plainly difcover that the great diftreffs of England at that time, proceeded from the following caufes.

The enterprife they were engaged in, was far beyond their power to fupport, although they had the greateft part of Europe to affift them.

The bravery of the Britifh nation was ill fupported with money the finews of war.

The coin foon after the revolution fell into the greateft diforder, which fent it away; and no expedient was found to fupply its place for the ufes of domeftic circulation; and, confequently, the fixed revenue could not be paid, nor induftry carried on.

The people were unaccustomed to taxes: tunnage and poundage, the branch with which they were best acquainted, and which they bore with the least murmuring, because it was little felt by individuals, together with the excise upon beer and ale, the hearth money, the post-house, and wine licences, composed the whole of the permanent revenue of the state, and amounted to about one million and a half sterling: besides which, the parliament had granted new customs (all to cease before 1690) to the amount of about half a million more, upon wines, tobacco, sugar, and French linen. This was the state of the revenue at the revolution.

One would imagine that England, under so small a burden, might have been able to make the greatest efforts.

Were we now to grapple with France, under such circumstances what sanguine hopes would we not form of success! The case turned out widely different the first benefit the nation expected in consequence of their liberty restored, was an abolition of the hearth money; a tax which raised over the whole kingdom, 245,000 *l.* and was considered as an insupportable burden.

Such sentiments and dispositions in the English nation, might have been a sufficient indication of what was to be expected from the war; the consequences of which had before 1695, produced the following changes in the revenue.

The tunnage and poundage, which at the revolution produced 600,000 *l.* was by this time reduced to 286,687 *l.*

The excise upon beer and ale, from 666,383 £. was reduced to 391,275 £.

The hearth money was abolished.

The post-house, from 65.000 £. was reduced to 63,517 £.

The wine-licences, from 10, 000 £. to 5000 £.

The temporary customs which subsisted at the revolution, were now expired, and had been either continued by new grants, or by others of the same nature introduced in their stead. The former had produced 415, 472 £. the new produced 373,839 £.

The last and most important grant of all, was an additional excise upon beer and ale, which produced 450,000 £.

The revenue at the revolution produced, clear of all charges, 2 001 855 £ sterling. A revenue established at pretty much the same rate, and nearly on the same objects, with an addition of a new excise, which produced 450,000 £. produced net in 1694, no more than 1 570 318 £. so that, deducting the new excise, the old revenue was diminished in its produce, no less than 1 081 527 £. or above one half, in five years time.

In a country like England, at that time, taxes were of little use to the state, and were an excessive burden on the people.

What could they be paid out of? Not out of the value in the hands of the people; because there was no way provided for turning that value into money. The whole of the money coined before the end of the war in 1697, did not amount to 8½ millions. It was not to be expected that during the war, foreign coin

was to come in, except in consequence of borrowing ; and we may be very certain, that all that was borrowed, and a great part of what had been coined at home, had gone out from the year 1695 to 1697. Under these circumstances , the exchequer issued tallies of wood , a notable expedient for facilitating circulation ! And the bank of England lent not one farthing upon mortgage : all that was possible to be raised on the land and on the people, by pound-rate, assessment, and poll tax, was imposed.

Now let us recal our principles concerning circulation , alienation , and banking upon mortgage, and combine these with what we have so frequently repeated, and I think demonstrated, viz. that in proportion to the extent of alienation, and the demands for money, a circulating equivalent should be provided , so as to be ready at the hand of every person who has property to pledge for it ; and then decide whether it was any wonder that credit in England should have been at so low an ebb at the peace of Ryswick ; that taxes should have diminished in their produce ; that interest should have risen to such an extravagant height ; that the people should have groaned under a load from which they could not relieve themselves.

Under such circumstances, England appears to me in the light of a dumb man put to the torture in order to extort a confession.

Were eight or nine millions sterling in coin, and a few wooden sticks, the tallies, constantly sold at a great discount, a circulating value sufficient to supply the exigencies of a state which was spending annually at the rate of five or six millions ?

The consequence of this total drain of money, was, that people could neither consume exciseable commodities, or pay the taxes laid upon their persons and solid property.

The excises failed, because the body of the people, who paid them, were interrupted in their industry, for want of money to carry on alienation. Those who were liable to the arbitrary impositions, such as the landlords, could not pay; because what they had, their land, could not be given in payment.

From what I have here laid together, we may determine, that as alienations among individuals cannot exceed the proportion of the circulating equivalent of a country, so a statesman when he intends *suddenly* to augment the taxes of his people, without interrupting their industry, which then becomes still more necessary than ever, should augment the circulating equivalent in proportion to the additional demand for it.

This according to my notions, cannot be so well compassed as, 1. by establishing banks of circulation upon mortgage: 2. by relieving those companies of the load of paying foreign balances by giving bills at par, or at a small exchange: and 3. by providing funds abroad for the payment of them, according to the principles above deduced.

Such expedients will work their effect, in a nation where the public faith stands upon the solid security of an honest parliament, and upon that responsibility which is fixed upon those who are trusted with the exertions of the royal authority.

I think I may illustrate this operation by a simile.

A gentleman chuses to form a cascade of the water which serves to turn his corn-mill; consequently, the mill stops: but in its stead, he immediately erects another which turns with the wind. Coin is the water, bank paper is the wind, and both are equally well calculated for the use they are put to.

C H A P. IV.

Of the State of public Credit in France before the reign of Louis XIV. and of the Sentiment of the great Richlieu upon that Subject.

HAVING laid before my reader the sentiments of Davenant on the subject of public credit, which were analogous to the then state of England, it may be instructive to compare them with those of another very great man, in a rival nation; I mean the Cardinal de Richlieu.

The constitution of Great Britain at present, is pretty much what it was in Davenant's time: and that of France does not differ widely from what it was at the death of Louis XIII.

Britain and France are two nations, rivals in every thing worthy of emulation, and similar in those distresses which are the inseparable concomitants of modern ambition, debts and taxes.

As long as the constitution of the two governments shall stand as at present, Britain will constantly have the advantage in borrowing: France will have it in

paying off her debts. It is this contrast which engages me to enter into the following detail. I consider it not only as a piece of historical curiosity, but as a subject of profound reflection, from which much instruction may be gathered.

The fate of kingly power was decided, both in Britain and in France, much about the same time. In France, it was supported by Cardinal de Richlieu; in Britain, it was broken to pieces under Charles I.

Before that time there was no fixed form of government established in either country; nor can ever a regular constitution take place any where, until the mechanism of a state becomes so complex as to render changes extremely difficult. This is becoming the case more and more every day; and upon this and nothing else will depend the stability of our present forms.

Let us now take a view of the sentiments of a great minister, delivered in writing by himself, in his political testament; the authority of which would never have been called in question, had the matter it contains been properly attended to, and well understood.

It is in the 7th paragraph of the 9th chapter of the testament, where the Cardinal shows his ability in paying off the debts of France: and in going through the subject, he casually has thrown out several things, which enable us to form a judgment of the state of taxes, and of the effects they were found to produce in his time.

“It is pedantry,” says he, “to maintain that a prince has no right to draw money from his

“ subjects, and that he ought to content himself
“ with the possession of their hearts. None, how-
“ ever, but flatterers, the pest of society, can main-
“ tain, that he may draw from them, justly, what-
“ ever he thinks fit: and that his right extends, in this
“ particular, as far as his will.”

The taxes of France at this time had been augmented far beyond their due proportion; and this had produced many strange and contradictory phenomena; which, as we shall now see, misled the Cardinal in many respects; because his experience was not sufficient to discover the causes of them.

“ The augmentation of impositions on the people,”
“ says he, does the King *so much* hurt by raising
“ prices, as to compensate all he can gain.” If we suppose that the King gained by the augmentation; that is to say, that the tax, when increased, really produced more than before, and raised prices proportionally; then the King could only lose his proportional part, but never the whole. If the tax, by being augmented, produced less than before, which was the case often, then he lost by a diminution upon his income, not by the rise of prices. But this was not the case; because deficiencies of that kind could not fall upon the King, but upon his farmers.

The true reason was, that the King paid most of his expenses by assignments upon the taxes, and then, no doubt, the higher they were raised, and the more difficult to recover, the dearer every undertaking would cost the King.

This reasoning upon the effect of taxes shows, that at that time the doctrine of them was not well under-

stood. No wonder: theory is not sufficient to lay open political consequences, even to the greatest genius. All our information as to these matters arises from experience, and all our instruction from our attention and reflection.

As a proof of this, he mentions, almost in the same place, an effect of the increase of taxes, which is quite contrary to the former.

“Consumption,” says he, “diminishes as taxes augment.”

This is a contingent, but not a necessary consequence, as we have seen, and has the effect of lowering prices.

I mention these particulars, only to show how little this great man had studied the principles of taxation, or combined the causes of those phenomena which he saw arising from them.

Such contrary effects could not fail to be felt, when taxes were raised in the manner usual at that time, and when no method was contrived for augmenting the currency.

In Richlieu's time the custom was to treat with the *partisans*, as they were called, or undertakers for the farm of taxes; and for a sum of money, valued at a certain interest, to give them a right to levy certain impositions on the people, esteemed equivalent to the rate agreed upon; some in one province, some in another, as the parties could agree. Then the *partisans* fell to work with the people, and committed the most horrid extortions. In the 4th §. of his 4th chapter, he says, “The abuse is carried such a length, as to be quite insupportable, and must

“ end in the ruin of the state ; the people are plundered , not taxed ; fortunes are made by rapine, not industry : using the partisans like sponges is very just ; but liable, on the other hand, to great abuse, when not conducted with moderation and justice. ” This is a very different system of taxation from that carried on in England in Davenant’s time , and must have produced effects very dissimilar.

But it may be asked, if these partisans in France had found out means of raising money, far beyond the King’s intention ; what prevented the Cardinal from examining into such means, and using them in a gentle and equitable manner, to the extent only of satisfying the creditors for the money borrowed from them ?

In those days several difficulties occurred, which rendered this expedient impracticable.

1^{mo}, The partisans would lend in no other way ; they would have nothing to do with the King as a debtor : his credit was not well established ; and by having the direct administration of a tax, they considered themselves as more secure.

2^{do}, Had the King levied the money on the people, and been paymaster to the creditors himself, there would have been no gains to the partisans but what were stipulated : had they exacted more than legal interest, they exposed themselves to great danger ; and consequently would not lend. So by delivering up the people to be plundered , the King made a better bargain, he thought, than any other way ; and if the partisans plundered the people, the Cardinal plundered them in his turn.

3tio, At this time there were not, as now, merchants of extensive credit, and fair character, who serve as interposed persons for the whole money'd interest in Europe, and who can fill a subscription for millions with a single name.

The partisans themselves, as the Cardinal observes, had often neither money or credit at setting out: by parcelling their undertaking into many hands, they got together what was necessary. Thus the subaltern associates were in a moment, like locusts, spread over the whole face of the country, and plundering went on in every quarter.

This represents a quite different system of credit from what we see established, even in France, at present; where the tax-gatherers are still loudly complained of, though much more than they deserve. The mode of raising the taxes is now most exactly specified by the King; and nothing more can be exacted than according to the plan laid down; but in every case severe penalties are imposed upon frauds, and when levied, are accounted for to the farmers; but when compounded for under hand, sink into private men's pockets.

In a country where taxes are rightly established, industrious people have no occasion to indemnify themselves by fraud for the taxes they pay; they have a more certain method of being refunded. This shall be explained in its proper place.

By this method of oppression in the Cardinal's time, a great part of the odium was removed from the King, and cast upon the partisans. The people resembled a dog who bites the stick with

which he has been struck, instead of biting him who holds it*.

I have now said enough to point out the method of borrowing money in France at this time, from which the nature of the security may easily be gathered.

* Thus were taxes established in France, in spite of the great aversion of that nation to them. The exigencies of the state were apparent; Princes were considered as under an absolute necessity to find money at any rate; they appeared to be in the hands of unrelenting usurers, who became the execration of the people, to whose fury they were sometimes delivered over, when stripped of their wealth: the people were now and then relieved of a part of their burden; the tax remained under milder management; formed an addition to the King's revenue, and served as a fund for future emergencies.

But the nature of man is such, that the more he grows in wealth, the more the desire of spending it increases. Thus the fund provided for unforeseen emergencies, is insensibly incorporated with that which is appropriated for the current service of the state.

Nothing however is more certain than that in time of war, far greater sums are required than any people can pay, without contracting debts.

Is it not then indispensibly necessary, either, *1mo*, To have a sum locked up in treasure? Or, *2do*, A fund appropriated, to borrow upon in time of war, which may serve to pay off the debts in time of peace? Or, *3tio*, To borrow upon the stipulation of an annual payment, which may, in a certain number of years, acquit both interest and principal?

The first is the plan of the King of Prussia; the second that of England; the third is, in a good measure, that of France: Holland borrows no more, and pays as she can what she owes; Spain lives on her income; and Austria remained in the old way till very lately, without credit, and consequently without much debt.

The Cardinal, upon the supposition of an approaching peace, enters into the plan of paying off what had been contracted. He was resolved to preserve credit; for even at that time, the consequence of that great engine was sufficiently felt by this great man, to relieve the people, and to get rid of the debts.

After a long detail of all the branches of the revenue, and after showing how they might be improved, he draws out a general state of them, and of the debts affecting them; and then adds, "The total revenue of the kingdom amounts to near 80 millions;" (the silver was then at 27 livres 10 sols the marc fine, which, valued at 2 *l.* 4 *s.* sterling, makes the 80 millions worth above 6 millions sterling) "of which there is above 45 millions engaged for the debts. By good management I pretend that this immense load of debts, which seems to be the ruin of the King, shall turn out to his ease and opulence. Some imagine it would be a right measure to free the state entirely of her burden, (a general sponge) but as she cannot certainly, support all the burden, so neither does reason dictate that she should be entirely set free." No modern statesman could form a better judgment of things. The Cardinal's ideas are just and profound; and it is astonishing how a man uninstructed by our experience should see so far into remote consequences.

He next lays down different schemes for paying the debts, upon the return of peace and tranquillity. They are all arbitrary, more or less, according to the

the standard of English ideas of credit. But if we abstract from one expedient lately discovered, to wit, the diminishing the interest, and allowing the capitals to remain, I doubt if any modern statesman could discover any other than those which the Cardinal has proposed.

A preliminary step to all his schemes was, *by an act of power*, to reduce the debts which bore a higher interest, to that of the 16 penny, or to a little more than 6 *per cent*. This method of reduction has constantly been and is still practised in France.

Then he proposes to enter into an account with the creditors for the sums they had received; and to consider whatever they had obtained above the legal interest, as payments in part of the capital.

This scheme however he rejects, upon examination. He says it is agreeable to equity; but it would have the effect of totally destroying all credit for the future.

The second expedient was, to reimburse the creditors the sums which they really paid for the annuities assigned to them: but that he found impossible to verify; because they had had the address to specify, in their contracts, sums far exceeding what they really paid. For this reason he rejects the second expedient also; and adopts a third, as the best plan of any for paying off the debts. This was, to value the capitals at what they then sold for in the market, before the peace was concluded.

This method appeared to the Cardinal the most equitable, at least he says so, and the only one practicable; but in my opinion it was the most arbitrary of the three; the most liable to abuse, and the most

opposite to the principles of public credit, as at present established: and yet it is a thought, which, when conducted with justice, may upon some occasions answer excellent purposes, as I shall observe in a proper place.

Had he adopted the first expedient, of ascertaining the value of the real advance, there was an appearance of justice; because the creditors were thereby represented as usurers; and by repaying them what they had advanced, by the enjoyment of an income above the legal interest, he treated them with more indulgence than the laws allow between private persons: but when money was borrowed in time of war, a higher interest should have been allowed for it than in time of peace, when it was to be paid off; and therefore to take the standard of peace, in reckoning with the creditors who had lent in time of war, was an evident injustice.

Could he, according to the second scheme, have discovered exactly the sums which had been paid for the annuities given, and offered reimbursements upon that footing, less could have been said against it; because the mentioning more in the contract than what had been paid, was a palpable fraud against the King.

The third method, which the Cardinal approves of, contains this piece of great injustice, that the ancient creditors of the state who had paid 12 years purchase for their contracts, that is, those who had lent at about 8 *per cent.* might by this scheme be paid off with one half of what they originally paid. If it be answered, that nothing is worth more than what it can bring; I answer, that it may be worth more than

what it can bring *at a particular time*. During a war, an annuity which had been bought at 12 years purchase in time of peace, will fall to five, providing annuities can then be bought at that rate. The new loans constantly regulate the value of the old capitals; but upon a return of peace, they will rise to the original value.

Another injustice here was, that a minister, by borrowing a sum at a very high interest, at a time he wanted to set a value on the capitals, might sink this value. And, in the third place, the greatest injustice of all consisted in this, that the Cardinal had no thoughts of any reimbursement, as we shall see by what follows.

There was, at this time, one class of annuities constituted at 8 *per cent*. These he proposed to reduce to 6 *per cent*. as above, by his preliminary operation. Such annuities sold at that time for five years purchase. These, says the Cardinal, *we must fix at that value*; and by allowing the proprietors to enjoy them for $7\frac{1}{2}$ years, the capital and interest will be paid off.

Other annuities constituted upon the *taille* sold for six years purchase, which, by the same rule, were to be paid off in $8\frac{1}{2}$ years.

The annuities and other debts charged at this time upon the *taille* alone, amounted to 26 millions a year; and by this scheme, the whole was to be paid off in $8\frac{1}{2}$ years.

Besides these, there were engagements upon other branches of the revenue, which sold at different prices. All were to be set upon a proportional footing. The annuities which sold the dearest,

were at 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ years purchase, which were to be paid in 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ years.

Thus, by the Cardinal's scheme, the debts of France, which at this time bore an interest of about 45 millions, were entirely to be paid off, in about 12 years, without any new imposition; and when that was concluded, the lands were to be discharged of 26 millions of yearly *taille*, near two millions sterling, and the King was to have a clear revenue of 53 millions, or about 4 millions of our money, which with the 26 millions taken off the *taille*, make 79 millions; the total amount of the French revenue at that time.

I shall now point out the characteristic differences between the principles upon which the credit of England and France were established, at the two periods of which we have been speaking.

Had two such writers as Davenant and Richlieu been to be met with in the same age, and at a time when England and France were engaged in contracting debts, the contrast would have been stronger; but as it is, it suits our purpose. The debts contracted in France from 1708, when credit fell, to the end of the war in 1714, were in consequence of rapine and extortion, as in Richlieu's time: and the operations upon them, after the peace of Utrecht, resemble those of Richlieu in some very material circumstances. Such as, *Imo*, That all the debts were then, by an act of power, put a 4 *per cent.* without any regard to the original stipulations. *2do*, That what the Cardinal despaired of accomplishing, the Regent undertook, and

executed, at a great expense to the King, and with great injustice to many individuals.

He established a commission, called the *visa*, to inquire into the unfunded debts, which amounted to 600 millions. His intention was, to discover the effective sums which had been paid for the grounds of debt. The most favorable classes of these debts consisted in arrears of pay to the army, indemnities for pillage, and the like, constituted by notes issued from the office called the *extraordinaires des guerres*, which were diminished $\frac{1}{5}$; the second class was diminished $\frac{2}{5}$; the third class $\frac{3}{5}$; and the last of all, sums due to brokers, usurers, &c. were diminished $\frac{4}{5}$.

But alas! there was not the least shadow of justice in this operation; because long before the *visa* was established, most of the grounds of those debts had circulated from hand to hand, under the greatest discredit: so that the real sufferers were then beyond the reach of the indemnity offered; and the usurers and brokers who had bought them up, were those who made fortunes by them. The Cardinal's plan of paying at the selling price, would have proved, *in this particular case*, more rational, and more according to equity, than any other: so greatly do circumstances influence our decisions in all political matters!

By the *visa*, the 600 millions were reduced to 250 millions, and put at 4 *per cent.* like all the other debts. No plan was proposed at first for paying off the capitals; but a sum was appropriated, though very ill paid, for discharging the interest. We have discussed sufficiently the famous operations of

the Mississippi; by which an attempt was made to throw the whole national debt on the company of the Indies; and we have seen how it succeeded.

The distance, therefore, of Richlieu's time, from Davenant's, occasions very little deception in comparing the principles of French and English credit: and when we come to examine the present state of that question, I am afraid we shall find, in France, enough of the old system still remaining, to verify my observation, that the French have the advantage in paying their debts; the English, in contracting them. Where the balance of advantage may lie, will be the subject of more speculation.

The first essential difference I find between the credit of France and that of England, in the two periods we are considering, relates to the *coin*. In the first, the value of *it* had been very well preserved: no considerable alteration had been made upon *it*, from 1602 to 1636, that the Cardinal raised the denomination of the marc of fine silver, from 22 livres to 27 livres 10 sols, as has been said. Whereas from the revolution, until the establishment of the bank in 1695, the *coin* had suffered in England a debasement from clipping, of near 50 *per cent*. This circumstance, more than any other, affected the credit of England, and increased the expense of King William's war. In Richlieu's time, circulation and trade had made more progress in France than in England at the time Davenant lived. The revenue left by Henry the Fourth was double to that of England at the revolution: and, in general, the

income of the Kings of France had far exceeded that of the Kings of England, for many reigns before that of the great Henry. Borrowing also, upon a fixed and permanent interest, had been known in France so far back as Francis the First.

That Prince was the first, I find who contracted a regular debt, at perpetual interest, upon the town-house of Paris, at about 8 *per cent.* when the legal interest in England, under his contemporary Henry the Eighth, was 10 *per cent.*

The predecessor of Francis, Louis XII had of gross revenue, charged with his debts, which eat up near one half, above 2,500,000 *l.* sterling. Dutot, *Réflex. Pol.* Vol. I. p. 204. Francis I. left to his successor in 1546, a gross revenue of 2,685,314 *l.* sterling, and of nett income 2,287,998 *l.* according to Dutot and M. de Sulli.

Under Henry II. and Francis II. the gross revenue stood at about 2,618,000 *l.* sterling.

Under Charles the IXth, I have not been able to discover any thing which can be relied upon: but his successor Henry III. according to Sulli, had, in 1581, a revenue of 3,250,000 *l.* sterling, and left only about 16 millions of livres of debt, which was no great sum.

To this Henry IV. succeeded; and by the capacity and unwearied application of his great minister M. de Sulli, it was raised to above six millions sterling, at the beginning of the reign of Louis XIII. This revenue, by wars and his expenses, was left greatly incumbered; but still the taxes were established which brought it in; and so early in the reign of his successor

Louis XIV. as the year 1683, his revenue extended to no less than 9,182,914 *l.* sterling, according to Dutot, *Réflex. Pol.* Vol. II. p. 256 *.

Let any man, acquainted in the least with the history of England, examine the fixed revenue there, under Henry VII. and VIII. and Edward, Mary, and Elizabeth, and their successors, down to the revolution; and they will evidently see the great disproportion of wealth, proceeding from taxes, in the one and the other kingdom.

From these facts I conclude, that debts and taxes in France were much more familiarly known in Richlieu's time, than possibly they could be in England when Davenant wrote.

Public credit had long grown up in that kingdom, under the hard influence of regal power: whereas in this it had sprung up lately, under the protection of liberty, and a most limited authority.

To that cause I ascribe the difference we find between the principles of English and French credit; and to an effect similar to the cause I ascribe the gigantic steps by which Britain has outstripped her powerful rival in the establishment of her credit, since the beginning of this century.

It is folly to prophecy, I know; but I may be allowed to conjecture, that the same causes which have raised the credit of this nation to such an amazing height, will either force the French from their old principles, or they will, some time or other, bury her credit in the dust.

* These sums are all converted into sterling, according to the value of the French livre at the different periods here mentioned.

Had one half of the acts of power been exerted with us, which have been so familiar in France: had half the liberties been taken, in tampering with the claims of creditors; a total bankruptcy would long ere now have been the consequence: but in Britain credit is young; and has been tenderly reared. In France she is old, and has been accustomed for many ages to rougher usage. But example works wonderful effects, especially when nations live together in this great European society; and the advantages of a security to be depended on will every day more and more engage the money'd interest to prefer this to any violent and precarious profits.

How nicely does not Davenant employ political arithmetic, in order to make true estimates of the taxes to be imposed, and appropriated for a term of years, for extinguishing principal and interest? How exactly has not the account between the state and the bank been carried on from 1695, to this day? How faithfully have not all parliamentary engagements been observed? When, in 1749, a most natural operation was performed, to reduce the interest of the debt of Great Britain, by gentle steps, from 4 to 3 *per cent.* what an outcry did it not make, although an alternative was left to the creditors, either to receive an actual reimbursement, or to accept of the new terms? The credit of Great Britain must have appeared to France in the light of a pettish child, educated in the house of a too indulgent parent: her own is not treated with such gentleness; and when our money-jobbers try their hand at Paris, and meet with disappointments from unexpected acts of council; to prevent the laugh going against them,

for trusting to the credit of France, they turn it off by a jest, and pretend that they were only playing as at the Groom-Porter's, or in Change-Alley.

In a word, what would totally ruin the credit of England, does not equally affect that of France. An act of power there, no doubt, throws a damp upon it for a time; and if that act of power takes place at a critical juncture, it may cost her very dear; as it has lately cost her the continent of North America; which, I think, was sold for 32 millions, withheld from her creditors, for a short time in the end of 1759. But this act of power, and many others since, have not ruined the credit of France: many trust her still; only those who purchase in her funds, at present, take about 2 *per cent.* off from their interest, as a premium for the insurance of her good faith, until she recovers her mercantile reputation*.

C H A P. V.

Of the present state of public Credit in Great Britain.

WE have, in a preceding chapter, given a general view of the state of public credit in England, at the end of the last century. In this, I shall briefly run through the most remarkable revolutions, both in sentiments and events, which have succeeded since that time.

At the revolution the revenue of England was about two millions sterling, affected by two debts. The first

* Money invested in the French funds, *anno* 1766, will bring the purchaser 6 *per cent.* This I consider as 4 *per cent.* for the interest and 2 *per cent.* premium for the risk; and were she now to borrow any considerable sums, I suppose the insurance would rise in proportion.

was called the bankers debt, contracted by Charles II. and, by letters patent, charged upon his hereditary excise, to the amount of upwards of 1 300 000 *l.* This debt was reduced to one half, in the last years of King William, and put at 6 *per cent* perpetual annuity, to commence from 1706. The other was a debt of 60,000 *l.* due to that Prince's servants, neglected to be paid by his successor, and discharged after the revolution.

At the peace of Ryswick, the national debt amounted to about 20 millions. The branches of taxes subsisting at the revolution, and continued till then, produced no more than about 800,000 *l.*; but by additional taxes laid on in the reign of King William, the whole revenue extended to 3,355 499 *l.* of which above one million was to cease before 1700, as has been said. This reduced the revenue, at the beginning of Queen Anne's reign, to nearly what it had been at the revolution: out of which if we deduct the interest of the national debt then subsisting, and the expence of the civil list, we shall discover the extent of the funds prepared for engaging in the war with France; and then by comparing the state of the nation at her succession, with what it was at her death, we shall form a general notion of the progress of credit, debts and taxes in England during that period.

The revenue of England at the accession of Queen Anne may be stated at about - - - - - £ 2 272 000

The debts subsisting on the 31st of December 1701 were - - - - - £ 6 748 780

Upon which the annual interest was - 566 165

Queen Anne's civil list * : - 600 000

Which two sum amounting to - - - 1 166 165

Being deducted from the revenue there will remain for the current service of the state - 1 105 835

* The Queen got from parliament 700,000 *l.* for her

What the exact amount of the revenue of England was at the death of the Queen, I cannot justly say. But as it may be comprehended under the three general branches of customs, excises, and other inland duties we may form a guess at it, though imperfectly I allow, from the number of articles in each.

At her accession, the customs comprehended fifteen articles; at her death, they amounted to thirty-seven: at her accession, the excises comprehended ten articles; at her death, they amounted to twenty-seven: at her accession, the other inland duties comprehended eight articles; at her death, they amounted to sixteen, including the land tax, then become in a manner perpetual, although laid on from year to year.

At her accession, the public debts amounted (as above) to near seven millions, at her death they exceeded fifty millions.

In fourteen years, from the revolution to her accession, the money granted by parliament, partly raised on the subject, and partly borrowed, or taken credit for, according to the custom of the times, amounted to above fifty-five millions. During the 13 years of Queen Anne, the money granted by parliament raised on the subject, or borrowed as above, amounted to upwards of 80 millions.

By this general sketch I do not mean to enter into exact details: facts must be sought for in books which treat of facts; our chief object is to examine the principles upon which the public credit was supported, let the exact sum of money raised be what it will.

civil list; but she immediately ordered 100,000 l. to be annually paid to the uses of the war.

The expenses of the French war first engaged the nation to revive those taxes which had been suppressed; and to impose many others for a considerable number of years, in proportion to the money borrowed upon them, according to the principles of the former reign.

In 1720, interest was so low, that government got money at 5 *per cent.* It continued so till 1704, when some loans began to be made at 6 *per cent.* and at this rate it stood during the war.

But in 1706, the exigencies of government were far greater than what all the money to be borrowed, or raised on the subject, could supply. This opened a door to the abuse of paying the growing deficiencies upon the taxes with exchequer bills, chargeable on distant funds. These fell constantly to great discount; and the unhappy servants of the state who received them in payment, were obliged to dispose of them to people who could wait for an usurious reimbursement by parliament.

When those exchequer bills had once got into the hands of the monied people, they had interest with government to engage the bank to circulate them at 6 *per cent.* interest: but as the funds upon which they were secured happened at that time, 1706, to be engaged for discharging debts previously contracted, the bank, during that interval, could receive no payment of this interest of 6 *per cent.* so the expedient fallen upon, was to pay the bank compound interest for all the tallies and bills they were to discount, until the funds appropriated, should be relieved

This expedient, bad as it was, and burdensome to the state in the highest degree, proved of infinite service, both in establishing the credit of exchequer bills, and relieving those who received payment in them.

This operation was quite similar to those of banks of circulation upon mortgage. The bank of England was here employed in converting into money exchequer bills, secured upon the faith of government. Banks upon mortgage convert into money the property of individuals, upon private security. Had, therefore, banks upon mortgage been established in England at this time, all those who had property would have got credits from them, and would have been enabled thereby to pay their taxes, and carry on their industry, without diminishing their consumption. The exchequer would then have had no occasion to issue discredited bills and tallies for making up deficiencies; because taxes would have been productive, and the state would have been relieved of this excessive burden of interest at 3 *per cent.*, accumulated quarterly in favor of the bank.

What extraordinary profit must have accrued to the bank by this operation, every one must perceive. They were not here procuring funds to lend at a great expense; all they did was to augment the quantity of their paper upon government security; which they knew well would be suspended in the common circle of payments within the country; and the public borrowings were sufficient to furnish credit for the sums sent out of the country. In this view we may conclude, that almost the whole

accumulated interest paid, was pure profit to the bank, and a great augmentation of the national debt.

This operation of the bank in 1706, did not prevent subsequent deficiencies, in the payment of the navy, army, ordnance, and of many other articles. In 1710, they amounted to above nine millions sterling. This was too great a sum to be borrowed; and the bank durst not venture to discount more than what domestic circulation could suspend: so that after this great debt had circulated upon the discredited obligations which had been issued for it, and in that way had fallen again into the hands of monied people, at 30 and 40 *per cent.* below par, the new proprietors of it were all incorporated into one great company, with a governor and directors, who got 6 *per cent.* for the whole capital, with an allowance of 8000 *l.* a year for charges of management.

Thus all the real creditors for these deficiencies lost the discount; the monied people gained it, and the public paid for all.

When credit is in this languid state, every expense of government rises in proportion to the discredit of the paper with which they pay, till at last the whole sum, with interest, accumulation, and expense falls upon the state, as if every farthing of it had been frugally expended in ready money.

This is a general view of the state of credit in Queen Anne's reign.

Government had not, as in the former war, the inconveniences flowing from the disorder in the

coin to combat with. These contributed more than any other circumstance, to raise the capital of the debts at the peace of Ryswick. Circulation, too, was considerably augmented, in consequence of the increase of taxes, public debts, and the operation of the bank in circulating exchequer bills and tallies. Yet money was still scarce, in comparison of what it might have been, had proper methods been contrived to preserve it upon a level with the occasions for it.

The incorporation, also, of nine millions capital in the hands of a corporation, which afterwards was called the South Sea Company, was an assistance to public credit, by increasing a monied interest, the principal view of which was to fill the government loans, on the lucrative conditions offered for them. And last of all, the strictly adhering to the public faith of engagements, without seeking, by acts of power, to indemnify the state for the losses it had been obliged to incur, from the circumstances of the times, laid the solid basis of national credit for the future.

Although the many additional taxes added to the former revenue, did not increase it in any proportion to the load laid upon the subject during this war, they served, however, as a good foundation for improvement, as soon as the effects of peace restored them to their full production. But the charges laid upon them having become every year greater, government was obliged to engage certain funds for thirty-two years to come, and sometimes longer; and many branches of taxes, which formerly
had

had been granted for short terms, were then made perpetual. After the peace of Utrecht, the expenses of the state were greatly diminished, and money began to regorge: so that in the year 1716, the first foundation of the sinking fund was laid, by opening a subscription for paying off about ten or eleven millions sterling, at that time, charged upon several branches of taxes, the produce of which amounted annually to 724 849 *l.* sterling.

The proprietors of these debts were allowed to subscribe into this new fund, at an interest of 5 *per cent.* redeemable by parliament: and in case the whole subscription should not fill at that rate, the bank and South Sea company became bound to make it up, upon receiving a like annuity in proportion to their subscriptions.

The bankers debt, of which we have spoken, the only public debt owing at the revolution, made part of those which were to be subscribed for.

The taxes which had been appropriated for the discharge of those capitals, from temporary, were made perpetual; with a clause added, that when the surplus of the fund, after payment of interest, had discharged the capitals of all the national debt due the 25th of December in that year, the whole produce of the fund itself should remain at the disposal of parliament.

After this first operation in reducing the interest, the bank was satisfied with a reduction to 5 *per cent.* of that paid to them; and they began to circulate exchequer bills at a more moderate interest than formerly.

Public credit was now daily gaining ground. In 1719, the South Sea company, whose capital was then swelled to eleven millions at 5 *per cent.* with a sum of 9397 *l.* sterling for the expence of management, enlarged their views; and finding great profits to arise from such a fund under one administration, formed a project of acquiring a large sum of the public debts, which remained outstanding upon the original funds appropriated for them.

For this purpose they proposed to government to acquire, 1. The property of above 16 millions of redeemable debts, bearing then 4 and 5 *per cent.* interest; and to reduce the whole to 4 *per cent.* at midsummer 1727. 2. To acquire a sum of 794 000 *l.* of annuities upon lives, and for long terms, as they should agree with the proprietors, at 5 *per cent.* upon the purchase-money, until 1727; and at 4 *per cent.* afterwards. Annuities were then valued at fourteen and twenty years purchase, according to their length: they rose however, during the operation of the South Sea, to 25 and 30 years purchase. 3. They were to have a sum added to their former allowance for the charge of management, in proportion to this augmentation of their stock. 4. That for the advantage which might follow upon this agreement with government, they were to pay into the exchequer above seven millions sterling, toward discharging other national debts outstanding. And in the last place, they engaged to circulate a considerable sum of exchequer bills, and to pay the interest of 2 pence *per cent. per diem*, which should grow upon them during seven years *

* After the long and particular account I have given of the

From the operations we have been describing, we perceive, that the point of view in England, from

Mississippi, I shall not enter into a like detail, concerning a scheme which proceeded upon the very same principles; to wit, the artificial raising the value of a stock, by promising dividends, out of funds which were nowise proportioned to them.

I shall therefore, in a very few words, compare some of the operations of the South Sea scheme, with those of the Mississippi; and in doing it, point out the principal differences between them.

The great profits upon the Mississippi were expected from the interest paid by government for the great loan, the farms of the revenue, and the profits upon their trade.

Those of the South Sea were, at setting out, 1. The profits upon their trade: 2. The allowance made them: 3. The difference of receiving 5 *per cent.* for the money they laid out in purchasing the public debts, when money was at 4 *per cent.* as it was when the scheme was set on foot: and 4. The surplus money subscribed into the stock above par, in consequence of the artifices used to enhance the value of it.

The seven millions they were to pay to the state, seemingly for no value received, were a sort of compensation for receiving the 5 *per cent.* for 7 years, at a time when money was worth no more than 4 *per cent.*

These advantages raised, at first, the value of the original stock of eleven millions. The consequence was, that the proprietors of the 16 millions of the redeemable debts, which were to be bought in when they came to subscribe their capitals into the new stock, transacted them at a proportional discount; which discount, being good against the government in favor of the company, served to discharge proportionally the seven millions the company was to pay. This gave an additional value to the stock; and so it rose, greatly indeed above that proportion. Then the company promised a dividend of 10 *per cent.* for one half year, upon their capital, at midsummer 1720; this dividend was to be paid in stock,

the peace of Utrecht, has always been, to reduce the interest of the national debt; but never to leave

which was constantly rising in its value; but no information was ever given the public concerning the funds which were to produce this dividend; so every one concluded that there were hidden treasures in their hands, which enabled them to promise such large dividends. Accordingly, stock rose from 300 *per cent.* to 375; then to 400, and at last to 1000 *per cent.*; and in proportion as it rose: the wealth of the former subscribers augmented from the surplus above par, paid by the latter, and those who subscribed last, bore all the loss upon the blowing up of the scheme.

But one great difference between the South Sea and Mississippi, was this: That in France there was abundance of money in the hands of the public, for purchasing the actions, at the exorbitant price to which they rose; but in England there was not: consequently, in France, the rate of interest fell to 2 *per cent.* and in England, the great demand for money to borrow, raised it beyond all bounds.

Those who subscribed in money, paid down no more than 10 *per cent.* at subscribing; but became bound to pay up the remainder. But when the stock tumbled, people were better pleased to lose the 10 *per cent.* they had paid, than to pay up the remaining 90 *per cent.* according to the terms at subscribing. Those indeed who subscribed their former capitals at a vast discount, did not labor under the same inconvenience of want of money; but that discount became as real a loss to *them*, as the cash subscribed became a loss to the money subscribers, the moment that those who were in the secret, and who, by the most infamous chain of artifices, had blown up the public frenzy, began to realize and sell out, and that the whole was discovered to be a cheat. So that upon the whole, the English scheme had much less foundation than the French. The first blew up from an absolute necessity, and for want of any bottom at all; the last from misconduct, and rather from folly than knavery. I return to an account of the scheme.

in the hands of the creditors, any part of the savings made, in order to diminish the capital. These

The original capital of the South Sea company, was 11 750 000 *l.*: the redeemable debts they were to purchase in, amounted to 16 750 000 *l.*; and the value of the irredeemable, or what were called the *absolute terms*, was computed at 15 058 000 *l.* together 31 808 000 *l.* sterling.

The proprietors of this original capital of 11 750 000 *l.* consulted their own advantage only, in purchasing in this large sum of debts, which were to be converted into additional stock; and therefore founded very high the great advantages of such a transformation of them; *imo*, From the profits of the trade, which they were to enjoy exclusively. And *2do*, From the great addition to their wealth, from the constant rising in the price of their stock. They carried their views to nothing less than obtaining a majority in the house of commons, by the weight of their wealth, and of becoming the absolute rulers of the nation.

The public being from the beginning intoxicated with such ideas, subscriptions for stock were opened at 200 *per cent.* above par; and some of the proprietors of the 31 808 000 *l.* subscribed at first their capitals at a proportional discount; that is, they made over a debt of 100 *l.* for $33 \frac{1}{3}$ in South Sea stock; and successively, the subscription rose to 1000 *per cent.* These immense profits being incorporated into the gains of the general stock, were proportionally shared by the subscribers themselves, who became proprietors; and the higher the stock rose, the more these gains augmented. This influenced the infatuation; and the dividends augmenting in proportion to the price of subscription, there appeared no end of the rising of the stock.

The first dividend offered, as has been said, was 10 *per cent.* half-yearly, in stock: this was afterwards converted into no less than 30 *per cent.* in money, for that half-year: and when stock rose to 1000, a dividend of no less than 50 *per cent. per annum*, in money, was promised for twelve years to come.

savings have constantly been thrown into a sinking fund, *supposed* to be intended for extinguishing the capital; and were it employed for that purpose for a few years only, and not diverted to other uses, I am persuaded the consequence would be, to reduce interest in England lower than ever perhaps it has been seen in any nation. That interest may be reduced, by making money regorge in the hands of the lenders, is, I think, an uncontroverted principle: that by regorging in France, *anno* 1720, it reduced interest to 2 *per cent.* is a fact indisputable. I shall not pretend to say positively, that the total

Had stock risen to 2000 *per cent.* the dividend could have as easily been carried to 100 *per cent. per annum*, as it had been to 50 *per cent.* when at 1000.

But whence was this dividend to be paid? The company and the directors took good care never to give to the public any light as to that particular.

To prevent, therefore, such abuses in the rising of the South Sea, it ought to have been provided by parliament, that in taking in subscriptions, and offering dividends, the directors should have informed the public, 1^{mo}, Of the money owing to them by government. 2^{do}, Of the money gained by the subscriptions above par. And 3^{tio}, Of the profits upon their trade. And, on the other hand, of the debts due by them; and of the nett balance upon their books, in their favor.

This would have been fair dealing. But to pretend the necessity of secrecy, in a point where a nation is interested, was in itself a mere pretext; and had it been otherwise, it might have been answered, that a company which is obliged to have recourse to such secrets, ought to be prevented from dealing with those who were to remain ignorant of *them*, however deeply interested.

appropriation of the sinking fund, and augmentation upon annual grants, to make up the void, would in Great Britain work this effect in a few years; but I think it is very probable that it would: and if the domestic creditors, in any state, where debts, *due to strangers*, are swelled to such a height as to exceed the whole profits made upon trade, shall by their influence, and from a motive of present advantage, obstruct a scheme of this nature; the consequence will prove, in the first place, to discourage, and then totally to extinguish commerce, and in a little time to occasion an unavoidable bankruptcy; as shall be farther explained in a succeeding chapter. I return to the South Sea company.

The proposal of the South Sea company, mentioned above, was accepted of, and ratified by act of parliament, 6 Geo. I. chap. 4th. But the disaster which befel credit, in consequence of the ambitious views of those who were in the administration of that company, prevented the nation from reaping all the advantages which might have proceeded from it.

The reign of K. George I. though little disturbed by foreign wars, produced not the smallest diminution upon the capital of the public debts; and those which subsisted at the peace of Utrecht, stood, at his death, at 50 354 953 $\text{\textsterling}$. The same taxes subsisted; and every one almost was by this time made perpetual, except indeed the land tax and malt duty, which to this day continue to be annual grants.

But alas! this apparent revenue, arising from a multitude of taxes, was of no use towards defraying

the smallest *extraordinary* expense of government. Every article of it was engaged for debts; and the operations for reducing the interest were calculated only to produce a fund for discharging the capital. The civil list, indeed, that is to say, the expense of civil government, exclusive of army, navy, ordnance, and incidental articles, was paid from the permanent taxes, and considered as a charge upon them. But were not armies and navies then become as regular an expense upon every state in Europe as judges and ambassadors? Undoubtedly they were. Yet after the peace of Utrecht, in laying down the plan which has constantly been followed ever since, for defraying the regular expense of British government, these two great and unavoidable expenses were considered as contingent only, and provided for by annual grants: and because armies, in time of peace, in former reigns, had proved dangerous to liberty from the abuse of power, they were still considered in the same light, at a time when liberty and trade were continually threatened from their armed enemies and rivals abroad.

When the continuance of peace, in the reign of George the First, had produced the effect of reducing interest, on many occasions, to 3 *per cent.* the sinking fund began to gather strength. The land tax, from the year 1722, had not exceeded two shillings in the pound; and the *extraordinary* expense of government, according to the annual grants of the 13 years of his reign, did not exceed 34 800 000 *l.* or 2 670 000 *l.* a year.

Public tranquillity was very little disturbed during

the first twelve years of the succeeding reign; and all the *extraordinary* expense did not much exceed three millions *per annum*: yet that expense, small as it was, compared with what it has been since, was almost every year made out, by taking one million at least from the sinking fund; and in the years of the least expense, such as 1731 and 1732, the land tax was reduced to one shilling in the pound, at the expense of taking two millions and a half from the sinking fund.

These steps of administration I neither censure, or approve of. I must suppose every statesman to have good reasons for doing what he does, unless I can discover that his motives are bad. May not the landed interest, who composed the parliament, have insisted upon such a diminution of their load? May not the proprietors of the public debts have insisted on their side, that no money out of the sinking fund should be thrown into their hands, while the bank was making loans upon the land and malt duties at 3 *per cent.*? Might not the people have been averse to an augmentation of taxes? When three such considerable interests concur in a scheme, which in its ultimate, though distant consequences, must end in the notable prejudice of perpetuating the debts, although opportunities offer to diminish them, what can government do? They must submit; and which is worse, they cannot well avow their reasons.

Such combinations must occur, and frequently too, in every state loaded with debts, where the body of the people, the land-lords, and the cre-

ditors, find an advantage in the non-payment of the national debt. It is for this reason that I imagine, the best way to obviate the bad consequences of so strong an influence in parliament, would be, to appropriate the amount of all sinking funds in such a manner, as to put it out of a nation's power to misapply them, and by this force them either to retrench their extraordinary expenses, or to impose taxes for defraying them.

The second period of George II's reign, was from the breaking out of the Spanish war in 1739, to the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. During these ten years, (1748 being included) the extraordinary expense was, upon an average, very near seven millions; and at the end of the year 1738, the public debts amounted to 46 661 767 *l.* bearing 1 962 053 *l.* interest.

The first expedient for borrowing money during the war, was to continue the duty on salt for seven years; and to mortgage it at once for 1 200 000 *l.* according to the old plan. To this was added, the expedient of lotteries, and loans upon indeterminate annuities, according to the current value of money.

An additional excise upon spirituous liquors, brought in where-withal to compensate these additional sums of interest; and the East India company, for lending one million at 3 *per cent.* upon this occasion, had their charter continued from 1766 to 1780. This operation I also consider as an anticipation; and as it was to commence at the distance of 23 years from the time of the grant, could not

fail of being very burdensome to the nation, however convenient it might be at that particular time.

Were the India company now, 1766, to purchase the renewal of their charter for 14 years, what a sum might be expected from it! Yet the value given for the grant they then obtained did not exceed 30 000 *l.* because the other annuities of 3 *per cent.* were sold at that time for 97 *l.* or, in the language of the funds, at 3 *l.* premium for every 100 *l.* subscribed; and this so early in the war as 1743.

The practice of borrowing upon premiums had taken place in Queen Anne's reign, and has of late years been very common. The credit of Great Britain is so firmly established, that in whatever way government inclines to borrow, the money'd men are willing to lend, provided the loan be made at the then rate of interest.

To avoid therefore the establishment of funds at different rates, in proportion to the fluctuations of money, the bargain is made at one determinate interest. Suppose, for an example, 3 *per cent.* Then, according as it is found to rise above that rate in the market, a premium is paid out of the money subscribed; as in this case 3*l.* was paid out of the 100 *l.* subscribed; that is, the subscriber retained it, and obtained his 3 *l.* annuity, for the payment of 97 *l.* so this remained a 3 *per cent.* loan, instead of being, as it really was, at 3 $\frac{9}{97}$ *per cent.* and was sold and transferred as every other 3 *per cent.* without occasioning any perplexity.

As the war continued, interest rose, from the demand for money, when the supplies became deficient.

The year following, viz. 1744, this manifested itself, by the conditions offered by government, which were: That, of two millions to be borrowed at 3 *per cent.* as before, upon the whole sum, 1500 000 *l.* should be formed into perpetual annuities, and the remaining 500 000 *l.* into a lottery, consisting of 500,000 tickets, to be sold at 10 *l.* each. The original subscribers to this loan subscribed therefore 10 *l.* for the ticket, and 30 *l.* for the annuity, in all 40 *l.*; for which they were to receive 3 *per cent.* But the premium consisted in this, that every subscriber for 10 tickets, that is, 400 *l.* of the total fund, had an annuity for life given to him of 4 *l.* 10 *s.*

This made five thousand annuities, 4 *l.* 10 *s.* each, or 22 500 *l.* a year to be added to the interest of 31 *per cent.* on the two millions, that is, to 60 000 *l.* a year of perpetual annuities. So that the whole loan of two millions this year cost government 82 500 *l.* of interest, or $4\frac{1}{8}$ *per cent.*; 22 500 *l.* of which was to extinguish with the lives of the subscribers.

Now, if we suppose these life-annuities worth 20 years purchase*, this was the same thing as if

* This may seem a high valuation, and is, in fact, far beyond what any of those annuities sold for: but as the interest of money cannot be estimated, for a constancy, at more than 3 *per cent.* and that probably the best lives were chosen, the value to government of such annuities may well be estimated at 20 years purchase. By De Moivre's tables, annuities for the most favorable ages, interest being at 3 *per cent.* are valued at 19 87 years purchase; and his valuations are generally allowed not to be too high.

government had given a deduction of 90 *l.* out of the 400 *l.* subscribed; consequently the remainder, which was 310 *l.* produced 12 *l.* This makes the rate of interest upon the loan to have been 3. 87 *per cent.* And as government inclined that the loan should be made in that way, the lenders were willing that it should be so; and the difference between 3. 87 *per cent.* (the then rate of money) and 4 1/8 interest, which was paid by government, was a sinking fund, as it were, for the gradual extinction of the capital of the lottery for 500,000 *l.* during the lives of the annuitants.

In 1746, perpetual or indeterminate annuities were constituted at 4 *per cent.* and the premium upon the ten lottery tickets was raised to 9 *l.* life-annuity.

It would be unnecessary to trace the various methods of contriving the premiums given in the succeeding years of this war. The principle upon which they were regulated was always to proportion them to the rate of interest at the time; and the motive was, I suppose, that by this method of borrowing, a part at least of the debt would become extinguished with the lives of the subscribers. There might perhaps be another, to wit, that by swelling the capital, for value not received, there was an appearance of borrowing at a lower rate of interest than what in reality was the case. Thus in 1747, when 6 300 000 *l.* were borrowed, instead of giving not quite 4 1/2 *per cent.* for this sum, they gave 4 *per cent.* upon 6 930 000 *l.* which capital, although money should return to 3 *per cent.* was still to stand

at its full value ; whereas , had 6 300 000 *l.* been borrowed at 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.* there would have been a saving of 600 000 *l.* upon the capital; and at the peace, the interest of 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.* would equally have come down to 3 *per cent.* with the other funds.

During this first war of George the Second, the land tax was constantly at 4 *s.* in the pound ; and new branches of customs, excise, or other inland duties, were created in proportion to the swelling of the national debts, which, on the 31st of December 1748, amounted to 78 293 313 *l.* sterling, bearing 3 005 325 *l.* interest; and the sinking fund, or surplus of all permanent taxes then imposed, after paying the civil list, and the interest upon this capital, amounted to 1 060 948 *l.* sterling. During this war, the debts were increased above what they were at the end of 1738, by 31 631 546 *l.* sterling capital, and by 1 043 272 *l.* of interest or annuities.

The war was no sooner over, and the national expense diminished, than money began to regorge in the hands of the monied interest: an infallible consequence of such a violent revolution; when extraneous circumstances, such as occurred after the peace 1763, do not prevent it.

To profit of this conjuncture, government, early in 1749, proposed that all the public creditors upon capitals bearing 4 *per cent.* interest, redeemable by parliament, and amounting to upwards of 57 millions, who should accept of 3 *per cent.* from December 1757, should have their debts made irredeemable until that time ; and in the interval should continue to have 4 *per cent.* till December 1750; and 3 $\frac{1}{2}$

per cent. from thence, until the total reduction to 3 *per cent.* in December 1757.

This bold undertaking had the desired effect. Many obstacles were thrown in the way; but the regorging capitals in the hands of many, made every one fear the reimbursement for himself; and the credit of France was then so low, that very few chose its funds as an outlet for their superfluous money.

But an outlet, unfortunately, was not wanting at the end of the last war in 1763, as we shall show in its proper place.

Here then is a notable instance of the effects of regorging money. A small sum, when compared with a nation's debt, operates upon the whole capital; as a small balance upon the trade affects the whole mass of reciprocal payments.

The reimbursement of 57 millions offered by government, in 1749, was, to the conviction of all the world, an impracticable scheme; but the stockholders seeing a large sum ready to be subscribed, at the interest offered, and feeling the effects which that regorging money must, in all events, have produced, willingly, and wisely perhaps, consented to the offer made them. Had they refused, and had the scheme proposed become abortive thereby, perhaps the nation might have been so far animated against the creditors, from the disappointment, as to have consented to be at the expense of defraying the service of the following years, without encroaching upon the sinking fund. What effect this would have produced upon the rate of interest, in that conjuncture, no man can

tell, nor will the real consequence of such a measure ever be known, until the happy trial be made. That it would have brought interest below 3 *per cent.* in December 1757, is, I think, evident: for as matters stood, had the creditors of 57 millions been able to hold out, I must do them the justice to believe, they would not have consented to the proposal made to them; and an addition of all the sinking fund thrown among them annually, at a time they could not dispose of what they had, upon better terms than those offered them, would undoubtedly then, as at all times, operate a very great national relief, in bringing down the interest.

During the tranquillity which continued from the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, to the commencement of hostilities in 1755, the money expended for extraordinary services amounted on an average to above four millions *per annum*. The expense of government was then increased, by supporting the colonies, and by several great and uncommon outgoings at home, for purposes mentioned in the supplies of those years.

A little before the breaking out of the last war, that is to say, on the 5th of January 1755, the national funded debt was reduced to 72 289 674 *l.* upon which was paid an annuity of 2 654 500 *l.* and the sinking fund amounted to 1 308 814 *l.**. At the end of 1763. the year of the peace, the

* To this funded debt must be added the unfunded debt, which I do not know exactly; and the value of the annuities granted in 1745, and 1746.

funded debt amounted to 130 586 789 *l.* 10 *s.* besides above 9 millions not provided for. So that at the end of last war the national debt exceeded 140 millions; besides the value of the annuities granted in 1757, 1761, and 1762. Hence it appears, that the war occasioned an augmentation of upwards of 58 297 116 *l.* upon the funded national debt; besides the difference between the unfunded debts at the beginning and end of the war; and also the value of those annuities*.

I shall, before I conclude this chapter, present a short scheme of the state of the nation at that time: but first let us take a view of the methods used to borrow so large a sum in the short period of eight years.

Until 1757, money was borrowed by government, at a little above 3 *per cent.* but then a loan of 5 millions being necessary, government consented to create annuities of 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.* irredeemable for 24 years. By this expedient the monied people eluded the operation of reducing the interest of this fund, upon the return of peace. How far this expedient was to be preferred to the former, of increasing the capital beyond the money paid; or whether it would not have been still better to have paid for the money wanted, according to the current rate of interest

* The annuities of 1757, are estimated, by the author of the *Considerations on Trade and the Finances*, at 472 500 *l.* or at 14 years purchase; and the annuities of 1761, 1762, at 6826 875 *l.* or at 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ years purchase. But this valuation seems too low, for the reasons given in the note, p. 60.

in the market at the time, waiting until a peace might afford a favorable opportunity of reducing it, I shall not take upon me to determine.

I have observed how rash it is for any one to censure acts of administration, when the motives of a statesman's conduct are unknown. This, however, I have sometimes ventured to do, in speaking of things which happened many years ago; but we ought to be more cautious as we come nearer to our own times, because not having, as in this case, a course of experience to point out the errors, we must entirely rely upon our own sagacity, and reason only from analogy.

During the last war, as in that preceding it, taxes were increased in proportion to the interest of the money borrowed, and new impositions, were now laid on the articles of great consumption, which produced abundantly. The new malt-duty of 3 *d.* *per* bushel, and the new beer-duty of 3 *s.* *per* barrel, bring in net into the exchequer near 820 000 *l.* *per annum*, and discharge the interest of above 27 millions sterling, at 3 *per cent.* Such a sum raised at the end of a war so very expensive, and at the very time when the credit of France was totally fallen, must have operated in the strongest manner, and did in fact operate more, perhaps, than any other consideration to put an end to that war, the most glorious that Europe has beheld since the beginning of this century, or perhaps in any age whatever: advantageous to Great Britain, notwithstanding all the expense, providing that the consequences happen to correspond to what may be reasonably expected.

I shall now set before my reader a short state of the taxes, debts, and public funds of Great Britain, at this bright period of her history.

From the best authority I have been able to procure, the revenue of the state, considered under the three general branches of customs, excise, and other inland duties, which comprehend the whole permanent income of this kingdom, was then as follows:

Customs net into the exchequer, about	-	-	£ 2 000 000
Excise in all its permanent branches net about	-	-	4 600 000
Other inland duties net	-	-	1 000 000
Land tax at 4 s. in the pound	-	-	2 000 000
Annual malt tax net	-	-	613 000
In all	-	-	<u>10 213 000</u>

Let us next state the annual charges and appropriations settled upon this fund.

First then the civil list, to the amount of	£ 800 000
2do, The interest of about 131 millions of funded debts at different rates of interest, about	4 500 000
3tio, The interest of nine millions not then provided for, supposed to be at 4 per cent.	<u>360 000</u>
In all of regular and permanent annual charge	5 660 000
So there remains free, about	<u>4 553 000</u>
From which if we deduct the annual grants of land and malt-taxes, which extend together, as above, to	<u>2 613 000</u>
There will remain as the produce of the sinking fund*	1 940 000

* I find that the sinking fund is now estimated at 2 100 000 l. by the author of the Considerations on Trade, &c. above cited. I am also informed that the net produce of the customs exceeds 2 000 000 l. considerably: but 4 600 000 l. is rather the gross than the net produce of the *permanent* duties of excise; that is, of all the excise duties, excepting the annual malt-duty. It must also be observed, that the annuities payable to the national creditors, amounted, the 5th

In that state, nearly, stood the affairs of Great Britain after the conclusion of the peace in 1763.

It now only remains to offer some conjectures why, after this period money was not found to re-gorge, as after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, so as to furnish an opportunity of reducing the rate of interest upon all redeemable debts, and by that of raising the amount of the sinking fund, and more firmly establishing the national credit.

After the fall of the credit of France towards the end of 1759, Great Britain had the command of all the money to be lent in Europe; and accordingly amazing sums were borrowed in 1760, 1761, and 1762. Of the sums borrowed, a great part, no doubt, was the property of strangers; but they, not being so well acquainted with the affairs of this nation as the English themselves, instead of subscribing to the loans, lent the money to our own country people, who, in hopes of a great rise upon the return of peace, filled the subscriptions with borrowed money.

The consequence was, that no sooner did the funds begin to rise after the peace, than every creditor demanded his money of those who had invested it in the public funds. This obliged the latter to bring their stock to market, and this again had naturally the effect of keeping the funds very low.

January 1764, to more than 4 720 000 £. But on the other hand, the interest of the unfunded 9 millions is rated too high, as appears from the author above quoted. I cannot pretend to give exact details. The general sketch here stated is sufficient for my purpose.

Some, more prudent than the rest, had borrowed upon a long term of repayment; which had the effect of putting off still longer the settlement of the funds in the hands of the real proprietors, and of taking them out of those who only held them nominally.

Besides this accidental cause of the low price of the funds, other circumstances, no doubt, greatly contributed to produce the same effect.

However great the balance of trade, that is, of exportations above importations, may have been of late in favor of England, still the mighty sums drawn out by strangers have certainly, upon the whole, prevented much money from coming home on the general or grand balance of payments. While that remains the case, it is impossible money should regorge at home in the hands of the natives, and until this happens, there is no hope of seeing the 3 *per cents.* above par. But then the rise, small as it is, since the peace, may encourage us to hope that that time is not far off: for had the profits of our trade been quite unable to balance the loss upon our foreign debts, the funds would undoubtedly still continue to fall, which is demonstrably not the case from the circumstances of the loan in April 1766, obtained by government, with the assistance of a lottery indeed, at 3 *per cent.* *

* The loan of 1766, was 1 500 000 *l.* at 3 *per cent.* Every subscriber for 100 *l.* had an annuity of 3 *per cent.* on 60 *l.* and 4 lottery tickets, valued to them by government at 10 *l.* each, in all 100 *l.* The prizes and blanks in the lottery amount to 600 000 *l.* and bear 3 *per cent.* paid by

Here then was an outlet provided for more money than all that could regorge at home, viz. the pay-

government. The annuities amount to 900 000 *l.* and bear also 3 *per cent.* The number of tickets are 60 000. Hence, at 10 *l.* each, they amount to 600 000 *l.*

The advantage government reaps by this way of borrowing, is, that the desire of gaming, raises the lottery tickets above their value, when thrown into the hands of the public; and this advanced value being a profit to those who receive them in part of their subscription, that profit they share with government. Example. In April 1766, when government borrowed 1 500 000 *l.* at 3 *per cent.* the 3 *per cents.* were only at 89: consequently, the difference between 89 and 100, which is 11 *l.* must have been supposed to be the sum which the subscribers, from the propensity of people to game, had a reasonable, or rather a certain expectation of gaining upon the sale of 4 lottery tickets, that is, 2 *l.* 15 *s.* upon every one.

To know therefore the real par of a lottery ticket, you must proceed thus: it costs the subscribers 10 *l.* for which they receive from government 3 *per cent.* This 10 *l.* at 3 *per cents.* stood at 89, is worth at that rate no more than 8 *l.* 18 *s.* add to this sum what the public must pay for the liberty to play, which we have stated above at 2 *l.* 15 *s.* and you have the exact par of a lottery ticket at 11 *l.* 13 *s.*

Whatever they sell at above 11 *l.* 13 *s.* is profit to the subscribers, whatever they sell below 11 *l.* 13 *s.* is a loss to them.

This profit, though small in appearance, is greatly increased from another circumstance, viz.

That the subscribers may sell their subscriptions at a time when they have really advanced but a small part of it. The first payment is commonly of 15 *per cent.* on their subscription: when they sell, they make this profit upon the whole capital. Suppose then 15 *per cent.* paid in: if the profit upon selling be no more than 1 *per cent.* upon the capital, that 1 *per cent.* turns out no less than 6 $\frac{2}{3}$ *per cent.* upon the money they have advanced. Thus a person who is possessed of 1500 *l.*

ment of those foreign creditors, to whom the stockholders were indebted. Besides this, the sale by government, of such tracts of land in the new acquired islands in the West Indies, [provided another; money was even placed in the funds of France soon after the peace, until the adventurers were checked by the operations of the King's council, in reducing both capitals and interest upon them, contrary to the original stipulations with the creditors. A lucky circumstance for Great Britain, as it forces, in a manner, all the money of the continent into the English funds, which equally remain a debt upon the nation, whether high or low in the market.

only, may subscribe for 10 000 *l.* in this loan: he pays in his 1500 *l.* and receives his subscription; when he sells, he sells 10 000 *l.* subscription, upon which he gains 1 *per cent.*: 1 *per cent.* of 10 000 *l.* is 100 *l.* so (in one month suppose) he gains by this means 100 *l.* for the use of 1500 *l.* But as a counterbalance for this profit, he runs the risk of the falling of the subscription, which involves him in a proportional loss if he sells out; or in the inconvenience of advancing more money than he had to employ in that way, in case he should prefer keeping his subscription for a longer time, in hopes of a rise in the public funds. By this mode of borrowing, government profits by the disposition of the people to game. But this propensity has its bounds, and at present it is found by experience not to exceed 60 000 lottery tickets, or 600 000 *l.* Were, therefore, a subscription of 3 millions taken in upon the same plan with the present of 1 500 000 *l.* the regorging number of tickets would so glut the market, that the whole would fall below the par of their supposed value.

C H A P. VI.

*State of the public Credit in France, their Debts, Funds,
and Appropriations, at the Peace 1763.*

WERE it as easy to get information of the political state of France as of Britain, one might attempt to give such a sketch of their affairs as we have now done of the other; but when we consider the lame accounts given by French authors who have made researches of that kind their particular study, it would be inconsiderate in a stranger ever to undertake a task so difficult.

In France, the finances are considered as a political arcanum, of great consequence to the state to conceal from vulgar eyes. It is not long ago, since the farmers of the greatest part of the revenue used regularly to burn their books at the end of the year, to prevent the King's servants from knowing the state of the most essential part of his affairs. Cardinal de Fleuri abolished this custom, and obliged them to lay every thing open to his eyes.

I shall now endeavour to communicate, in as short and distinct a manner as I can, an idea of the present state of the French revenue; of the taxes from which it proceeds; of the manner they are admi-

nistered; of the purposes to which they are appropriated; and of the state of the King's debts at the end of the last war.

From this view we shall form a general notion of their public expenses; of their public debts; and of what is most material, of the resources of that Kingdom in time to come.

For this purpose, I shall divide the whole revenue of France, that is all that is raised on the people, to, whatever purpose it may be applied, into five branches; and after having first explained the nature of each, I shall give a general detail of them in their order.

The first branch is what is called the King's ordinary revenue. This is composed of about twelve articles of permanent taxes, supposed to be sufficient for defraying the whole expense of government, civil and military, in time of peace.

The second is composed of all the extraordinary impositions which were laid upon the people, in consequence of debts contracted in the former war, ended in 1748.

The third, what was imposed during the last war, for the service of the state, and for paying off the debts then contracted.

The debts of France, contracted in periods anterior to those two wars, are charged on the ordinary revenue, as we shall presently see.

The fourth branch consists of two articles. The first comprehends certain perpetual taxes appropriated for certain state expenses, not charged upon the ordinary revenue. The second, what is com-

puted to be the expense of levying all the taxes, and also the profit of the farmers: or in other words, what the people pay more than the public receives from the hands of the tax-gatherers.

The fifth and last branch, comprehends the taxes paid to the court of Rome, to the clergy, and to the poor; with other duties belonging to private persons. Under one or other of these five branches, may be very properly arranged all the taxes paid by the French nation.

First general branch.

The King's ordinary revenue, with the charges upon it for the year 1761.

Articles of revenue.	Fr. money.		Sterling ditto.		
	livres.		l.	s.	d.
1. Domain (the King's landed estate)	6 000 000	266 666	13	4	
2. Taille (the land-tax) -	56 600 000	2 515 555	11	1	1/2
3. Double capitation (the poll-tax)	53 200 000	2 364 444	8	10	1/2
4. Ditto upon such as have civil employments, pensions, &c.	6 700 000	297 777	15	6	1/2
5. 2s. in the pound on all civil employments.	6 800 000	302 222	4	5	1/2
Carry over	129 300 000	5 746 666	13	3	1/2

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.		
Brought over - - -	129 300 000	5 746 666	13 3	1/2
6. The mint, or coinage - - -	2 400 000	106 666	13 4	
7. Décimes and capitation of the clergy - - - -	12 400 000	551 111	2 2	1/2
8. Free gifts from the states of Burgundy, Provence, Langue- doc, and Brittany - - -	10 000 000	444 444	8 10	1/2
9. Paulette, or annual tax upon hereditary offices - - -	2 600 000	115 555	11 1	1/4
10. Tax on the Lutheran clergy of Alsace - - - -	200 000	8 888	17 9	1/4
11. Regale, or the sovereign's right on ecclesiastical benefices	1 400 000	62 222	4 5	1/4
12. General farms - - - -	112 500 000	5 000 000	—	—
Total of the ordinary revenue	270 800 000	12 035 555	11 *	1 1/4
Of this total the general farms amount liv. l. s. d.	to 112 500 000 5 000 000 — —			
And the other branches	to 158 300 000 7 035 555 11 1 1/4			
The farms were increased anno 1762 by - - - -	11 500 000	511 111	2 2	1/2
Total ordinary revenue at the end of the war - - - }	282 300 000	12 546 666	13 4	
Articles of Expense.				
Household of the King and royal family - - - -	9 400 000	417 777	15 6	1/2
Ditto. their personal expense -	4 600 000	204 444	8 10	1/2
Carry over	14 000 000	622 222	4 5	

* These reductions of French money to sterling, are computed at the rate of 22 1/2 livres to the pound sterling. Hence 270 800 000 livres make 42 035 555 l. 11 s. and 1 1/3 d. sterling, or nearly 1 1/4 d. as stated, though the amount of partial sums differs by 1 d.

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. ds		
Brought over - -	14 000 000	622 222	4	5
King's stables and stud - -	2 500 000	111 111	2	21/2
Hunting equipages - -	1 600 000	71 111	2	21/2
Alms - - - -	600 000	26 666	13	4
Pay of the palace guards, (<i>gardes de la porte</i>) &c. - -	3 300 000	146 666	13	4
King's buildings - -	6 600 000	293 333	6	8
Total expense of the court -	28 600 000	1 271 111	2	2
Pay of all the household troops -	8 000 000	355 555	11	11/4
Pay of all the other troops of France - - - -	48 000 000	2 133 333	6	8
Fortifications - - - -	6 000 000	266 666	13	4
Artillery for land service - -	6 600 000	293 333	6	8
Military gratifications, over and above the pay - - -	10 000 000	444 444	8	10 1/2
Pay of general officers command- ing in provinces and fortresses	2 000 000	88 888	17	9 1/4
Pay, &c. of the <i>maréchaussée</i>	2 200 000	97 777	15	6 1/2
Expense of prisoners of state	1 200 000	53 333	6	8
Ordinary expense of the navy	25 000 000	1 111 111	2	2 1/2
Total regular military expense } by land and sea - - -	109 000 000	4 844 444	8	10
Royal pensions - - - -	9 000 000	400 000	—	—
The appointments of the King's ministers - - - -	310 000	13 777	15	6 1/2
Carry over	9 310 000	413 777	15	6 1/2

Fr. money.	Sterling ditto.		
livres.	l.	s.	d.

Brought over -	9 310 000	413 777	15	6 1/2
Ditto of the first presidents of all the parliaments in France, ex- pense of criminal prosecutions, and many other articles of that sort	22 000 000	977 777	15	6 1/2
Appointments of the venal em- ployments, of the robe, treasu- rers, receivers, comptrollers, &c.	10 000 000	444 444	8	10 1/2
Bridges, highways, dikes, &c.	4 000 000	177 777	15	6 1/2
For the royal academies - -	1 400 000	62 222	4	5 1/4
To the King's library and archives of France - - - -	1 800 000	80 000	---	---
Extraordinary and casual expense upon the two last articles -	400 000	17 777	15	6 1/2
For lighting and cleaning the city of Paris - - - -	840 000	37 333	6	8
Appointments of the secretary of the cabinet council, for couriers, and other expense - -	1 400 000	62 222	4	5 1/4
Ditto of ministers at foreign courts	1 800 000	80 000	---	---
Total sum of this branch - -	52 950 000	2 353 333	6	8
Interest at 2 1/2 per cent. upon 990 000 000 liv. or 44 000 000 l. sterl. of the late King's debts, constituted after the bankruptcy 1720 - - - -	24 750 000	1 100 000	---	---
Interest at 2 1/2, upon 94 millions due to the company of the Indies, upon their old accompts 1720	2 350 000	104 444	8	10 1/2
Carry over	27 100 000	1 204 444	8	10 1/2

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.		
Brought over -	27 100 000	1 204 444	8	10 1/2
Farther allowed to the company, for paying their dividends	2 400 000	106 666	13	4
Annuities on lives constituted during the last war - -	16 000 000	711 111	2	2 1/2
Total interest of debts - -	45 500 000	2 022 222	4	5

This article of 16 millions of annuities on lives is the only charge cast upon the King's ordinary revenue, in consequence of the last war.

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.		
Recapitulation of the expenses				
Expense of the court - -	28 600 000	1 271 111	2	2 1/2
Fixed military ditto, by sea and land - - - -	109 000 000	4 844 444	8	10 1/2
Justice, pensions, &c. - -	52 950 000	2 353 333	6	8
Interest of debts - - -	45 500 000	2 022 222	4	5 1/4
Total expense - - - -	236 050 000	10 491 111	2	2 1/2
Total ordinary revenue at the end of the war - - - -	282 300 000	12 546 666	13	4
The first deducted from the latter, Remains free - -	46 250 000	2 055 555	11	1 1/2

Besides the articles of expense here stated, there are many others, to which no limit can be set. The *comptant*, or the King's private orders for secret service, and many different expenses, form a great article. Subsidies also to foreign courts: in short,

much more , in all human probability , is spent , than all the produce of this permanent revenue can answer. So that from this no relief from debts can be expected , except so far as it may be augmented by the falling in of the annuities on lives. But public debts are to be paid only by funds appropriated for that purpose : and were this revenue to be relieved of the whole 45 millions of interest charged upon it , I have little doubt but the King's expense would augment in proportion.

I shall delay making any observation upon the nature of the impositions which produce this revenue , until we come to the subject of taxes , to which it naturally belongs.

Besides this ordinary revenue of the Kings of France , which (if we except 26 600 000 livres , or 1 182 222 l. 4 s. 5 1/4 d. upon the capitation , added on account of the war only for a time) may be considered as their civil list ; there are other branches of revenue , which are to be looked on as extraordinary supplies , imposed for raising money in time of war , and for paying off the debts contracted , upon the return of peace. Of this nature are *dixièmes* and *vingtièmes* ; taxes very contrary to the spirit of the French nation , and to which they never have submitted without the greatest reluctance , and only on very urgent occasions.

The credit of France fell very low towards the end of the former war , which began in 1744 , and ended in 1748. The parliament registered with great unwillingness every edict imposing new burdens. The *dixième* was a great augmentation of revenue ,

for the time it lasted ; but being an imposition which the Kings of France never have been able to make perpetual, it could not be pledged for such large sums as are required in time of war, and which no nation, however wealthy, can furnish annually, as they are demanded.

To supply, therefore, the want of a fund to be mortgaged, and consequently the want of public credit, the King's banker, M. de Monmartel, with other men in business, joined their credit, and supplied the King's extraordinary occasions. They opened a sort of bank *anno* 1745, where they received money at $1\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent. per month*, the principal payable on demand. This fund gained credit; payments being regularly made as soon as demanded.

Upon settling accounts after the peace, *anno* 1748, the King was found indebted to this bank for a vast sum of money. In order to pay it, lotteries were set on foot. The tickets were given to the bankers, and they by the sale of them withdrew their own paper, which was circulating with very good credit on the exchange of Paris. In order to furnish a fund for this lottery, the King had interest with the parliament to get a twentieth penny established, or one shilling in the pound, upon all the revenues of private people in France, except the clergy, and some hospitals. The same was charged upon the industry of all corporations of trades and merchants; and to these was added a capitation upon the Jews.

This was thrown into what they call the *caisse d'amortissement*,

d'amortissement, or sinking fund; and appropriated for paying off the lotteries, and some of the ancient debts which were to be drawn, for this purpose, by lot; and for other extraordinary expenses incurred in consequence of the war. This tax was to subsist, I believe, till 1767. It was this *caisse d'amortissement* which was shut up in 1759, by which step a mortal blow was given to French credit.

Besides this first twentieth penny, there were five other taxes imposed, and appropriated during a determinate number of years, not exceeding 15 in some, 12 in others, for paying off the debts contracted in the war ended 1748, and for some extraordinary expenses of government.

These shall be specified in the following general view of this branch of the French revenue.

Second general branch.

Extraordinary taxes established after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, with their appropriations.

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.		
The first twentieth penny on all income - - - -	23 800 000	1057 777	15	6 1/2
Ditto upon tradesmen and mer- chants incorporated - -	6 500 000	288 888	17	9 1/4
Ditto upon the Jews - -	1 400 000	62 222	4	5 1/4
Total of the twentieth penny, which formed a sinking fund, shut up in 1759 - - -	31 700 000	1408 888	17	9 1/4
The farm of the posts and <i>relais</i> of France - - - -	6 000 000	266 666	13	4
Two shillings in the pound of the capitation added to it - -	5 520 000	245 333	6	8
The farm of stamp-duties on lea- ther, and duties on tanners bark - - - -	2 960 000	131 555	11	1 1/4
The farm of duties upon gun- powder and saltpetre - -	2 988 000	132 800	----	----
Two shillings in the pound of the twentieth penny added - -	3 170 000	140 888	17	9 1/4
Total of this second branch of French taxes - - - -	52 338 000	2 326 133	6	8

Appropriations of this fund, as
follows:

1. For paying, during 10 years, a
part of the 990 millions, of

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.		
livres, of old Annuities, charged above on the King's ordinary revenue, and bearing an interest of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. the yearly sum of - - -	5 000 000	222 222	4	$5\frac{1}{4}$
2. To the India Company, in discharge of a debt due to them : for 12 years - - -	2 000 000	88 888	17	$9\frac{1}{4}$
3. For paying the prizes of the bankers lotteries every year as they are drawn : for 12 years	3 800 000	168 888	17	$9\frac{1}{4}$
4. Towards making good deficiencies upon the funds appropriated for the war, yearly, till paid - - -	18 700 000	831 111	2	$2\frac{1}{2}$
5. Ditto upon the funds appropriated to the new <i>Ecole militaire</i>	1 200 000	53 333	6	8
6. For payment of perpetual annuities created during last war	14 500 000	644 444	8	$10\frac{1}{2}$
7. For making good deficiencies upon the artillery and magazines, during the war 1744 : for 12 years, the annual sum of - - -	1 800 000	80 000	---	---
8. Ditto upon the article of foreign affairs - - -	8 690 000	386 222	4	$5\frac{1}{4}$
Total appropriation - -	55 690 000	2 475 111	2	$2\frac{1}{2}$

This branch of revenue appears, by this state, to be totally appropriated to certain purposes.

Were appropriations, adhered to in France, and could one be certain that debts are actually discharged, at the period appointed, in consequence of the appropriation for that purpose, we might form a better judgment of the *actual* amount of the debts of France, than in fact any man can do who is not in the administration.

Of this second branch of taxes I consider the twentieth penny, the two shillings in the pound augmentation upon it, and a like augmentation upon the double capitation; amounting in all to above 40 millions a year, as a resource which France may have at all times, in cases of necessity; although I do not suppose it will be possible to establish them as a fixed revenue. They will probably, however, as matters stand, be continued, either in whole or in part, until the great load of debts, recently contracted, shall be considerably diminished.

As for the remaining sum, arising from the posts, leather, and saltpetre, these I consider as perpetual; because by their nature they are not burdensome to the people.

We are not to understand that the annual sum of five millions of livres, appropriated for paying off the capital of 990 millions of the old annuities, bearing $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. stated in art 1st, was intended to be applied to these capitals, at the rate they stand. In France it is supposed that he who gets 20 years purchase of the interest of his debt, is always fairly paid off; and people there are so fond of reimbursements, even at this rate of making

them, that when, about the year 1755, a like scheme of paying off those old annuities was suggested, it was upon condition that every one having, for instance, an annuity of 100 livres, should, in order to be entitled to this reimbursement, pay to the King 20 years purchase of it, or 2000 livres ready money; and that being complied with, his contract was to be put into the lottery wheel, with all the rest subscribed for, and if it happened to be drawn, he was to receive 4000 livres; to wit, the 2000 he had paid down, and the other 2000 as the value of a capital of 4000 livres, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

This every body must allow procures a wonderful facility in paying off debts. If the English creditors could be engaged to enter into the spirit of such reimbursements, government, I am persuaded, would not apply so closely as they do, to reduce the interest upon them; whereby a great distress comes upon poor widows and orphans, who have their all vested in the funds. This inconvenience is avoided in France: the poor are cherished by the comfort of high interest; the state is set free; and the creditors rejoice in getting back their money, in any shape whatever.

The war of 1756 breaking out, obliged the King to think of every expedient to increase his income. Had he set out by borrowing upon annuities for lives, at 10 per cent. and by mortgaging his ordinary revenue for the payment of them, his credit would have been more solid, and the plan of running in debt more systematical: but in the end, it would have involved him in the terrible dilemma of either

making a bankruptcy, in order to reinstate himself in the possession of his ordinary revenue, or of making him depend more than he inclined upon his parliament; whose authority is absolutely necessary for laying a perpetual and regular imposition, which alone can form a solid basis of national credit.

He was therefore resolved, in one way or other, to increase the impositions on the people in the time of war, in order to avoid the consequences he foresaw from the loss of his fixed revenue.

The King's ministers at this time could not convince the parliament of Paris, that in order to borrow money upon the best terms, it was necessary to have a sure fund for paying the interest of it.

It had been usual to borrow money, on pressing occasions, from the farmers of the revenue, bankers, and financiers, as they are called, at 7 and even 10 *per cent.* They understanding the chain of the affairs of France, used to obtain credit both abroad and at home, from people who would not lend directly to the King; although they knew at the time of the loan that the money was borrowed for his use. The reason was, that the King was under an absolute necessity to keep faith with this set of men, upon whom the credit of France has depended for many ages: and as the profits they used to make were very great, ministers knew, by a sort of instinct, when they had gained enough; and in clearing their accounts in the usual way, a sufficiency was left to them, to repay what they had borrowed from others.

Perhaps the parliament thought, and perhaps with reason, that in the main it was cheaper to borrow in this way, at 10 *per cent.* than in the English way, at 3 *per cent.* because of the great facility in paying off the debts which attended it; but this is only a conjecture. That there was however a contrast of sentiments between the parliament, and the ministers of the finances at that time, who had contracted English ideas of credit, is most undoubted; and it was this contrast which brought on the bankruptcy in 1759, when the sinking fund was shut up against the creditors by an act of power. To judge of the sentiments of both parties with candor, let us then examine the plan of borrowing proposed by the one, and by the other.

The minister, M. de Silhouette, proposed to the King, to levy, as a solid fund of credit to borrow upon, a general subvention, as it was called, over all France; or in other words, to make the reparation of a large annual payment, over all the cities, towns, villages, and suburbs in France.

This was to be divided according to the supposed wealth and quantity of circulation every where. Every district was ordered to report to the King's council their opinion concerning the particular mode of raising their proportional part of it, in the best way relative to their situation. This report the council was to examine, and to approve or amend the proposal given in, according to information.

This was perhaps the best plan of taxation, if properly executed, that ever has been thought of, for a nation already under a regular administration

of government, and accustomed to pay considerable impositions.

It removes the inconvenience attending all general taxes, which never fail to affect unequally different places and districts. It admits of a prudent mixture of excises, with taxes upon possessions, according to the internal circumstances of every place. It confines them to towns, where alone all excises at least can be levied with propriety. It lightens the oppression of tax-gatherers; because the corporation may employ whom they will for that purpose. In a word, it is a tax administered with all the advantages of a farm.

This tax, the general subvention, after it had been imposed by edict, registered in a Bed of justice September 1756, fell to the ground, from the nature of the French constitution; because it could not be levied without a systematic administration, supported by the authority of the courts of law, to which the parliament would not give their concurrence, for a very plain reason.

The general subvention being very extensive, and calculated for a fund of credit to borrow upon, was, by its nature, of a species proper to become a perpetual tax, as all excises are. The parliament of Paris seemed to think it agreeable to the constitution, which they are sworn to maintain, to preserve at all times in their hands a certain power over the King's purse, in order to prevent an extravagant minister from impoverishing the King and the kingdom at once, or running them into the inextricable confusion of an infallible bankruptcy.

This circumspection of the parliament was represented in another light at court; and odious parallels were drawn between what had happened in England about the middle of the last century, and what soon might be expected in France.

Upon such topics every one judges as he is affected. The minister was railed at by the parliament-party, in the most virulent manner. Who was in the right, and who was in the wrong, upon the general question, of the propriety of raising so large an imposition, to serve as a fund of credit, under a government like that of France, I shall not here examine. But that a solid fund should be provided, in one way or other, proportional to the actual deficiency of the annual supplies, and to what could not be raised within the year, for the uses of the war, was, I think, entirely agreeable to principles.

This the minister had proposed in the subvention, though perhaps the plan was too great; and the parliament, when they rejected the proposal, sensible that the exigencies of the state demanded a supply of money, proposed in their turn, as an equivalent for the general subvention, to coin for 600 millions of notes, which were to have the sanction of parliament for their fund of payment; but no provision was made for the ready circulation of them in the interim.

Here then is an example where the sentiments of the French nation were divided upon the principles of public credit. And this affords a good opportunity of reconciling them, and of confirming the doctrine we have been endeavouring to establish.

The minister felt the disadvantage of the King's borrowing upon a lame security ; he therefore proposed a solid and permanent fund of credit for performing the obligations to be contracted with the creditors.

The parliament, on the other hand, examined the situation of the people, who, they thought, were no longer in a capacity to pay the taxes already imposed ; and therefore concluded, that it was unnecessary to establish any new one. They therefore proposed to augment circulation, by providing a means whereby alienations might be carried on, and by that they expected to render the taxes already imposed more productive.

Both parties were in the right, as commonly is the case in such disputes ; but they did not perceive how their opinions could be reconciled.

Had circulation been facilitated by the establishment of a bank upon true principles, perhaps the taxes already imposed, might have produced a sufficient fund for carrying on the war, without the expedient of the general subvention.

But the manner proposed by the parliament to increase circulation, by paying with paper money, and not providing a fund for realizing it when it came to stagnate, was an expedient entirely delusive. The paper would soon have fallen to a great discount : the remembrance of the Mississippi would probably have been revived, which would have occasioned the locking up of the coin ; and the kingdom might have been involved in the greatest distress and bankruptcy.

The minister should therefore have concurred with the parliament in a scheme for establishing a bank: the King might safely have intrusted the administration of it to parliament, and even have supplied coin from the royal treasury for circulating the paper. But the minister, I suppose, took it for granted, that taxes *would* be paid, providing they were imposed; and the parliament, that the paper *would* circulate, providing it was issued.

The reasonings I have ascribed to each party in this dispute, are not founded upon information: they are only natural conjectures which I form from the opposition of sentiments between men who were all, I suppose, well acquainted with the situation of France, and who respectively took part according to the combinations which occurred to them.

The remonstrances of parliament at that time were filled with an enumeration of distresses, all of which are the necessary effects of a scanty circulation. In the King's edicts there is strong reasoning upon the principles of public credit. The candor I feel in my breast, while I examine the merits of this important dispute, will I hope serve as an apology for all mistakes in point of exact information.

The result upon the whole was what might have been expected. The subvention was dropt, and the proposal of the paper was rejected by the King.

The middle term adopted by the parties, showed however, I think, that in the main the minister had been in the right; because the taxes were increased and paid: had the paper been issued

the success, I am persuaded, would not have been favorable in proportion.

But instead of a permanent subvention, a tax of the most odious nature was established, which, from this very circumstance, there was little danger of seeing long continued.

In the preceding year, a second twentieth penny upon possessions had been imposed, to which had been added 2 shillings in the pound of the tax itself; a new poll-tax upon certain classes of the people in proportion to the number of their servants; an additional duty upon the stamps upon silver and gold plate; higher duties on foreign manufactures imported; and 20 *per cent.* on all former duties on consumption. The second twentieth was to continue until two years after the peace; the other duties for eight years longer.

Notwithstanding this heavy load already laid upon property, the parliament, rather than consent to the subvention, agreed to impose a third twentieth penny upon possessions; and to render this tax more productive, additional poll-taxes upon place-men, &c. were comprehended in that edict. Thus ended the dispute: the minister was dismissed, and the edict for the general subvention was withdrawn.

Besides the second and third twentieth penny, several augmentations of revenue were obtained during the last war, which I shall presently mention, two of which, for their peculiarity, I shall briefly explain.

The clergy of France, strongly pressed by the

King, supported by his parliaments, to give in a declaration of their income, in order to be taxed at so many shillings in the pound, like other subjects, after many evasions, at last succeeded in disappointing the scheme. They offered an extraordinary free gift equivalent to the two twentieths, to be paid annually until 1765, and this was accepted.

The ordinary free gift of the clergy is at the rate of a million and a half of livres a year; this they doubled and paid at the rate of three millions a year, which we may consider as two shillings in the pound of all the clergy possess in France, which makes their revenue to be about thirty millions a year, and I believe it does not far exceed it.

The other branch of revenue is something analogous to a circumstance in the history of English taxes: it was called an extraordinary free gift to be paid by every corporation in France. Charles I. had a very exact valuation put upon all England, when he proposed to levy ship-money. This was found so correct that it served for a basis to regulate the distribution of the sum of 100 000 *l.* a year paid to Charles II. for his courts of wards and liveries*.

In like manner the King of France had a very accurate estimate made of all France, when he formed his edict for a general subvention, which had pretty much the fate of the ship-money. And though the parliament refused their consent to the great subvention, they agreed to establish the epitome of it in August 1759: which see in the note†.

* Davenant's Ways and Means, Article of Monthly Assessments.

† This free gift was imposed upon all cities, towns, burrows,

This tax small as it is, may be of infinite consequence in times to come. The great difficulty of raising taxes is in the beginning, and if the levying of this trifle in every city, town, village, and suburb, in France, be carefully conducted, with a view to subsequent augmentations, and it if be properly distributed upon every branch of consumption and revenue, nothing will be so easy to the King as, by his own private authority, to enforce a gradual augmentation of it, and perhaps in time to absorb in it, the whole, or at least the greatest part of the revenue of his kingdom.

Besides the two twentieths, and the free gift of the cities several other taxes of less moment were either

villages, and suburbs, in France. And those lying within the jurisdiction of every Intendant were joined in one sum, leaving the repartition of them to those magistrates, as the custom is.

For the generality of Amiens	-	153 300
For the generality of Orleans	-	356 000
For the generality of Paris	-	1 578 000
For the generality of Chalons	-	200 900
For the generality of Poitiers	-	265 200
For the generality of Soissons	-	60 700
For the generality of Tours	-	34 434
For the generality of Rochelle-		131 800
For the generality of Bourges	-	105 600
For the generality of Moulin	-	91 770
For the generality of Riom	-	165 628
For the generality of Lyons	-	397 454
For the generality of Artois	-	150 000

Sterling.

Sum Total	-	-	-	-	3 690 786	£ 164 034 18	8
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The duties imposed by this arret are to be levied upon all classes of the people, nobility, commons, clergy, even nuns and monks; no exception is made except in favor of hospitals for their own consumption only.

imposed, renewed, or continued for a longer term, and then sold for raising money for the service of the year, viz.

1mo, Five years of the free gift of the clergy of France, amounting to 15 millions, were paid down at once by that body.

2do, That of the clergy of Alsace, paid in the same way, for the same term, produced 3 millions.

3tio, A duty on firewood, &c. in the city of Paris, valued at 3 400 000 a year, sold for 7 years, for 10 millions.

4to, Another duty upon the consumption of eggs, butter, &c. valued at 2 400 000, sold for 15 years for above 30 millions.

5to, A like sum got from the farmers general, for allowing them to raise the price of their tobacco 10 *per cent.* for 10 years. The annual amount of this I do not know.

6to, And in the last place, the third twentieth penny, which produced 36 270 000 a year, was sold, for the two years for which it was imposed, for 60 millions.

Thus, of all the impositions raised during the last war, the second twentieth, and an epitome of the subvention raised in all cities, towns, villages, and suburbs, in France, remain unalienated.

In order to throw all the light I possibly can upon the present state of that nation, I shall next briefly recapitulate the extent of the annual supplies raised for the service of the different years of the war, from 1756 to 1762 inclusive; in which I shall point out, as well as I can how this third branch of revenue was appropriated.

It is in this manner only I can communicate to

the reader what I can guess concerning the present state of that nation. Could we know, as with us, the amount of taxes, and outstanding debts at every period, that detail would be unnecessary.

The extraordinary grants of 1756, amounted to 121 millions, 5 377 777 *l.* sterling.

In October 1755, the farms of almost all the taxes were renewed. Upon such occasions, it is usual for the farmers to advance sums in proportion to the extent of their farms, for security of the lease; for which advances the King, at that time, allowed them an interest out of their yearly farm-rent of 5 *per cent.* and the sums advanced were appropriated for the service of the year 1756. Here follow the sums advanced upon the several farms.

	Fr. money livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.		
1. Upon the general farms, after repaying what had been advanced upon the former lease, nett into the royal treasure -	40 000 000	1 777 777	15	6 1/2
2. Upon the farm of the posts of France - - - -	3 000 000	1 333 333	6	8
3. Upon the farm of the stamps upon leather - - -	1 000 000	44 444	8	10 1/2
4. Upon the farm of the <i>paulette</i> - - - -	1 000 000	44 444	8	10 1/2
5. Upon the farm of duties on gun-powder and salt-petre -	1 000 000	44 444	8	10 1/2
6. The farm of the market of Poissi was sold for seven years, for - - - - -	15 000 000	666 666	13	4
This sum was the price of the total alienation of the duties col-				
Carry over -	61 000 000	2 711 111	2	2


Fr. money.	Sterling ditto.		
livres.	l.	s.	d.

Brought over -	61 000 000	2711111	2	2
lected in that market for the whole time; which duties should be marked as a branch of revenue; but as the annual amount of them cannot be ascertained, it is here thrown in as an extraordinary means of supply arising from the sale of a tax.				
7. Besides those casual supplies from the new farms, there was levied this year, for the sale of five years revenue of the free gift of the clergy of France, to 1761 exclusive - - -	15 000 000	666 666	13	4
8. And for that of Alsace - - -	3 000 000	133 333	6	8
9. Raised by a lottery, for which the annual sum of 3 800 000 was set apart for 11 years - - -	32 000 000	1 422 222	4	5 1/4
10. And for the sale of the duties upon firewood, &c. in Paris, for 7 years - - - -	10 000 000	444 444	8	10 1/2
Total extraordinary supplies for 1756 - - - - }	121 000 000	5 377 777	15	5 3/4

The supplies for 1757, amounted to 136 millions, £ 6 044 444 sterl.

1. Two lotteries, for which were appropriated, for the first, 3 800 000 during 12 years; and

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.
for the second, 4 000 000 during 11 years. These sums were an- nually to be drawn, and paid every year; for which was paid to the King, for the first, 36 mil- lions; for the second, 40 mil- lions; together - - -	76 000 000	3 377 777 15 6 1/2
2. The ordinary revenue was charged with 6 millions of life annuities, at 10 <i>per cent.</i> sold for	60 000 000	2 666 666 13 4
	136 000 000	6 044 444 8 10 1/2
The supplies for 1758, amounted to 135 millions, £6 000 000 sterl.		
1. The first was a loan of 40 mil- lions, upon a perpetual annuity of 5 <i>per cent.</i> proposed to be paid off by way of lottery, at the rate of 3 200 000 yearly - - -	40 000 000	1 777 777 15 6 1/2
2. The King obliged those who have hereditary offices propor- tionally to purchase additional salaries, to the extent of 1 mil- lion a year, at the rate of 20 years purchase, or forfeit what they had - - - -	20 000 000	888 888 17 9 1/4
3. The additional 10 <i>per cent.</i> upon the price of tobacco, was sold this year to the farmers, for -	30 000 000	1 333 333 6 8
Carry over -	90 000 000	3 999 999 19 11 3/4



Fr. money. Sterling ditto.

livres. l. s. d.

Brought over -

90 000 000 3 999 999 19 11 3/4

4. The ordinary revenue was charged with 3 600 000 livres, life-annuities, upon two lives, at 8 *per cent.*; sold for the sum of - - - - -

45 000 000 2 000 000 - -

135 000 000 5 999 999 19 11 3/4

The supplies for 1759, amounted to upwards of 194 millions, £ 8 652 923 sterl.

1. The first supply for this year was the epitome of the general subvention, called an extraordinary free gift from all the cities, towns, burghs, villages, and suburbs in France - - -

3690 786 164 034 18 8

2. 3 600 000 livres of perpetual annuities, borrowed upon the general farms, at 5 *per cent.* until reimbursement, sold for -

72 000 000 3 200 000 - - -

These are called the contracts upon the farms; each one thousand livres capital.

3. The free gift of the clergy, for five years from 1761 inclusive, sold at once for - - -

16 000 000 711 111 2 2 1/2

4. The second twentieth penny produced for this year - - -

35 000 000 1 555 555 11 11 1/4

Carry over -

126 690 786 5 630 701 11 11 3/4

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.		
Brought over - -	126 690 786	5 630 701	11	11 3/4
5. Sold to the magistrates and heads of colleges in some towns in Flanders, some branches of their own taxes, for - -	8 000 000	355 555	11	11 1/4
6. The ordinary revenue was charged with 3 millions of annuities, called <i>tontines</i> , sold for	60 000 000	2 666 666	13	4
	194 690 786	8 652 923	16	5
The supplies for 1760, amounted to above 251 millions, £111 864 30 sterling.				
1. The Paris-duties above mentioned sold for 15 years -	30 283 900	1 345 951	2	2 1/2
2. The 3d shilling in the pound fold for two years, for - -	72 340 000	3 215 111	2	2 1/2
3. The 2d shilling produced this year - - - - -	35 000 000	1 555 555	11	11 1/4
4. Raised by perpetual annuities, at 3 <i>per cent.</i> secured on the King's ordinary revenue * -	60 000 000	2 666 666	11	4
Carry over -	197 623 900	8 783 284	8	10 1/4

* When the bad consequences of shutting up the sinking fund were discovered, the King opened subscriptions, such as were the *tontines* of the last year, this of 60 millions, and one the next year of 30 millions; in which the discredited paper was received, in part payment of the sum. This I suppose is the reason why the supplies of 1759 and 1760 appear so high, and also why money appears to have been borrowed at so low a rate as 5 *per cent.* upon *tontines*, and 3 *per cent.* on article 4th of this year; because the interest of that part

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	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.		
Brought over -	197623900	8783284	8	10 1/4
5. The free gift of the cities, &c.	3690787	164034	19	6 1/2
6. By a lottery at 5 per cent. where the discredited paper (the pay- ment of which was stopt, when the sinking fund was shut up in 1759) was taken in payment for one half, was raised - -	50000000	2222222	4	5 1/4
7. Borrowed from the officers of the town house of Paris, at 5 per cent. secured on the ordinary re- venue - - - - -	380000	16888	17	9 1/4
	251694687	11186430	10	7 1/4

The supplies for 1761, exceeded
120 millions, £ 5 364 034 sterl.

1. Charged upon the ordinary re- venue, 200 000 livres a year upon lives and other annuities, at 10 per cent. in favor of the order of the Holy Ghost, sold for	2000000	88888	17	9 1/4
2. Borrowed on the duties upon leather, at 3 per cent. - -	30000000	1333333	6	8

These were the annuities which
were ordered to be

Carry over	32000000	1422222	4	5 1/4
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only which was paid in specie is stated; not the interest upon the
discredited paper subscribed, which was paid out of the first twentieth.

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.		
Brought over -	32 000 000	1422222	4	5 1/4
reimbursed after the peace of 1763, at 20 years pur- chase; and which, I sup- pose, had been subscribed for, partly, in discredited paper.				
3. Charged on the ordinary reve- nue, 4 millions a year, for an- nuities at 8 per cent. upon two lives, sold for - - -	50 000 000	2222222	4	5 1/4
	82 000 000	3644444	8	10 1/2
4. Besides these sums, there was the amount of the 2d twentieth, and the small subvention, or free gift, which continued to be applied to the current service, as they had not been sold off; inde - - - - -	38690787	1719590	10	8
Total -	120 690 787	5364034	19	6 1/2
The supplies for 1762, exceeded 159 millions, £ 7 076 923 sterl.				
1. The farms which had been lett in 1755, came to be again re- newed this year; from which arose a sum for the security of them, of - - - - -	83 200 000	3697777	15	6 1/2
Carry over -	83 200 000	3697777	15	6 1/2

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.
Brought over -	83 200 000	3 697 777 15 6 1/2
2. There was no borrowing this last year of the war. The se- cond twentieth, which never had been fold ; the third twentieth, which this year became free, as it was imposed a-new for two years more ; and the little free gift by all the towns of France; made together an additional sum of - - - - -	76 030 787	3 379 146 1 9 1/4
	<u>159 230 787</u>	<u>7 076 923 17 4 3/4</u>

Recapitulation of the expence of the seven years of the war. *

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterl. ditto. l.
For 1756 - - - - -	121 000 000	5 377 778
For 1757 - - - - -	136 000 000	6 044 444
For 1758 - - - - -	135 000 000	6 000 000
For 1759 - - - - -	194 690 786	8 652 924
For 1760 - - - - -	251 694 687	11 186 431
For 1761 - - - - -	120 690 787	5 364 034
For 1762 - - - - -	159 230 787	7 076 924
Total - - - - -	<u>1 118 307 047</u>	<u>49 702 535</u>

Having gathered together, from the best information I can, the amount of all the extraordinary supplies raised in France, for the service of the last war, let us suppose, that at the peace, no part of

* The Sterling money, in this recapitulation, is reduced to the nearest integer neglecting fractions of a pound.

any capitals borrowed had been paid off, according to the plan laid down for that purpose at the time of contracting. Let us suppose, I say, that all the lottery funds and life-annuities, as well as those annuities which were intended to be paid off by way of lottery, stood at their full extent, without diminution, at the peace, and then calculate what sum of debt should have remained upon France in consequence of the war.

As for the sums raised, either upon renewing the farms of the revenue, the amount of new taxes imposed, or such branches of them as were sold at once for a sum of money, they remain no debt upon the King; and are therefore to be considered (as they really were) extraordinary resources drawn from the people, without any recourse to credit or borrowing.

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.		
These sums collected from the above supplies, and laid toge- ther, amount to - - -	520 926 948	23	152	308 16 -
Let us then state the whole of the supplies as above - -	1 118 307 047	49	702	535 - -
And from thence deduct the ex- traordinary resources drawn from the people, as above, to wit - - - - -	520 926 947	23	152	308 16 -
There will remain a capital of borrowed money - - }	597 380 100	26	550	226 4 -
Of this the life-annuities (char- ged upon the ordinary revenue) form a capital of - - -	217 000 000	96	444 444	8 10 1/2
The lotteries form a capital of -	108 000 000	4	800 000	--- ---
Carry over	325 000 000	14	444 444	8 10 1/2

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.
Brought over - - -	325 000 000	14 444 444 8 10 1/2
And the perpetual annuities, a capital of - - -	272 380 100	12 105 781 15 6 1/2
In all, as above - - -	597 380 100	26 550 226 4 5

Let us next see the amount of annual payments for discharging either the capital or the interest.

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.
For the life-annuities until extinguished, paid out of the ordinary revenue - - -	16 200 000	720 000 --- ---
To discharge the lottery fund, in 12 years at most - - -	11 600 000	515 555 11 11 1/4
Suppose the perpetual annuities all at 5 per cent. ; inde - -	13 619 000	605 288 17 9 1/4
Annual sum of interest - - -	41 419 000	1 840 844 8 10 1/2

Let me now draw up a state of the taxes raised for defraying the expenses of this war. In that I shall only comprehend such articles as existed at the peace, unfold: as for the other, we may consider them only as expedients for raising money for the current service; but which, in time to come, may serve to augment the revenue.

Third general branch.

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling l.	ditto s.	ditto d.
1. The 2d twentieth, never alienated - - - - -	35 000 000	1 555 555	11	1 1/4
2. The 3d twentieth, imposed for the years 1762 and 1763, not alienated - - - - -	30 000 000	1 333 333	6	8
3. The free gift of the cities, towns, &c. never alienated -	3 690 786	164 034	18	8
	68 690 787	3 052 923	16	5 1/4

Let me now proceed to the fourth general branch of taxes, or of money raised upon the people of France: *1mo*, To the profit of the farmers: *2do*, Towards defraying the expense of collecting the three foregoing branches of revenue, which amount to about 403 millions: And *3tio*, To pay what is appropriated to certain purposes within the country, here to be specified.

Fourth general branch.

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling l.	ditto s.	ditto d.
1. First then, the net profits of all the farmers of the revenue are calculated to amount to about -	17 240 000	766 222	4	5 1/4
2. The expense of levying all the revenue is calculated to amount to about 10 per cent. of the whole; <i>inde</i> - - - - -	40 300 000	1 791 111	2	2 1/2
3. There is a revenue appropriated for keeping up the water-works at all the royal palaces - -	1 200 000	53 333	6	8
Carry over -	58 740 000	2 610 666	13	3 3/4

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.		
Brought over	58 740 000	2 610 666	13	3 3/4
And to the invalids, St. Cir, and the <i>hôtel militaire</i> - - -	7 300 000	324 444	8	10 1/2
There are taxes imposed for clothing the militia, to the a- mount of - - -	3 800 000	168 888	17	9 1/4
All the towns in France have par- ticular branches of taxes appro- priated to themselves, for pave- ment, buildings, &c. and for maintaining the police; which amounts to - - -	15 000 000	666 666	13	4
And the duties levied in the courts of law for sentence money, emo- luments to the judges (<i>épices</i>), and expense of registrations, the vast sum of - - -	27 000 000	1 200 000	---	---
	111 840 000	4 970 666	13	3 1/2

Formerly, all the officers of the courts of justice had salaries paid out of the King's revenue. These were insensibly diminished in every reign, and those court-fees were augmented in order to fill up the void; from which the greatest oppression ensues.

If to the sum in this last article we add 22 millions above stated as a charge upon the ordinary revenue for salaries to first presidents, &c. and other expenses of the law, we shall find that the article of justice alone costs near 50 millions of livres, a year, to the public. The greatest part of this sum should be considered as the interest of money borrowed by the Kings of France, the capitals whereof are still outstanding; and if the capitals were paid off, a great augmentation of income would arise from it. But the bad

footing upon which their credit stands, renders even this burden expedient on some occasions; because the King can oblige all those who have such hereditary offices, to lend money upon an augmentation of their salaries.

To conclude this enormous catalogue of taxes paid by the Kingdom of France, we must not omit the last branch, which comprehends the heads following:

Fifth general branch.

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.		
1. What is paid for bulls, dispensations, baptisms and burials, to the pope, bishops and inferior clergy, very near - - -	10 000 000	444 444	8	10 1/2
2. For the support of hospitals, a sort of poors rates - - -	11 500 000	511 111	2	2 1/2
3. To branches of impositions, of various kinds, belonging to private people, peers of France, governors of provinces, and officers of all the royal jurisdictions within the kingdom - - -	20 000 000	888 888	17	9 1/4
	41 500 000	1 844 444	8	10 1/4

General recapitulation of all the money raised in France by public authority, for whatever purpose employed.

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.		
1. The King's ordinary revenue as it stood at the peace 1762 -	282 300 000	12 546 666	13	4
2. The extraordinary revenue raised at the peace 1748 - - -	52 338 000	2 326 133	6	8
Carry over -	334 638 000	14 872 800	0	0

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.		
Brought over -	334 638 000	14 872 800	0	0
3. The extraordinary revenue raised on account of last war, and for the payment of debts then con- tracted, not sold at the peace	68 690 787	3 052 923	14	4
4. The expense of raising the taxes, and emoluments of the farmers, with other branches perpetually appropriated for defraying re- gular expenses - - -	111 840 000	4 970 666	13	4
5. Taxes paid to the church, poor, and private persons - -	41 500 000	1 844 444	8	10 1/2
Sum total raised annually in France	556 668 787	24 740 834	19	6 1/2

Charges, or appropriations of it.

1. Charges upon the ordinary re- venue <i>per list</i> above - -	236 050 000	10 491 111	2	2 1/2
2. Ditto upon the second general branch <i>per ditto</i> - - -	55 690 000	2 475 111	2	2 1/2
3. Ditto upon the third general branch for lotteries and perpetual annuities constituted during the war: the life-annuities being already charged in article 1st	25 219 000	1 120 844	8	10 1/2
4. Ditto upon the fourth general branch totally exhausted <i>inde</i>	111 840 000	4 970 666	13	4
5. Ditto upon the fifth general branch ditto - - -	41 500 000	1 844 444	8	10
Carry over -	470 299 000	20 902 177	15	6

	Fr. money. livres.	Sterling ditto. l. s. d.		
Brought over	470 299 000	20	902 177	15 6
There remains (unappropriated) for all extraordinary expenses of state, which completes the sum total of what is raised in France	86 369 787	3	838 657	4 ---
	556 668 787	24	740 834	29 6

In this light does the state of the French affairs appear, from the sketch I have been able to give of it.

Had the sum of 86 millions, remaining as unappropriated at the peace, been any way sufficient for paying off claims which have not appeared upon the state we have given, and for all extraordinary expenses, the credit of France would not have been so low as it then was, and still continues to be.

The expense of a Kingdom must constantly exceed the amount of all regular and permanent income.

At the end of a war what great sums of debts unprovided for are constantly found! Taxes also, when stretched as they were, and imposed in so great a proportion upon possessions, in respect of what was raised upon consumption, must always diminish in their produce; but the expense and charges never fall short. This is more especially the case in a country where paper credit is not established.

The constant complaints for want of money to carry on circulation in the time of war, is a proof of it. When peace returns, and money is kept at

home, then all taxes are readily paid in France, and half the burden of them is not felt, although they be more productive than before.

As I said in setting out, I do not pretend that the account I have given of this dark affair, is in any degree so correct as to satisfy a French minister; but it is a rough sketch, which contains the general state of their affairs; and if it be worth any man's while, who is better informéd, he may correct it, and thereby bring on a farther inquiry into the true state of the question.

What interest a nation, which is not in an actual state of bankruptcy, can have in concealing its affairs, I cannot find out. How much more then is it not the interest of a mighty kingdom, which possesses such amazing resources, to expose its situation in a fair light to the world, to which it must, upon all occasions, have recourse for assistance in point of credit?

Of the many branches which compose this great national revenue of above 550 millions, there are several articles which must of necessity be cut off, so soon as the debts are brought into a regular form. The double poll-tax is most oppressive on the poorer sort, and therefore was imposed only for a time: the three twentieths, as they are levied, are no less so upon the higher classes of the people.

These four articles amount, however, to 116 millions. If we deduct this from the revenue, as we have stated the account of it, it will not only exhaust the balance of 86 millions, but it will create a deficiency, upon the whole, of 30 millions, which

can only be compensated by discharging a corresponding part of the burden of debts, while those branches do subsist.

But then the same resources are open upon every new emergency; and as they have now begun to be collected, they will be more easily paid at another time.

Besides, what an acquisition will be made to the revenue by the extinction of 16 millions of life-annuities, and by the expiration of so many anticipations of taxes for terms of years!

On the other hand, it is not to be supposed that the King will continue to demand of the clergy, above 1 500 000 livres a year, or one shilling in the pound upon their benefices. That body is becoming daily more and more indebted, by the practice introduced of late, of making payment of their free gifts to the King, by borrowing the money, instead of paying every one's proportion out of his benefice. This in time may oblige them to accept of pensions for their benefices, and to make over their revenue in tithes to the King: they will, at least, in one way or other, become, entirely at his mercy, and at that of their own creditors.

Before I conclude, I must say a word concerning the method of levying the taxes in France.

The most general distribution I can make of this, is to reduce it under four principal heads.

The first comprehends the general *recettes*; to wit, the *taille*, or land-tax, the *capitation*, or poll-tax, and all the twentieths. These are administered by the intendants of the provinces, who both make the
distribution

distribution of them upon the subjects, and who levy them by officers under their direction; and for the expense of levying, is superadded to the taxes, 10 *per cent.* upon the whole. When they are collected, they are paid in to the receivers general at Paris, who deliver them in, and account for them to the royal treasury.

The second comprehends all the taxes which are farmed. The farmers are vested with the King's authority for raising the duties let to them, according to certain regulations; and as they are obliged to keep open books, the expense of management is known, and at every new lease a reasonable profit is allowed to them over and above.

The third branch comprehends all free gifts of determinate sums of money, imposed according to certain regulations prescribed to those bodies politic who pay them; into which may be comprehended all taxes upon the clergy; because they levy them themselves.

The fourth comprehends retentions which the King makes out of the salaries he pays. This needs no explanation.

What farther observations may be made on this head will find a place when we speak of taxes.

C H A P. VII.

Comparative View of the Revenue, Debts, and Credit of Great Britain and France.

IN comparing the state of credit in the two nations, I must first observe, that it is not so essential to

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compare the *extent of the revenue* of both countries, as the *resources* they have for obtaining extraordinary supplies in case of need.

Whatever be the permanent revenue of a state, we may be very certain that the exigencies of it will be in proportion; and whenever any extraordinary expense is to be incurred, it must be provided for by extraordinary means.

In examining the state of Great Britain and France, we have found this observation verified. If the expenses of the year do no more than absorb the revenue of it, and if the sinking funds appropriated for paying off incumbrances be properly applied, the state has no reason to complain.

This distribution evidently points out how necessary it is not to confound those branches of revenue which are appropriated to state expenses, with those which ought to be set apart for the payment of debts and interest. This however I apprehend is too much neglected in both kingdoms.

If times of tranquillity be not made use of, to disengage those funds which necessity had opened, it cannot be denied, that future exigencies must then seek for a supply, from resources as yet undiscovered.

That nation, therefore, which has certain branches of revenue lying dormant in time of peace, has the advantage in point of resources.

In this respect the advantage hitherto has lain on the side of France; she has had her *dixièmes*, *vingtièmes*, and double poll-tax, which have never been imposed except in cases of necessity.

But on the other hand, Great Britain has a noble and opulent branch of permanent taxes, which com-

poses her sinking fund. Were this employed in times of peace, as it ought to be, it would prove in time of war a more ready fund of credit than any France can boast of.

Those extraordinary resources of France cannot be mortgaged. They are supplies for the current service; but they are no fund of credit. Whereas the sinking fund of Great Britain is always ready in the mean time to supply urgent demands. While this subsists, there is no danger of being obliged to break faith with all the public creditors, upon a demand for a million and a half sterling, as was the case with France in 1759. The one resembles a credit in bank; the other the rents of a great estate. The sinking fund affords time to raise new supplies, in proportion to the debts contracted; and if these, when new, and raised in time of war, prove sufficient to answer the interest of the loan, they will probably do more as they continue to be levied, and upon the return of peace.

One very remarkable difference between the state of credit in the two nations is, that in Britain the object of attention is the rate of interest; in France it is the speedy repayment of the capital. The great care of a British minister is to support the price of the funds: the meaning of which is, to keep the interest of money low. Did not the price of the funds regulate the rate of money, the state would be no-wise concerned in the price of them.

Now the credit of Great Britain is so firmly established, that she may command money at all times, providing she will give the interest required.

The case is totally different in France. Her credit is not well established; that terrible Mississippi-monument, of near a thousand millions, standing fixed upon the ordinary revenue to this day at $2\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.* first reduced from the most exorbitant interest, by successive acts of power, after the late King's death, and afterwards from a moderate interest to $2\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.* in the year 1720, is reason sufficient to deter monied men from lending to France upon perpetual interest.

In borrowing upon life-annuities at 10 *per cent.* and upon lotteries at nearly the same rate, for 11 or 12 years, France obtains credit for large sums. She also borrows with tolerable success at 5 *per cent.* when there is a lottery-clause put in, which stipulates a large sum to be annually paid for extinguishing the capital. The reason is, she is more punctual to such engagements: they remain constantly under the eye of the public: the stock-holders consider their money as constantly coming in; and any interruption in the payment gives a general alarm. But when funds are settled at perpetual interest, people lose sight of the capital altogether. The contracts by which they are commonly constituted, are not so easily transferred as other funds: in a word, it is not the taste of the French nation to lend their money in that way, and far less the taste of strangers; and the reason is, that as matters have hitherto been conducted, it has by no means been their interest.

Before the commencement of the late war, no security in France was looked upon as better than the actions of the company of the Indies. This was

a fund of perpetual interest. They brought in to purchasers little more than 4 *per cent.* and every body wished to have them. Every action bore a dividend of eighty livres a year; and the action itself sold from eighteen to nineteen hundred livres. The war had not lasted four years, when the dividends were reduced to one half, and the capital fell to about 700.

In short, all perpetual funds in France, whether upon government or company-security, are very precarious; and while this is the case, we may decide that the credit they are built on is precarious also.

C H A P. VIII.

Contingent Consequences of the Extension of Credit, and Increase of Debts.

HAVING applied the principles of public credit to the state of facts in Great Britain and France, such as I have been able to collect, I must observe, that all short sketches of this kind are intended only to satisfy a general curiosity which mankind has, to know a little of every thing. Although they may appear superficial and incorrect, to persons thoroughly instructed in those matters, they still are for our purpose; which is only to take them as something approaching nearer to truth than bare suppositions can do; and they sufficiently answer the purpose of illustrating the subject we are upon.

I now proceed to inquire what may be the consequences of this mighty change produced upon the policy of industrious and trading states, from the establishment of credit, debts, and taxes.

I have, from the very beginning of this inquiry, occasionally taken notice of the influence that such a change must make upon the spirit and manners of a people. The lower classes, who are slow in forming combinations, do not soon comprehend the necessary consequences of such revolutions. Even ministers have been often at a loss to judge of the consequences which might follow upon some steps of their own conduct relative thereto, although taken upon mature deliberation.

When public credit is employed for raising money upon a plan of refunding the capital, either by uniform annual payments exceeding the interest, or by funds established for sinking the capital, no contingent consequences can happen, providing the plan be executed: the debts contracted will be paid, and matters will return to their former state.

When public credit is employed for raising money upon payment of a perpetual interest; or if, whatever be the plan laid down, capitals should not happen to be discharged, and that the debts should swell continually; in this case, the contingent consequences are many and various, far exceeding any man's sagacity to investigate.

If we judge of them from what past experience teaches us, we may conclude, that, in one way or other, all debts contracted will in time disappear, either by being paid, or by being abolished: because

it is not to be expected that posterity will groan under such a load any longer than it is convenient; and because in fact we see no very old public debts as yet outstanding, where interest has been regularly paid.

This is a very rational conclusion from past experience; but it is only relative to the circumstances of past times. While the debtors are the masters, there is no difficulty of getting clear of debts: but if the consequence of this new system should be to make the creditors the masters, I suppose the case might be different. Farther,

In former times public debts were contracted between the state and its own subjects; but at present we see that in such loans, foreigners, even enemies, are invited to concur: and the better to engage them to it, a total immunity is promised from all taxes upon the interest to be paid by the borrowers.

This circumstance has already drawn the attention of Princes, in the discussion of their reciprocal concerns. We saw how, in the treaty of Dresden, which took place after the King of Prussia's invasion of Saxony in 1745, it was provided by the 6th article, that all debts due by the bank of the *Steuer* to that Prince's subjects, were to be paid, on presentation of their contracts.

We have not indeed as yet seen wars carried on for the payment of debts; but the case may happen, and kingdoms may be carried off upon such pretensions, as well as private property. What a chain of contingent consequences arises from this single combination, were this a proper place to introduce them!

But without going to the supposition of Princes or nations becoming reciprocally engaged in debts, and thereby involving such mighty interests in the support of public faith, we may easily conceive, that a monied interest, of a long standing, may have influence enough to operate a change upon the spirit and manners of a people.

Let me here take the example of Great Britain. Do we not see how the spirit of that nation is totally bent upon the support of public credit? And do we not see how absolutely their commercial interest depends upon it? Can it be supposed, that every one has combined all the consequences which may flow from the constant swelling of their debts? Or indeed is it possible to determine what will be the consequences of them? This however we may suppose at least, because we see the progress of it already, that the interest of the creditors will daily gather strength, both in parliament and without: and if from small beginnings it has arrived at the pitch we now see, it is very natural to conclude, that, in time, it may become stronger, and at last, that the creditors of the nation may become the masters of it.

When any one interest becomes too predominant, the prosperity of the state stands upon a precarious footing. Every interest should be encouraged, protected, and kept within due bounds. The following speculations are intended for the application of principles to new and unexperienced combinations; where natural causes *may* work their direct and immediate effects, and thereby prove prejudicial to

the general welfare, unless they be foreseen in some degree, and proper remedies be prepared against them.

Europe was possessed by our ancestors free from taxes; our fathers saw them imposed, and we see how fast they become mortgaged for our debts. We can as little judge of the extent of our credit, as they could of the possibility of contributing so large a fund for the support of it.

As the plan of imposing taxes has been extended, we see the public coffers every day receiving a vast flux of money, and like the heart in the human body, throwing it out again into circulation. Happy state, could it be lasting, and were this flux and reflux preserved in a due proportion to all the uses for which it is intended! But states have their vices, as well as private people. Public opulence should be proportioned to public exigencies: but how often do we see ambition putting on the face of public spirit, and animating the resentment of a nation, under color of providing for her security? Hence wars, from wars expense: recourse is had to credit, money is borrowed, debts are contracted, taxes are augmented; all this increases circulation, which demands a supply of currency: this is procured by melting down the solid property. These operations performed, the public money is either sent abroad, or remains at home. If sent abroad, more property must be melted down, in order to fill up the void. If it remains at home, it will animate every branch of circulation; and when the exigency, which required this additional quantity

of money, is over, what circulation finds superfluous, will stagnate in the hands of the monied interest, and will either form a new fund for contracting more debts, or it will be laid out in the purchase of the property formerly melted down, which produced it; and thereby will be consolidated a-new.

Every interest in a state must influence the government of it, in proportion to its consequence and weight; and every government must influence the spirit of the people who live under it.

Now, as we have seen how industry creates wealth; how wealth and confidence create credit; how credit creates debts and taxes; how these again occasion an augmentation of money, by the melting down of property; and how this property is transferred to a new set of men, who were once the monied interest, and who afterwards acquire the lands, and consolidate this additional circulation; does not this chain of consequences represent a kind of circle, returning into itself? And is it not plain, that without the intervention of this engine, the money created in proportion to the demand for it, the chain would be cut off, before it could reach the link from which it first set out? Will not this conversion of a monied interest into a landed interest, insensibly inspire the bulk of the landlords with sentiments analogous to a monied interest? Is not that evidently more and more the case every day in England; And from this may we not prognosticate the solidity of public credit in that nation?

If on the other hand we find, as in France, industry in times of peace drawing wealth from other nations,

and thereby increasing the coin, upon which alone credit is circulated through the kingdom; and then foreign expence sending it away in times of war; must not circulation keep pace with the coin, that is to say, be circumscribed within the proportion of it?

If the solidity and extent of the French King's free revenue should afford credit to borrow this coin; and if, instead of providing a proportional supply of currency to fill up this new loan, the coin borrowed be sent out of France; how will the ordinary circulation be carried on?

Let us here recal to mind what was said in the 22^d chapter, upon banks, where we distinguished *voluntary* circulation, which is buying, from *involuntary* circulation, which is paying: we there observed how *paying* must always take place of *buying*; consequently, we may here determine that taxes must be paid before buying, that is consumption, can go on. The deficiency therefore of coin for circulation, will, first proportionally affect the trade, manufactures, and consumption of France, and afterwards the revenue which arises from them. Is not this the constant complaint in France, when war carries off their coin? The remonstrances of all their parliaments are filled with it.

In times of peace, the amount of what comes from the people is greater than in time of war: but then there is coin sufficient for all the payments; and when they are made to the royal treasury, they immediately return into circulation, and no hurt is felt.

I insist the more upon this principle, and I introduce it in so many different ways, and under

such a variety of views, because I take it to be one of the most important considerations in the whole doctrine of credit, and one which I have never seen suggested by any French, or English writer upon this subject. Many are the complaints for want of money; but no method have I ever seen proposed for obtaining it from solid property; the easiest and safest of all operations, when conducted with honesty, and according to principles.

As money therefore is the means of closing the chain of consequences already mentioned, and forming it into a circle, as has been said, we plainly see how, when it is wanting, the same effects cannot be produced; and consequently the country of France, when money is confined to the coin, will be very long in adopting the sentiments of a monied interest; whether for its profit or loss, in the end, is not here the question.

We have now traced the contingent consequences of public credit so far as to show how it *may* tend to influence the spirit of a people, and make them adopt the sentiments of a monied interest.

The allurements of acquiring land-property is very great, no doubt, especially to monied men. The ease and affluence of those, on the other hand, who have their capitals in their pocket-books, is very attracting to the eyes of many landlords, especially at a time when they are paying the heavy taxes laid upon their possessions.

The firm establishment of public credit tends greatly to introduce those reciprocal sentiments of good-will among the two great classes of a people,

and thereby preserves a balance between them. The monied interest wish to promote the prosperity of the landlords; the landlords, the solidity of credit; and the well-being of both depends upon the success of trade and industry.

Let us now suppose what is actually the case in Great Britain, that from the swelling of public debts an enormous fund of property is created. This is formed out of the income of the whole nation; and as it has been purchased by those who have lent money to the state, in common language it is included in what we call the monied interest: it is however very distinct from it, as will be understood from what is to follow.

The capital of the public debts is the price which was paid for the annuities due to the creditors, and is now no more money to them than land is money to the landlord. It may be turned into money, no doubt; but so may land.

By the monied interest, properly, should be understood, those who have money, not realized upon any fund, and who either employ it in the way of trade, in the way of industry, in jobbing in land, in stock, or in any way they please, so as to draw from it an annual income. While it is fixed, that is, given for any permanent value, it ceases to be money; when it is called in, it becomes money again. Let stock, therefore, suffer ever so many alienations from hand to hand, it still continues stock: it never can become land, it never can become money, until it be paid off. I hope this idea is clear, and understood. Stock, therefore, I here consider

as one great branch of solid property ; so far as the security of government is solid and good ; and as such, may be melted down into money by banks, as well as any other thing.

Now I have said that this fund is formed out of the income of the whole nation; consequently by *fund*, here, I do not understand the capital, which exists no more, but the interest which is drawn for it: it is this interest, I say, which arises from the land, money, trade, industry, &c. From the land, out of the amount of the taxes charged upon it; from the money, trade, industry, &c. out of the amount of proportional taxes, such as excises, customs, salt-tax, stamp-duties, and the like.

The more the debts increase, by the monied interest realizing into this branch of solid property, the more the taxes must augment; and consequently, the more the solid property of the funds themselves will be affected, as well as the land.

From this exposition of the matter, I think it appears pretty evident, that as proportional taxes affect every man's income, according to his consumption; the landlord, *cæteris paribus*, who pays a land tax, as well as his proportion upon his consumption, is more hardly dealt with than the proprietor of the other branch of solid property, the funds, who only pays the proportion of the last.

But the condition of the stockholder is not equal to that of the landlord, for two very plain reasons. The first is, that the income of his stock cannot increase; that of the land may. The second is, that the swelling of this great capital of stock has the effect

offinking the interest upon it, and consequently of diminishing the income of the stockholder; and in proportion to that diminution, the value of land is augmented. Now I readily allow that the augmentation upon the *value* of lands is no inducement to a landlord to turn them into money; because he would then lose upon his money, what he gains upon the additional price received. But it is a great advantage in this respect that he thereby diminishes the interest he pays upon his debts, if he has any; and if he has none, it enables him to borrow at a lower rate for the future; and by improving his lands with the money borrowed, he augments his income much beyond the proportion of the interest paid.

It is therefore necessary, in imposing land taxes, rightly to combine every circumstance; that the load of all impositions may be equally distributed upon every class of a people who enjoy superfluity, and upon no other. If, after a fair deduction of principles, this shall appear a thing possible to be done, we may expect to see statesmen engaged to depart from the old maxim of grasping at what is readiest and nearest at hand, to wit, the landed property, with a view to spare a class of people, which, in a well regulated state, never can be made to feel the burden of any proportional tax whatsoever, I mean the industrious poor.

I now proceed in my inquiry into the nature and consequences of the swelling of this great branch of property, the public funds.

As to the nature of it, we have said already, that it is formed by realizing money into stock. When

government borrows, the lenders must be people who have money. If the loan is made at home, the money is no sooner paid in, than it is spent; and as we may suppose that it would not have been lent, had either the lenders found it necessary for their current expense, or had they found a more profitable way of realizing it than by lending it to government, we consider it as in a state of stagnation; but being lent to government, it is thrown into a new channel of circulation.

Farther, this money stagnating in the hands of the lender, either proceeded from his income, which exceeded his expense, or from the profits of his industry. In either case, the country is neither poorer or richer, when considered in a cumulative view; than if the same sum had been lent to private people at home.

Let us next suppose the money to have been borrowed for the exigence of a foreign war. In this case, if it be borrowed at home and sent abroad, it must first be converted into the money of the world, gold and silver, and then sent off, to the diminution of this kind of property; or it must go abroad in the money of the country, credit, to the diminution of the annual income upon which the credit is established. As this last operation may not be so clear, an example will explain it.

Government borrows a million; it is paid in paper, and must be sent to Holland. If at that time a balance be due by Holland for a million, bills will readily be found for it. In this case, the balance of trade is borrowed by government, and is converted
into

into a capital of a million in the public funds; the interest of which will remain at home, and continue to be the property of the nation. But as the value of this balance is sent to Holland and spent abroad, it is, upon the whole, to the nation, as if the balance had not been due to them. This I call a *lucrum cessans* to the country.

But suppose no balance due at the time the million comes to be sent off, I say the consequence will be, to alienate in favor of foreigners a part of the annual income, proportional to the whole interest paid for the loan, whether it has been subscribed for by foreigners, or by natives.

If the subscription comes from foreigners, the consequence is evident: it is equally so in the other case, upon a little reflection.

Suppose then the million subscribed for; and paid in London. Bills are sought for; none are found, I mean in the way of reciprocal compensation, does not this sum immediately become a balance against London? And as a country loses all such balances, and that the country to which they are due gains them, this million is lost to England, and forms what I call a *damnum emergens*; that is to say, her former property or income is so far diminished, or comes to be transferred to strangers.

From this we may conclude, that in all matters of public borrowing, it is of no consequence whether the subscription be filled by natives, or by foreigners, when the value of it is to be sent abroad.

Let us next examine the state of the question when

the loan is made in order to be spent at home, as is the case after a war, when the unfunded debts come to be paid off.

We have said that loans are filled by money stagnating, which the owner desires to realize: if he cannot do better, he lends it to government; if he can do better, he will not lend it.

While the uses of domestic circulation absorb all the money in the country, that is to say, when there are private persons ready to borrow all the money to be lent, at this time government cannot borrow at home; and if they did, by offering a high interest for it, the borrowing would do harm to circulation; because it would raise interest at home, or disappoint those who would gladly borrow it, for little more than the interest offered by government.

Let us next suppose that after a war, when the unfunded debts are either bearing a high interest, or selling at discount, government shall find an advantage in opening a subscription, which may be filled from abroad, at a lower rate than the then actual value of money. Suppose, I say, the Dutch should be willing to lend at 3 *per cent.* while money in England stood at 4 *per cent.* I ask if, in this case, government ought to borrow from Holland, at the expense of sending the interest out of the country, rather than suffer such debts to sell at discount; or to continue paying a higher interest at home for what they owe?

It is my opinion that still they ought to borrow, for the following reasons. That if the high interest

at home proceeds from want of money, that is to say, from circulation not being full enough, it is their interest to borrow, where it for nothing else than to supply circulation; because unless this be full, all industry must languish. But suppose it should be said that circulation is full enough, that industry suffers no check from that quarter, but that there being no superfluity of money, interest stands 1 *per cent.* higher than it would do were there considerable stagnations. In that case also, I think it is their interest to borrow, were it for no other reason than to produce such stagnations.

It is a general rule every where, that there is no having enough without having a superfluity; at least there is no certainty of one's having enough without finding a superfluity. Borrowing, therefore, in small sums, at such a time, will produce stagnations at home, from which succeeding loans may be filled, after circulation is sufficiently provided: and even in case more should be borrowed from strangers than is necessary, and that in consequence of it, too much should come to stagnate at home, after the demand of government is over, in that case, the monied interest would lend, in their turn, to other states, where interest is higher; and the annual returns from that quarter would more than compensate what must be sent away, in consequence of the former borrowing.

From these combinations, let us draw some conclusions.

1^{mo}, That the effect of public borrowing, or national debt, is to augment the permanent income

of the country, out of stagnating money, and balances of trade.

2^{do}, That this income so created, may be either the property of natives, or of strangers.

3^{tio}, That when money is found to stagnate, in a country where circulation is not diminishing, it may be supposed to proceed from the coming in of a right balance of trade.

4^{to}, If stagnations in one part are found to interrupt circulation in another, public borrowing, for domestic purposes, has the good effect of giving vent to the stagnation, and throwing the money into a new channel of circulation.

5^{to}, That the sum of interest paid by any nation to strangers, shows the general balance due by the nation, after deducting all the profits of their past trade out of all the expense of their foreign wars.

But here it must be observed, that as on one hand we are comprehending all that is paid to foreign creditors, on account of the funds they have in England, for example, so on the other hand must be deducted from this, all the like payments made to Englishmen by other nations.

6^{to}, From this last circumstance we discover, that the lending to other nations by private hands, produces the same effect to a nation as if the state were actually paying off the debts due to strangers. Consequently, when Moses permitted the Jews to lend to strangers at interest, and forbade such loans among themselves, his view was to establish a foreign tribute, as it were, in favor of his own nation, instead of establishing luxury at home.

7^{mo}, As the balance due to a nation upon her trade, is found to compensate, *pro tanto*, the money she spends abroad, we may from the same principle conclude, that so soon as she ceases to expend money abroad, the balance of trade in her favor, if not realized at home in some new improvement, will diminish *pro tanto*, the interest, or capitals due to strangers. This is evident from the nature of balances, of which we have treated already.

8^{vo}, The consequence, for example, of England's owing large sums to strangers, will, from the same principle, constantly prevent exchange from rising very high in her favor, when the balance of her trade is to be paid to her : because on every such occasion, her foreign creditors will be glad to disappoint exchangers, by furnishing bills for their interest, or capitals, to those who owe the balance ; the consequence of which is plainly to diminish the foreign debts*.

This circumstance implies no loss to the nation which is creditor in the balance of trade, and debtor upon the capitals ; because we have proved that the price of exchange never affects a nation, but only certain individuals, who pay it to others.

This is sufficient, I think, to point out in some degree the nature of a national debt. I come next to examine the consequences of its constant augmentation, without proper measures being taken, either

* We must always carefully avoid confounding the grand balance of payments with the balance between importation and exportation, which I consider as the balance of trade.

to pay it off, or to circumscribe it within certain bounds.

In what is to follow, I shall throw all consideration of capitals totally out of the question; and as to the amount of taxes, it is quite indifferent whether the money proceeding from them be in consequence of an improvement made upon those already established, or from new impositions: such combinations will come in more properly afterwards.

If the interest paid upon the national debt of England, for example, be found constantly to increase upon every new war, the consequence will be, that more money will be raised on the subject for the payment of it. The question then comes to be, 1. How far may debts extend? 2. How far may taxes be carried? And 3. What will be the consequence, supposing the one and the other carried to the greatest height possible?

I answer to the first, that abstracting from circumstances which may disturb the gradual progress of this operation, before it can arrive at the *ne plus ultra*, debts may be increased to the full proportion of all that can be raised for the payment of the interest. As to the second, How far taxes may be carried, I shall not here anticipate the subject of the following book, any farther than is necessary to resolve the question before us.

Taxes, we have said, either affect income, or consumption. The land-tax of England is now at 4 shillings in the pound, upon a supposed value of the property affected by it, which is all real and personal estates, the stock upon lands, and some few other particulars excepted.

This tax may be carried to the full value of all the real estates in England. As for personal estates it never can affect them proportionally; and that part of the statute of land-tax which passes every year, and imposes 4 shillings in the pound on personal estates, carries in it a vestige of our former ignorance in matters of taxation.

The notion of imposing (*facto*) 20 shillings in the pound upon the real value of all the land-rents of England, appears to us perfectly ridiculous. I admit it to be so; and could I have discovered any argument, by which I could have limited the rising of the land-tax to any precise number of shillings under twenty, I should have stated this as the maximum rather than the other.

The second branch of taxes comprehends those upon consumptions, excises, and the like. The maximum as to this class must be determined by foreign trade; because this is affected in a certain degree by the price of domestic industry. Other taxes have not this effect, as we shall show in its proper place.

But as foreign trade is not essential to the domestic industry, consumption, circulation, &c. of any nation, as has been proved in the second book, but only to their increasing in wealth proportionally to other nations; if foreign communications should be cut off entirely, I perceive no limit to which I can confine the extent of proportional taxes. Let me therefore suppose a term beyond which impositions of all kinds must come to a stop, and then ask, in the third place, what will the consequence be? I

answer, that the state will then be in possession of all that can be raised on the land, on the consumption, industry and trade of the country; in short, of all that can be called income, which they will administer for the creditors.

When this comes to be the case, debts become extinguished of course; because they come to be consolidated with the property: a case which commonly happens when a creditor takes possession of an estate for the payment of debts equal to its value.

Then government may continue to administer for the creditors, and either retain in its hand what is necessary for the public expense of the year; or if it inclines to show the same indulgence for this new class of proprietors as for the former, it may limit the retention to a sum only equal to the interest of the money wanted; and in that way set out upon a new system of borrowing, until the amount of taxes be transferred to a new set of creditors. This is the endless path referred to in the ninth chapter of the second book, which after a multitude of windings returns into itself.

A state, I imagine, which would preserve its public faith inviolable, until a period such as I have been supposing, would run little risk of not finding credit for a new borrowing. The prospect of a second revolution of the same kind would be very distant; and in matters of credit, which are constantly exposed to risk, such events being out of the reach of calculation, are never taken into any man's account who has money to lend.

The whole of this hypothesis is, I readily agree, destitute of all probability; because of the infinite variety of circumstances which may frustrate such a scheme. I only introduced it to show where the constant mortgaging of a public revenue may end; and to disprove the vulgar notion, that by contracting debts beyond a certain sum, *a trading nation which has a great balance in its favor*, must be involved in an unavoidable bankruptcy. To say that a *nation* must become bankrupt to itself, is a proposition which I think implies a contradiction.

C H A P. IX.

Of Bankruptcies.

IN the last chapter we have been running through a chain of consequences relative to the increase of public debts, which appear as extravagant to us at present, as it would have appeared to Davenant, to have supposed the debts of this nation to grow up to their present height, without the risk of involving the nation in a general bankruptcy.

But those consequences are only contingent. The present debts may either be paid off, or the nation may be involved in a general bankruptcy. In either case, the vast property in the funds, this great article of permanent income, belonging to natives and to foreigners, must wither and decay, and at last disappear altogether.

We may therefore decide, that one of three events

must happen, viz. either, 1. Debts will swell to such a pitch as at last to pay themselves: or, 2. The nation will be involved in a bankruptcy: or, 3. They will be fairly paid off.

The first supposition we have examined; the second we are now to consider; the last will be the subject of the following chapter, with which I shall conclude this book.

I shall advance no argument to prove that the scheme of a public bankruptcy is either lawful, honorable, or expedient, if voluntarily gone into by a state; because I think it is diametrically opposite to every principle of good government. It is a maxim uncontroverted, that a contract is binding between the parties contracting, and that it ought to be fulfilled in every article. If the public good be alledged as an overruling principle, to which every other must give way, I readily admit the exception. There is another of equal force, the impossibility of performance. When such arguments are used to engage a nation to commit a deliberate act of bankruptcy, two things must be examined: the first, is the interest which the public has in adopting the scheme: the second, the consequences of it. What reasons a state may have, I shall consider afterwards; at present, I shall inquire what might be the consequences of a general and total bankruptcy in England; from which we may gather what difference it would make, were it only partial; and by such an inquiry, we may be led to discover the proper method of breaking faith, in case it should become unavoidable. This is what in another place I called bringing credit

decently to her grave; when after being overstretched it cannot longer be supported.

A bankruptcy may take place in two ways: either as a consequence of circumstances which cannot be prevented; or by a deliberate act of government.

Were the trade and industry of England to decay, the amount of taxes might so far diminish, as to prove insufficient to pay the interest of the national debt, and defray the expense of government. Were the people to be blown up into a spirit of revolt against taxes, the same event would probably happen. In either case, the natural and immediate consequences of the bankruptcy would probably follow one another in this manner:

1^{mo}, Every creditor of the state would become poorer in proportion to the diminution of his income.

2^{do}, Consumption and the demand for work would diminish in proportion to the part of that income withheld, which the creditors annually expend for these purposes.

3^{tio}, Trade would *directly* suffer, in proportion to that part of the said revenue yearly thrown into it by the public creditors at present; and it would *consequently* suffer, in proportion to the hurt resulting to private credit, from the consequences of the bankruptcy.

The creditors then would lose all, the trade of England would be undone, and the multitudes who live in consequence of the demand for their industry from the one and the other would be reduced to misery. These immediate effects would first manifest themselves in the capital. The consequences would

soon be felt all over England: a diminution upon the consumption of the fruits of the earth; a stagnation of that commerce which is carried on between London and the country (which we have seen to be equal to the amount of all taxes and land-rents spent in London) would soon throw every thing into confusion. But taxes would be abolished: of that there is no doubt. Let a deliberate bankruptcy take place without any abolition of them by law, they would soon sink to nothing, from the utter impossibility there would be found to pay them.

A total bankruptcy, therefore, coming upon England, either from a decay of her trade, or a disturbance in collecting the public revenue, would have the effect of plunging the nation into utter ruin at home: what might be the consequences from abroad, I leave to the reader's sagacity to determine.

Let me now suppose a bankruptcy to take place from a deliberate act of power, with a view of expediency.

The difference between the two consists only in this; that in the first, all the consequences we have mentioned would follow one upon another, without a possibility of preventing them: in the other, a plan to prevent them might be concerted.

Let me then suppose, that government shall find it expedient, at any time, to use a sponge for the public debts; that they shall fear no external bad consequences, either from the resentment of those states who may be hurt by it, or from the ambition of others who may profit by it; that they shall coolly resolve to sacrifice the interest of all the creditors in

favor of the whole body; and that they shall deliberate upon the plan to be followed, in order to bring about so great a revolution, without essentially hurting any interest in the state, that of the creditors alone excepted.

In that case, I imagine, they would begin by ordering the amount of all that is paid to the creditors, to be set apart as a fund for the execution of the plan.

They would purchase all over England, every article of produce and manufacture which might remain upon hand for want of a market: they would feed all those who would be forced to be idle for want of employment: they would instantly put proper employments into their hands; one week's delay in the execution of this part of the plan would throw the manufacturing interest into such confusion, as to be past all remedy: they would furnish credit to all the merchants subsisting, in proportion to what they had lost by the extinction of the funds: they would establish offices every where, to supply the wants of those who would be totally ruined, until by degrees they could re-establish confidence, the parent of trade, the mother of industry. By such precautions, properly taken, and properly executed, none would suffer but the unhappy creditors and their families, who, from great opulence, would be reduced to poverty.

As far as human prudence is insufficient for going through so great a detail all at once; so far would the effects of a general bankruptcy add hurtful consequences to those which in every case are unavoidable.

Were a statesman endowed with the supernatural

gift of turning the minds of a nation at his will, and of foreseeing every consequence before it happened, such a plan might be executed. Another who, with the greatest capacity ever man was endowed with, would, for expediency, not for necessity, deliberately undertake a general bankruptcy, I should consider as a madman.

I should rather prefer to submit to the natural consequences which might result from an accidental bankruptcy, than endeavour to avoid them by a plan too complicated for human wisdom to execute.

Let us next suppose the scheme to be fairly executed from a view of expediency, no matter how, and all inconveniences prevented during the execution, what would be gained by it?

If by the supposition all taxes be kept alive, for at least a certain time, in order to prevent a total confusion, certainly no body could gain during that period; even the state itself would lose, because every branch of consumption would infallibly diminish. But that time elapsed, and taxes reduced to the lowest, who would be the gainers? We shall see when we come to the doctrine of taxation, that a sudden abolition of them, in consequence of a bankruptcy, would be advantageous to no body, but to creditors upon mortgage, and to the idle: not to landlords; because their incomes would diminish more than in the proportion of the present land-tax, at least their improvements would be interrupted, and their rents ill paid: not to the manufacturing classes; because at present they pay no taxes, but in proportion to their idleness or

extravagance, as shall be proved; the monied interest, not secured on land, would I suppose be extinguished; trade and credit at an end. The gains then would be confined to those who have money secured upon land, where the capital is demandable. In such a situation, interest would rise beyond all bounds; and a debt which might have been considered as a trifle before, might then carry off an estate. The idle also who live peaceably upon a very moderate income, would find a great advantage from the fall of prices for want of consumption, and from the distress of the industrious; but the indigent poor, who are supported from charity, would suffer: all the great establishments for labor and industry, would fall to the ground: the numbers of poor who are there maintained, would come upon a society, which is beginning to lose those tender feelings of compassion, which are more common in countries of idleness, in proportion as misery is more familiarly before them.

To say all in one word, a total bankruptcy, and abolition of taxes, would bring this nation back to the situation it was in before taxes and debts were known.

Does any body imagine that our present situation is not analogous to our present policy, and that it is possible that independently of the same circumstances we should long continue to enjoy the advantages we feel? No: were we in the same situation as formerly, we should feel as our fathers felt. They had as good understandings to improve their circumstances as we have; but they had to do with an idle, we with

an industrious common people. Trade and credit have been long at work to perform this great revolution: the operation is not as yet completed, and a total bankruptcy now would destroy every good effect for a long time.

Were taxes made to cease, the large sums which proceed from them would disappear entirely. Money would not, as some imagine, be equally distributed among those who now pay the taxes, and so proportionally increase every man's income. The reason is plain: the money paid for taxes, circulates; because it is demanded. Were taxes suppressed, people having less occasion for money than formerly, would circulate less in proportion. It is the necessity of paying taxes, which *creates* this money for the payment of them; and when this method of *creating* is not contrived, the taxes cannot be paid, as has been often said. Now it is this great flux of money from taxes which animates the trade of England: take them out of the circle, what becomes of the whole?

To suppose, therefore, so great a revolution in the circulation of a country, as that produced by the cessation of taxes; and to suppose no interruption from it upon the state of industry, and the employment of the people of this nation, is a proposition I must reject, as being contrary to all principles; and to this among the rest, that it would be a most sudden, and a most violent revolution; which throughout the whole course of this inquiry, we have found to involve inconveniencies beyond the power of any theory to extricate.

Upon the whole we may determine, that the fatal
consequences

consequences of a bankruptcy would be many ; and that the good resulting from a total abolition of taxes, would be confined to two objects 1. A relief to those who pay them upon their possessions, or persons. 2. A diminution of prices in favor of the idle at home, and of trade abroad : great objects, no doubt, could they be obtained at less expense than the consequences of a total failure of public credit and domestic industry. Perhaps when we come to examine the principles of taxation, we shall find that taxes do not raise prices so much as is generally believed ; and those which influence the application of public money, will point out better expedients than a bankruptcy for compassing those great national purposes.

But let us suppose a case, which may possibly happen, as matters seem to go on. Suppose, I say, that by continuing to carry on long and expensive wars, the sum of interest paid to strangers should exceed all that the nation can gain by her trade. In this case, there must be a general balance of payments against her every year, which very soon would manifest itself by the most fatal consequences.

The bank of England would be the first to feel them, by the departure of all the coin and precious metals. Trade would feel them next, and then indeed they would become universal.

In such a situation, I fairly acknowledge, that I cannot discover any expedient to avoid a bankruptcy. Engaging the foreign creditors to become citizens, by the allurements of the greatest privileges, and

bills of naturalization, are vain speculations. Unless some resource, hidden from me, should, upon such an occasion, open itself, in the deep recesses of future events, I believe the nation would soon be driven upon the fatal rock of bankruptcy. The idea of a nation's becoming bankrupt to itself, I have always looked upon as a contradiction; but that it may become bankrupt to the rest of the world, is quite consistent with reason and common sense.

I shall not take upon me to suggest what mode of bankruptcy would in such a case be the best; a total, or a partial one. The partial, I am afraid, would, in England, work effects almost as hurtful as the other. But if ever the case should happen, the only way will be, to watch over every symptom of the approaching catastrophe and to improve circumstances to the best advantage.

Of what infinite consequence is it then for a British statesman to inquire into the amount of debts owing to strangers, and into the state of the balance of trade? In speaking of exchange, I threw out many things concerning the idea of putting that branch of business into the hands of the bank, in conjunction with the exchequer. Were the state brought into the dilemma of either submitting to this gradual decline of trade, from a cause which could not be removed; or of being pushed to the necessity of leaping into the terrible gulph of a deliberate bankruptcy; in such a dilemma, I say, what infinite advantages might not be drawn from the management of exchange?

I have heard it said, that the debt owing to

strangers was a great advantage to England; because it drew people to that market where their funds are settled. I allow all the force any one can give to this proposition: But alas! what would it avail, whenever England becomes incapable to furnish goods equivalent to all her imports from abroad, added to all she owes to her foreign creditors?

I am very far from supposing the present situation of England to forebode the approach of any such disaster; but it is good to represent to one's self some determinate object, by which we may judge of our situation in times to come.

Debts have increased far beyond the imagination of every mortal. Great men have uttered prophecies, which have proved false, concerning the consequences of a debt of one hundred millions. From this most people conclude, that they will go on until some unforeseen accident shall dash the fabric to pieces. I have been pretending to show how they may go on in a perpetual chain. But alas! one fatal combination was there omitted; and now that is has been taken in, I think it serves as a datum, to resolve the most important problem of this science, viz. How to determine the exact extent of public credit. The solution of which is, That it is not necessary that public credit should ever fail, from any augmentation of debts whatever, due to natives; and that it must fail, so soon as the nation becomes totally unable either to export commodities equal to all their imports and foreign debts, or to pay off a proportional part of their capital, sufficient to turn the balance to the right side.

From this proposition two corollaries may be drawn.

1mo, That the most important object in paying off debts, is to get quit of those due to strangers.

2do, That whatever circumstance has a tendency towards diminishing the burden of foreign debts, should be encouraged.

If it be said, that whenever our foreign debts exceed the balance of our trade, the best way would be to break faith with strangers, and keep it with the subjects of the state: I answer, that were the thing possible, which I apprehend it is not, the consequence might prove equally hurtful.

The greatest of all the inconveniencies proceeding from a bankruptcy, is the ruin of industry, and the stop put to circulation. Can it then be supposed, that a country might execute so glaring a scheme of treachery to all her neighbours, and still continue her correspondence with them in the open way of trade? Certainly not. Were all foreign trade to be stopt at once, what a revolution would it occasion! The circulation of foreign trade, in the city of London only, exceeds perhaps the amount of all the taxes. A stop put to that would occasion such a stagnation, as would ruin the nation as much as if the bankruptcy were to become universal. I do not here pretend minutely to trace consequences, which are infinite: all that can be done, is to suggest hints, which every one may pursue, in proportion to the extent of his combinations.

The intention of touching upon this subject at all, is to show, that the expedient of a sponge, which is

frequently talked of as a remedy against the consequence of debts, is, perhaps, more dangerous than any thing that can be feared from them. The reason is, that the sponge implies a more sudden bankruptcy than any one brought on in a gradual way, by natural causes.

Were natural and irresistible causes to operate a total failure of all profit upon the trade of Britain, one cannot say how far the other nations of Europe might not find it their interest to assist *us*, providing we did our utmost to preserve our good faith to *them*. And as I think I have made it sufficiently evident that nothing can be gained by openly violating such engagements, the best resolution a nation can take, is to adhere to them to the last extremity, and to banish from their thoughts every idea which may be repugnant to them.

C H A P. X.

Methods of contracting and paying off Public Debts.

WE are now to collect together, in one view, the several methods of contracting and paying off the debts of a nation. Such methods may be deduced, either from principles, or from what practice has pointed out.

The foundation upon which public credit is built, is the existence of a sure and sufficient fund for performing the engagements contracted.

When, in the early times of public credit, the repayment of the capital was the chief object of the

lender, a much more extensive fund was necessary than at present, when no more is required than the payment of the interest. As such funds never can be formed but from taxes, or general contributions from the people, the greater they are, the larger must the contribution be. Whenever therefore there is occasion to contract debt, the chief object of a statesman's care should be, to model the spirit of his people so as to dispose them to concur in the proper resolutions to render the plan proposed as easy as possible in the execution.

In the first place, the body of the people must be made sensible that the consequence of contracting debts must imply a diminution upon the income of some individuals; but that the fewer the obstacles thrown in the way of the loan are, the less will that diminution be.

In the second place, he must gain the confidence of his people, so far as to impress them with a firm belief that he will consult *their* good, and nothing else, in what he undertakes.

And in the last place, he must gain the confidence of those from whom he is to borrow; and convince them that all covenants between the public and them will be religiously performed.

In a limited and free government, these three requisites are essential to the firm establishment of public credit.

Where the power of the statesman is unlimited, he may substitute his authority over the people, in the place of confidence; but with respect to those who are to lend, he will fill no room for any such substitution: confidence *here* is the only expedient.

All therefore that is required as to the people, is to *enable* them to do what he requires of them.

For that purpose he must establish credit with them; for finding the contributions he is to exact of them; because they will have as much occasion for it, in paying what is demanded of them by authority, as he himself has in paying what he is obliged to in consequence of his engagements.

If this general plan be not followed, the consequence will be, that taxes will fail on one hand, and public credit on the other.

If all this operation cannot be previously concerted, the plan of borrowing must be circumscribed to funds previously established.

When money is borrowed before the fund is prepared, every obstacle which occurs in establishing it is a drawback upon the confidence of those who lend, and renders the conditions less favorable to the state which borrows.

In the contract of loan, the first article to be agreed upon is the rate of interest. We have, in the beginning of this book, examined the causes of its rise and fall; and have in general determined, that when the demand is for borrowing, interest rises; when for lending, interest falls.

As the object of the borrower is to have interest low, the statesman who intends to borrow, must use all possible means to increase the quantity of money in circulation.

But if coin alone be used as money, and if this coin be sent out of the country, when borrowed, and if what is sent away cannot be replaced at will:

the scheme of augmenting money becomes impracticable : it will daily become more scarce, more difficult to procure, and interest must rise higher every day. Symbolical or paper money, that is credit, must then be established at home, upon the firmest basis : this will enable every one to pay what he owes ; consequently, the taxes will be paid, the creditors will receive what is due to them regularly, money will every year augment in proportion as debts are contracted ; and if borrowing do not augment beyond that proportion, interest will not rise ; and if borrowing should fall below that proportion, interest will sink.

Is not this whole doctrine verified in the strongest manner by the operation of the Mississippi ? At the death of the late King of France, money had disappeared. Some years before, he had, for seven millions in coin, engaged his kingdom for thirty-two millions ; upon a distant fund indeed ; but still it became a debt to be paid. Paper money had not been introduced three years, when interest fell to 2 *per cent*. The paper indeed was a bubble *in fact* ; but we have shown that it became so from bad management only.

By the augmentation of money, capitals cease to be so valuable. By the melting down of property, the very capital, though in the hands of the state, may be turned into money by the creditor, whenever he has occasion for it ; in the same way as the coin which is buried in the vaults of the town-house of Amsterdam, is constantly performing all the uses of circulation.

The method, therefore, of borrowing money to the best advantage, is previously to establish a fund of credit, arising from annual taxes; to provide the people who are to pay them with money in proportion to their property or industry; and to prevent the latter from ever failing for want of the medium, money, for carrying it on.

So long as interest stands high, relatively to other states with which you are at war, throw as much money as possible into the hands of your creditors, in payment of the debts already contracted; because the more you throw in there, the more you will draw out, if you have occasion to borrow more; and if you have no occasion to borrow more, the lower you will reduce the interest, by augmenting the fund of money to be lent.

From these principles I conclude, that every nation which sets out by contracting debts with its own citizens, must *begin* by borrowing upon condition of repaying the capital in a short term of years. This is also the best method to engage the people to contribute largely without murmuring. The reason is, that when taxes begin to be imposed, the mass of circulation becomes proportionally augmented; and the paying back considerable sums to the creditors, prevents, on the one hand, the debts from increasing so fast, and supplies circulation, and facilitates new borrowings on the other. While this plan of augmenting circulation is carrying on, the statesman must prevent his expense abroad from diminishing it proportionally at home. This is to be accomplished by opening loans for foreign expense in foreign

countries, and by paying the *interest only* of such loans, with the greatest punctuality.

The difficulty of performing this, is no argument against it. It must either be done, or credit will be hurt; because without obtaining credit abroad, it is impossible to defray any expense incurred abroad, beyond what the metals of your country and the exports from it can pay: that is, in other words, beyond the quantity of metals exported, and general balance in your favor upon all reciprocal payments with the world.

If it be said, that nations never pay the interest of their debts any where but at home, I answer, that it is so much the worse for them; because wherever the debts or interest is to be paid, the lender always states his account as if the payment were made in his own house. All the expense to him of sending his money to the place of subscription, and of drawing back his returns, are compared with the interest offered by the borrower; and if upon the whole the lender finds his account in the bargain, he subscribes; otherwise not. Since therefore the money borrowed must in this case be sent abroad, it is an advantage for the borrower to be under an obligation to provide a method of sending it; and by that means he will borrow cheaper than he can do, when he refunds to every lender all his expense and trouble in getting his interest remitted to him.

I am now deducing principles, and therefore shall not enter into a discussion of the many objections which occur against this plan, from foreign considerations; such as the facility it might procure to a

statesman of defrauding his foreign creditors, and several others which might be formed : all I say is, that this is a cheaper and more systematical way of borrowing, and it has this good effect, that it constantly points out the state of the external debt, from which alone a bankruptcy is to be feared.

Were a favorable balance to return after an expensive war, the payment of this foreign debt would be the consequence, as much as now when the payment is made at home, and rather more so; because who-ever owed a balance (to England, I suppose) would then pay his debts at London, with money due by England, payable at Antwerp, for example; consequently, he would transfer at discount; and when he transferred in favor of an Englishman, the debts may be considered as discharged upon the foreign fund, and stated a-new upon the funds payable in London. Could the payment of the interest of the public debts be rendered susceptible of such transfers upon all occasions, it would, I imagine, have a remarkable effect in favor of public credit.

This thought suggested itself, while I was considering the situation of a country where borrowing is in its infancy; and it occurred as an expedient for *preventing foreign expense from draining the country of the money necessary for circulation at home.* This, in every combination of circumstances, is the most important object of a statesman's care while he is engaged in wars abroad.

Now whether the money of a country be paper or coin, it is equally taken out of circulation, by every foreign payment. When it is coin, it goes out of the

country, as well as out of circulation : when it is paper it does not go out of the country, certainly, but by coming upon the debtor in it for payment, it is equally taken out of circulation; and what the debtor gives for it (viz. a bill of exchange upon another country) goes out of the country. And unless that bill of exchange can be paid with value exported in merchandize, it will remain a debt upon the country, contracted in favor of some other nation.

This I hope will be sufficient to recal to mind what has been so fully explained in the 13th chapter upon banks; where the same question was stated with regard to the payments Scotland was obliged to make to England, towards the end of last war. The same principles operate in the case before us, and may be applied to every circumstance of it; with this difference only, that here the statesman's interest is more closely connected with that of his banks than was the case during the distress in Scotland: because if he does not support them by a systematical chain of conduct, he will drain the fund of circulation by his remittances; his credit will fail; his taxes will not be paid; and his people will be oppressed. But if he pursues his plan systematically, circulation will be kept full; his credit will be supported; his taxes will be paid; his people will be easy: because no check will be put either to industry or to consumption for want of money, a great part of the former solid property will be melted down into money; whatever part of that money is lent to the state will be by that operation, consolidated into a new species of property, the public funds; and if after the borrow-

ing scheme is over (that is, when peace is restored) circulation should be contracted, a part of the money will stagnate in the hands of individuals, and will, in their favor, be realized in that part of the solid property which was melted down in order to produce it. That is, lands will be sold by the former proprietors, and will be acquired by those who have money not realized in stock; and for which circulation has no farther demand. This is the reason why, at the end of every war which has run the nation in debt, lands have constantly risen in their value, even when considerable quantities of them have been offered to sale.

If it be said that the stock-holders are those whom we commonly see buying the lands, and not those who have sums not realized:

I shall, in answer, observe, that the stock-holders can only buy lands by selling their stock, to those who have money not realized; so it is still the money not realized which is employed in buying every article of solid property: and even after that operation, the money still remains in circulation; because it is impossible to realize even paper money itself, except when the creditor in it becomes proprietor of the property upon which it is secured; and if the money be coin, it is plain that this cannot be realized any farther than it is by nature. When therefore we say, that a man realizes his money, we do not mean any thing farther, than that he gives his money to another in exchange for solid property. Thus when an estate is bought in a country where banks

upon mortgage are established, a part of the price is commonly taken out of circulation altogether; because in consequence of the price paid, the bank is refunded what it had melted down of the land sold; consequently, that paper becomes consolidated a-new, as it were, with the lands which are relieved of the mortgage.

But when lands are sold in a country where there is no paper, the price remains in circulation as before; and if the quantity of coin in circulation should exceed the uses for it, a case which seldom happens in these days, it would be exported, and realized abroad.

When this complicated and systematical scheme of credit is not established, the infallible consequence is, that money disappears: consequently interest rises. The taxes formerly imposed cannot be paid: consequently, it is in vain to seek to augment them; because in proportion as they are augmented, they become less productive. If money be borrowed upon remote funds, engaged for other debts previously contracted, and if public faith be at all events to be preserved, the consequence must then be, that the public will be eat up by usurers.

This was the case in England during the wars of Queen Anne.

So early as 1706, government, as has been said, began to borrow at 6 *per cent.* upon funds already engaged. What was the consequence? The exchequer having no money to pay the interest as it fell due, paid with tallies; these fell to great discount, and had they remained long in that discredited

situation. lending would have stopt, or interest would have risen, as in France, so high as to lose the name of interest altogether. This was the case, in the example above cited, when seven millions ready money, borrowed by the late King of France, became a debt of thirty-two millions on the state.

Upon the occasion above mentioned, government availed themselves of the bank of England, as I say every private citizen should have a power to do, on every occasion, when his credit is good, though money should fail him. They engaged the bank to discount all tallies issued for interest of debts; that is, in other words, to turn those sticks into money: but as public credit was so low that money could not be found to discharge even the interest of the advance made by the bank, the government consented, that all advances of that kind should bear compound interest quarterly, at 6 *per cent*. What a monstrous profit to the bank! what a charge upon the state! Had banks of circulation upon mortgages been established at that time, money would have come in at a moderate simple interest to individuals, who would have availed themselves of them, for the payment of all public burdens. Instead of which, industry was made to suffer; the public money did not come in; taxation stopt; expenses went on, and deficiencies were paid by the public at this monstrous charge.

On the other hand, had it not been for the assistance the bank then gave the state, in circulating those exchequer tallies, bills, &c. it is very certain that credit would have failed as totally in England

as it had done in France in 1708, when Desmaretz undertook the finances. This minister had no bank to avail himself of, and accordingly he run France in debt at the rate of two hundred millions of livres *per annum*, during seven campaigns; of which, I am persuaded, he did not receive one half, or near it, in effective value.

What I have said will, I hope, be sufficient to show that the only way for any state to borrow, is previously to provide a fund for making good what is agreed upon with the lenders; and that all expedients to supply the want of it will in the end bring great expense upon the people, either by involving them in an excessive burden of debts, in case public engagements should be held sacred, as has constantly been the case in Great Britain; or by driving the state to a bankruptcy, as was the case in France upon the death of the late King. I call it a bankruptcy, because *all* that was owing was not paid. A man who pays no more than 19 s. 11 3/4 d. in the pound, is a bankrupt, as well as he who cannot pay one farthing.

I now come to the methods of paying off debts when already contracted.

Public debts may be divided into two classes, redeemable and irredeemable. Redeemable debts may be paid off in several ways, which we shall briefly enumerate before we compare their several advantages.

First then, such *debts* may be paid off at once, by refunding to the creditors the whole capital, with all arrears of interest.

2do,

2do, *They* may be paid off yearly, according to a certain rule to determine the preference, and order of payment: for this purpose, a determinate sum must be set apart as a sinking fund.

3tio, *They* may be paid off cumulatively and proportionally every year, by incorporating the sinking fund into the money appropriated for discharging the interest, and by placing all that is paid beyond the interest, as payment in part of the capital.

4to, *They* may be paid in one sense, as shall be farther explained, by reducing the interest upon the capitals, without diminishing them.

5to, *They* may be paid off by converting them into annuities for lives.

6to, And lastly, *they* may be paid off under the value of the capitals, by the means of lotteries; where the state may gain what the creditors chuse to lose from a desire of gaining.

To one or other of these methods may be reduced all the fair and honest expedients which a state may employ to get rid of their debts, without any breach of public faith, or without proceeding to the extremity of prescribing conditions of payment, which the creditors are forced to accept against their will.

As for the irredeemable debts, I apprehend, that, without consent of the creditors, no change upon the condition of loan can justly be made.

I shall next point out the advantages and disadvantages of the several methods, of discharging debts, as they may affect the separate, or cumulative interest of a state.

Were large debts which have subsisted for a long time to be paid off all at once, it would occasion a sudden and a violent revolution, which is always attended with inconveniences.

Were, for example, the proprietors of lands to consent to sell off a part of their estates for the payment of the public debts, the quantity of land brought to market, would sink the price of it very considerably; from which would arise a great detriment to landlords. I shall not here inquire from whence such a sum of money could come.

Could a treasure be brought from India (let me suppose) sufficient at once to discharge the debts of Great Britain, circulation would become so glutted with money, that interest would fall to nothing. This would be a temporary loss to all the former creditors, until they had time to lend to the other states of Europe, who would, in consequence of the revolution, sink the rate of interest upon their own debts. Something like this was the consequence of paying off all the debts of France with bank notes in 1720, upon which interest fell, as we have observed above, to 2 per cent.

When, in the second place, debts are paid off partially every year, according to a certain rule, it is expedient to have the capitals reduced into shares of a determinate value, as is the practice in France, that they may be drawn out as in a lottery. The lots drawn may then be paid, and no detriment will follow to any particular creditor, more than to another: because if by being paid there be either profit or loss to the creditor, it will affect the

value of the whole stock in proportion. If, upon the establishment of such a plan, the stock be found to rise, it will be a proof that either the interest formerly paid was below the common rate, or that the credit of the state was looked upon as precarious: if it should sink, contrary conclusions may safely be drawn.

This is a common method of paying off debts in France, where funds are more commonly divided into shares than in Great Britain.

In 1759, the King opened a subscription for seveny-two millions of livres upon the general farms: this sum was divided into seventy-two thousand actions, bearing 5 *per cent.* and it was stipulated, that upon the renewal of the farms in 1762, twelve thousand actions should be drawn by lot, and paid off monthly; so that in six months the whole debt was to be discharged.

The third method of applying what is annually paid above the interest, in extinction of the capital, is the measure proposed by Cardinal Richlieu for discharging the debts of France; only the Cardinal went to work in a very arbitrary way, both in determining the interest, and in fixing a value upon the capital, equally detrimental to the creditors.

To apply this to an example. Had England at the time government first established a sinking fund, arising out of the savings which were made upon reducing the rate of interest, from time to time, continued to pay to the creditors the same annual sums as formerly; and thereby applied what was paid beyond the interest, to the payment of the

capital, there could not have been any misapplication of the sinking fund; and the debts by this time would have been greatly diminished. Whereas by applying the sinking fund to the service of the year, for the ease of the people and advantage of the creditors, the consequences *may* prove exceedingly inconvenient.

The fourth method of reducing debts is that adopted by Great Britain, viz. by reducing the interest paid upon them. From this we discover the reason why taxes, even in time of war, are seldom augmented in this kingdom much above the proportion of the interest of the money borrowed.

We have, in the second chapter of the first book, boldly declared this to be against principles, and the authors of such a scheme were there stigmatized as men of no foresight: we now see how much people may be mistaken in their conclusions in political matters, when they are formed upon too narrow combinations.

Were capitals intended *ever* to be paid, no doubt the conclusion would be just; but if it be resolved, that capitals shall never be considered as the object of attention, and that the interest alone shall be looked upon as the real burden, then all payment of capitals is unnecessary, except so far as by paying a part of them, it may serve to reduce the interest upon the rest, by making money regorge in the market beyond the uses found for it.

This plan cannot be carried on while a nation is engaged in an expensive war, which absorbs all the money to be lent: but it becomes the object of a

statesman's care, after peace is restored, and when trade begins to bring in a balance upon exportations.

We have seen how that balance tends every year to diminish the capitals due to strangers, and to keep money at home. Then is the time to extend taxation beyond the uses found for money to pay the interest. Two or three millions extraordinary, raised at the close of a war, and thrown into the hands of the creditors of Great Britain, in extinction of their capitals, would soon engage them to cry for mercy. They would find no outlet but France for such sums; and it is precisely after a war, that France is busy in playing off the arbitrary operations on her debts, which reduces her credit too low for any one to trust her with money. Let peace continue for a few years, confidence will there advance apace, and then it will become more difficult to make money regorge in England.

To say that taxes are already beyond all bounds, is, in other words, to say the nation is no more in a state of defence: because should Britain be again involved in an unavoidable war, the consequence will be, either to render more taxes indispensable, or to oblige the nation to submit to any terms demanded by her enemies.

If it be therefore true, that taxes may still be augmented, the most proper time for augmenting them, is, at the very close of a war; because then every circumstance favors the scheme, as we shall now explain.

We have said above, and experience proves the truth of it, that at the end of a war circulation

becomes too full for domestic uses; and that the superfluity of money is realized upon property. This is the consequence of a sudden stop in national expense. Were taxes at such a time augmented, part of this regorging money would find a vent by the augmentation upon domestic circulation which taxes would occasion; which augmentation would circulate into the exchequer, instead of becoming consolidated with property, as has been said, and coming into the hands of government, would be poured into those of the creditors, in payment of part of their capitals. There it would regorge a-new; because it is observed, in general, that those who have property in the funds are not apt to squander money when unexpectedly thrown into their hands; on the contrary, they are commonly found to live very much within their income*.

* Experience shows, that when the debts of a nation have come to a height, the public creditors become people of great consequence, upon account of the ease and affluence of their circumstances. They are not exposed to the many hidden expenses incident to land proprietors. They are a class in the state but lately known; the capital of their wealth is hid; and opinions concerning their figure and rank are as yet unformed. Whereas the family of a land proprietor is known; his expense *may surpass* that of his predecessors without much observation; but if it should *fall below it*, he commonly sinks in the estimation of his neighbours, who seldom combine circumstances which can only be guessed at. An heir to a landed estate, is bred up from his infancy with the notion of living like his father: the son of a monied man has commonly every different sentiments; and even when any of this class takes a turn to expense, the lustre of it is all displayed round their own bodies; that is, in their own house, and in their own

But suppose it should not immediately regorge, it would then increase expense and consumption; consequently, would advance industry, and render every branch of excises more productive. In every combination we can form, public opulence would be augmented: money would regorge at last; and then the creditors would come with their application to government to suspend the reimbursement of capitals, and to accept, in lieu of that, a diminution upon the interest.

This is the golden opportunity for diminishing the public burden occasioned by debts; and this method of compassing so desirable an end, is far preferable to that of compelling creditors to submit to a diminution, by offering a sudden reimbursement which was put in practice in Britain in the year 1749, as has been observed. Had the public waited with patience one year longer, and then thrown in a few millions more than they did into the hands of the creditors, the proposal of reducing the interest would have come from the other quarter; which in all bargains with creditors is of the greatest consequence to the debtor.

The sum of interest thus diminished, upon an obligation to suspend the reimbursements of capitals

families: no country seats, hounds, horses, servants in every quarter, family interest to keep up, little economy in spending. In a word, every one feels better than I can describe, that landed men commonly exceed, and monied men commonly live within their income.

for a limited time, three questions will naturally occur: 1. Whether the taxes should be diminished in proportion: or 2. If they should be allowed to subsist with a view to apply the overplus of them to national purposes: or 3. Whether it may not be most adviseable to turn such a part of the debts into annuities for lives, as may absorb the saving upon the former interest paid. The first two questions I reserve for the following book, where they will be fully examined; the last is the fifth expedient proposed for acquitting the public debts. As the nature of it is abundantly evident, I shall only repeat what I formerly observed, that this method of establishing a sinking fund, has the advantage of being less exposed to misapplications than any other.

The last expedient of paying off capitals, below the original value, by the means of lotteries, should only take place after interest is brought so low as to cut off any near prospect of reducing it still farther.

I shall not pretend to guess at the lowest point to which the rate of interest may be brought, by the expedients of increasing money at will, by the means of banks upon mortgage. I have in the seventh chapter of the first part of this book, thrown out a hint of a land-bank, which opens a very wide field of speculation; but in this place, it would be unnecessary to enlarge upon that subject.

Let me suppose the rate of interest brought lower in Britain than any where else, it will nevertheless be subject to periodical risings, on many occasions.

Upon every such emergency, capitals will sink in the market below par.

It is then *only* that a state can have recourse to this last expedient of opening lotteries, and taking in subscriptions at the market price of the funds subscribed into them. And although the annuities to be paid upon the lottery fund be regulated by the rate of interest at the time, and consequently considerably above the standard of the other debts; yet the same methods of reducing it afterwards will constantly produce their effects, and thereby diminish the capital by degrees.

In like manner, in time of war, when the public funds fall greatly in their price, government may open new subscriptions, and receive payment for them in their own paper at the market price, allowing a small premium in the rate of interest. If the creditors willingly subscribe upon these conditions, no violation of public faith can be alledged. By this operation, the capitals will be diminished, and the advanced rate of interest paid during the war, will return upon the peace to where it was: then the new subscriptions may be paid off, or subscribed for again at a lower rate than before.

Suppose it then resolved, that in time of war, the nation's creditors should be allowed at certain times, to subscribe their capitals in books opened at the bank for that purpose, one quarter *per cent.* above the selling price. Would not this have the good effect of supporting the price of stocks on one hand, and of reducing the capital of the national debt upon the other? Example.

Let me suppose that in time of war, the 3 *per cents.*

fell at $74 \frac{3}{4}$, might not government receive them at 75, and constitute the new subscription at 4 *per cent.*? What interest could any one have not to subscribe, who at such a time intends to sell his stock? His 3 *per cent.* sold to government at 75, and turned into a 4 *per cent.* would afterwards, when sold in the market, produce $\frac{1}{4}$ *per cent.* more than if it had not been subscribed into the new fund.

Perhaps in Change alley, where calculation is carried to the utmost pitch of refinement, even this eventual advantage to government might sink the value of the new 4 *per cents.* Let this be allowed. The answer is, that when people compute with such nicety, and comprehend in their calculations every circumstance the most minute, it is, I think, the interest of a state (whose views should extend far beyond the period of human life) to grant a premium upon such subscriptions more than sufficient to indemnify the subscribers, according to the most rigid calculation concerning their present advantage.

The smallest profit to be discovered by the nicest pen will engage the monied man to subscribe; consequently, the capitals of debts may be diminished, at a loss to the public almost imperceptible. And for this imperceptible loss in the mean time, the greatest national advantage may be obtained at a distant period.

It is now full time to close this book, which has swelled far beyond its due proportion. The subject of credit and debts is so connected with many questions relating to taxes, and to the application of their

amount, that the connexion of the subject would have suffered little in blending them together. But as I find it is a great relief to the memory to interpose, now and then, a pause; and as taxes were intended to be treated of by themselves, according to the plan I at first proposed, I shall make no alteration in it.

At the end of the first and second books, I subjoined a chapter of recapitulation; in the third book, this was supplied by a very full table of contents; here, because of the intimate connexion of the subject of this and the following book, I shall refer the reader to the end of the volume, for a full recapitulation of both.

AN INQUIRY
INTO THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY.

BOOK V.
OF TAXES, AND OF THE PROPER
APPLICATION OF THEIR AMOUNT.

INTRODUCTION.

THE subject of taxes is so closely connected with every branch of political economy, that I have not been able to avoid anticipating a subject, which, according to my plan, is left for the conclusion of this work.

What has been hitherto introduced concerning taxation, in treating of industry, trade, money, credit, and debts, relates principally to the effects of taxes upon circulation, prices, and several other things relatively to those subjects.

What therefore remains, not as yet touched upon, chiefly concerns the principles which determine the nature of every tax, relatively to the interest it is intended to affect.

To investigate the different consequences of taxes when imposed upon possessions, and when upon consumption, are questions which relate directly to the principles of taxation. But in this book I shall also have occasion to trace out, farther than as yet I have done, certain combinations concerning the effects which taxes have in multiplying the fund of circulation: and as the augmentation of taxes tends greatly to increase money, I am thence led to examine, how far the advantage gained by the suppression of taxes may not be more than compensated to a nation, by the inconveniences proceeding from so great a diminution of circulation.

Taxes have all along been supposed to enhance the price of living; we shall therefore have an opportunity of investigating the proper extent to be allowed to that general proposition.

C H A P. I.

Of the different Kinds of Taxes:

TAXES have been established in all ages of the world, under different names of tribute, tithe, tally, impost, duty, gabel, custom, subsidy, excise; and many others needless to recapitulate, and foreign to my subject to examine.

Though in every species of this voluminous category, there are certain characteristic differences; yet one principle prevails in all, upon which the definition may be founded.

I understand therefore by *tax*, in its most general acceptation, *a certain contribution of fruits, service, or money, imposed upon the individuals of a state, by the act or consent of the legislature, in order to defray the expenses of government.*

This definition may, I think, include, in general, all kinds of burdens which can possibly be imposed. By fruits are understood either those of the earth, of animals, or of man himself. By service, whatever man can either by labor or ingenuity produce, while he himself remains free. And under money is comprehended the equivalent given for what may be exacted in the other two ways.

I have no occasion to consider the nature of such taxes as are not in use in our days. Tributes of slaves from conquered nations are as little known in our times, as contributions of subsistence from the subjects of the state.

I divide, therefore, modern taxes into three classes.
 1. Those upon alienation, which I call proportional:
 2. Those upon possessions, which I call cumulative or arbitrary: and 3. Those exacted in service, which I call personal. These terms must now be fully explained, that I may use them hereafter without being misunderstood.

A proportional tax presents a simple notion.

It is paid by the buyer, who intends to consume, at the time of the consumption, while the balance of wealth is turning against him; and is consolidated with the price of the commodity.

Examples of this tax are all excises, customs, stamp-duties, postage, coinage, and the like.

By this definition, two requisites are necessary for fixing the tax upon any one: first, he must be a buyer; secondly, he must be a consumer. Let this be retained.

A cumulative or arbitrary tax, presents various ideas at first sight, and cannot well be defined until the nature of it has been illustrated by examples.

It may be known, *imo*, By the intention of it; which is to affect the possessor in such a manner as to make it difficult for him to augment his income, in proportion to the tax he pays.

2^{do}, By the object, when instead of being laid upon any determinate piece of labor or consumption, it is made to affect past and not present gains.

3^{tio}, By the circumstances under which it is levied, which imply no transition of property from hand to hand, nor any change in the balance of wealth between individuals.

Examples of cumulative taxes are land-taxes, poll-taxes, window-taxes, duties upon coaches and servants, that upon *industrie*, in France, and many others.

A personal tax is known by its affecting the person, not the purse of those who are laid under it. Examples of it are the *corvée*, in France; the six days labor on the high roads, and militia service before pay was allowed, in England*.

Having thus explained what I mean by proportional, cumulative, and personal taxes, it is proper to observe, that however different they may prove in their effects and consequences, they all agree in this, that they ought to impair the fruits and not the fund; the expenses of the person taxed, not the savings; the services, not the persons of those who do them.

This holds true in every denomination of taxes. In former days, when annual tributes of slaves were paid, and even at present among the Turks, where it is customary to recruit the seraglios of great men by such contributions, I consider the young women who are sent, as part of the fruits of the people who send them. This is a fundamental principle in taxation; and therefore public contributions, which necessarily imply a diminution of any capital, cannot properly be ranged under the head of taxes. Thus

* The *corvée* in France is the personal service of all the laboring classes, for carrying on public works. Were they paid for in money, it is computed they would amount to no more than 1,200,000 livres a year. This tax was omitted in the account of the French revenue.

when

when the Dutch contributed, not many years ago, the hundredth part of their property towards the service of the state, I cannot properly consider that in the light of a tax: it was indeed a most public spirited contribution, and did more honor to that people, from the fidelity with which it was made, than any thing of the kind ever boasted of by a modern society.

C H A P. II.

Of proportional Taxes, and their proper Object.

W HATEVER exists for the use of man, so far as it is considered as a fund for taxation, may be classed under the following heads: 1. The produce or fruits of the earth; 2. the produce of the industry of man; or 3. his personal service. Farther,

Fruits cannot be obtained without the necessary labor of man and cattle. As this labor presupposes all the necessary consumption of maintenance, &c. the produce of the land must be understood, with regard to taxes, to be that part of the fruits only which remains after deducting an equivalent for all necessary expenses in making the earth produce them. The net produce alone of the earth is to be considered as a fund liable to taxation; and every contribution which bears not a just proportion to that quantity, is wrong imposed, as shall be shown as we go along.

Again, as to the produce of work: this cannot be

brought into existence without some expence, viz. the maintenance of the workman; that is to say, his food, raiment, fire, lodging, and the expence he is at for tools, and every other necessary. This we shall, for the future, call his physical-necessary. The value of the work, over and above an equivalent for these articles, is the only fund to be taxed with regard to the workman.

As to work itself, we have seen above (Book II. chap. 26.) in the general distributiton of things which may be purchased with money, how it was ranged under the class of things incorporeal. For that reason, the work performed cannot come under taxation; and therefore the person working, who by work acquires a balance in his favor, is brought to be affected by proportional taxes upon the articles of his consumption; and when it is found that these articles suffer no alienation before they are consumed by him, and consequently escape taxation, then he may either be laid under the cumulative taxes, which will affect his wealth, or under the personal, which are paid in work itself, and in that respect may be considered as the fruit of the man.

Nothing would be so easy as a general rule for imposing proportional taxes, did the laborers of the ground actually consume a part of the fruits of the earth, and the other industrious classes a part of their own work, in lieu of this physical-necessary. In that case, nothing but what remained of fruits and work, not already consumed by the immediate producers, would come to market for the use of those who do not work; but who have an equivalent to give for

it, out of the produce of past industry. Where that, I say, the case, then at the time of alienation (or, as we expressed it in the 26th chapter of the second book, at the time when the balance of wealth is going to turn in favor of the industrious, against the idle consumer) a tax proportional to the value of the alienation might, with the greatest propriety, be imposed, as we shall presently discover.

This, I hope, will recal to mind the principles deduced in the chapter above cited, where we made it appear, how the industrious classes, who furnish consumable commodities for the price of their overplus, must constantly have the balance of wealth turning in their favor: and when once they arrive at a certain degree of ease, proportional to their ambition, then they give over working, and become incorporated into the class of those who have enriched them.

Thus matters go on in a perpetual circle. The industrious become easy, and the public lays the consumers under a perpetual contribution in proportion to their expense.

The hypothesis we have made, is not entirely agreeable to matter of fact; because the operation of taxes is far more complex than we have described it to be; but by simplifying it, as I have done, it serves to give an idea of the result, or general consequence of proportional taxes, which, when properly imposed, do affect the idle only, but never the industrious.

Were, I say, the operation of taxation as simple as we have represented it, nothing would be more

easy than to deduce its principles. Nothing would come to be refunded to the laborer or workman, at the sale of his surplus. This surplus would be equal to the whole produce of the earth, and whole industry of the country, deducting the physical-necessary of all the industrious; and this physical-necessary need not then be deducted; because it is supposed to be consumed in the very production of the surplus, as the aqueous part of sea water is consumed before you can have the salt.

This illustrates what has been said, viz. that the fruits of the earth are only to be reckoned to exist, after deducting the necessary expense of providing them. For though in fact a farmer possesses all his crop after harvest, yet part of it, *as to him*, is virtually consumed out of his own stock, or that of others who have furnished him food and necessaries all the time it was coming forward: consequently, that part neither belongs to the ground, or to the farmer,

If it be urged still, that the whole must be supposed to exist with regard to the state, I agree to the proposition; but according to our argument, it must not be supposed to exist in favor of the state, to the prejudice of the farmer; for this reason, that the total of the farmer's expense must be understood to have been taken from the surplus of other people's industry, and therefore if the crop be supposed to exist with respect to the state, because it is in the farmer's yard, the surplus of industry which he has consumed must not be supposed to exist in favor of the state, at the same time. But as the farmer is supposed to have paid the tax upon what he has bor-

rowed and consumed, he must *draw it back* from those who, in their turn, are to consume his crop: and if he draws it back, he cannot be said to pay it, although the state profits of it as much as if he did.

Does it not appear from this analysis, that a state can only take gratuitously and proportionally out of the surplus of fruits and industry? Now what is here called surplus, relatively to the industrious, is the necessary fund of consumption for all the rich and idle; consequently, were the state to diminish any part of the *quantity*, the idle and the rich would be deprived of a sufficiency: but in regard that those who do not work give money, which is the price of all things, in exchange for what they consume, there the state steps in, and says, we ask nothing of those who have nothing but their physical-necessary, this they have been allowed to take; we take none of their surplus from them, this we allow them to sell to you: but as for you, who do not work, and have in your coffers wherewithal to purchase the labors of your industrious brethren, this labor you shall not profit of, unless you give the state a certain value out of your wealth, in proportion to the work and fruit you are going to consume, although you have contributed nothing towards the production of it.

Hence it appears evident, that without *money* there could be no tax imposed: for, were the state to take their proportion of the real surplus, and dispose of it out of the country, a part of the inhabitants would be starved. But by any equivalent's being found, quite different from the surplus itself, of no use for subsistence, the whole produce of industry

is left for the use of those who have it; the state takes what part of the equivalent they please from the idle; and no body starves, but such as have not money, nor industry, nor the talent of exciting the compassion of the charitable.

By this simple representation of a most complicated operation, I have been able to deduce the capital principle of proportional taxation. If the reasoning be found solid, it may be retained; because we shall have occasion to recur to it, at almost every new combination.

C H A P. III.

How proportional Taxes are drawn back by the industrious, and how that drawing back is the only reason why Taxes raise the Prices of Commodities.

WHAT perplexes our notions in the theory of proportional taxation, is, that the industrious man, instead of bringing his surplus to market, is obliged to bring the whole of his work.

Let me, therefore, suppose him to be creditor upon one part of his work, and proprietor of the other. This will divide it, as it were, into two parts, which I shall call (A) and (B).

(A) represents that part upon which he is creditor, and answers to all the expense he has already been at; that is, to his physical-necessary, as we have called it. This we have said ought to be considered as virtually consumed by the workman, and if a tax

be raised upon it, it must not affect *him*; that is, he must draw it totally back from the person to whom he disposes of it. (B) on the other hand, represents that part of which he is proprietor, to wit, his profit; and therefore may either be taxed or not, as the state shall think fit.

If it be taxed in the hands of the industrious man, without suffering an alienation, the tax will be of a cumulative nature. If it be left free to him, and taxed to the person who buys it, it will be of the proportional kind, as we shall see afterwards. Again,

In the first case, it will check the growing wealth of the industrious man; in the second, it will accelerate the dissipation of the buyer.

Taxes, therefore, of the first kind, are proper to be imposed in countries where the state is jealous of growing wealth, as we have observed in the 25th chapter of the second book. If the tax, again, be laid upon the buyer, then the balance turns in favor of the industrious man, in proportion to the full amount of (B), and produces no other effect than to accelerate the dissipation of the buyer.

Let us now take in a new combination.

If, when the work is brought to market and sold, the price shall not exceed the value of the industrious man's (A), then he is of the class of those we call *physical-necessarians*, who accumulate no profits. If the price of it be less than (A), he becomes a load upon the state, a bankrupt to those who have fed him upon credit, and will die for want, unless he be supported by charity.

So far with regard to the seller: next as to the buyer.

The buyer appears at market with his money. When he comes there he must give, first, an equivalent for the prime cost of the merchandize: that is, he must refund every expense necessarily incurred in producing it; or he must refund the value of (A). Next, the industrious man has a claim upon him for his profits, viz. his (B). Then comes the state, who claims a part of his wealth, in regard that he is going to purchase what his own industry has not produced. This is the tax; I shall call it (C). This tax will be found of the proportional kind. It will not affect the growing wealth of the seller, but it will accelerate the dissipation of the buyer; and will pull down the scale against him, in favor of the industrious. This is a proper tax, in countries where the state observes the maxim of sharing the wealth of those who dissipate.

Let us now take in another combination. Let us suppose this buyer to be an industrious person, and the thing bought to be a necessary material for the manufacture in which he is employed. Is it not plain, that when the second industrious man comes to market to sell his work, which I also suppose composed of his (A) and his (B), that his (A) is a still more compounded body? It first includes his own physical-necessary, as above: 2. the (A) and (B) of the man from whom he bought the materials: and 3. the (C) which he paid to the state for the liberty of acquiring what he himself had not produced.

Whoever therefore buys from the second industrious man, must, in like manner, refund to him his full; (A); he must also pay him his (B); and then he will find the state claiming their (C), as in the former operation.

This being done, let us examine the interests of all parties. The first industrious man has no reason to complain of the tax; because he was paid his necessary expense (A), and also his (B) for his profit; and the state realized the tax at the expense of the second industrious man, who paid it. Now we said that the dissipation of his wealth was accelerated in proportion to the value of what he paid for (C), but as he is none of the idle, and as the thing bought was a material necessary for his manufacture, the second buyer finds himself obliged to refund the whole amount of the first (A), (B), (C); because the sum of them make a part of the second man's (A). Now it is the refunding of this (C) to the industrious man which is the only circumstance, from which proceeds the rise in the price of commodities, in consequence of proportional taxes. Moreover, the second buyer must pay the second industrious man's (B), in favor of the balance which is going to turn against him; and last of all, he must pay the second (C), which is the share the state requires of him, in order to accelerate his dissipation.

Now let us observe, that if the commodity bought by the second industrious man, be not necessary for the existence of his manufacture, it cannot enter into his (A), and therefore must be diminished upon his (B); and if his (B) cannot pay it, then he will owe it to some body, and for the future must either abstain from such expenses, or leave off working, in favor of those who can live without them.

Let me illustrate all this by an example.

A tanner sells his leather to a shoemaker; the

shoemaker in paying the tanner for his leather, pays the tanner's subsistence and profit, and the tax upon leather.

The man who buys the shoes for his own consumption, refunds all this to the shoemaker, together with his subsistence, profit, and the tax upon shoes; consequently, the price of shoes are raised, only by refunding the taxes paid by the industrious.

But if the shoemaker's subsistence shall happen to include either tavern expenses, or his consumption on idle days, he will not draw these back; because other shoemakers who do not frequent the tavern, and who are not idle, will undersell him: he must therefore take his extraordinary expense out of his profits; and if his profit be not sufficient, he must run in debt to the tavern-keeper.

The extravagance and idleness, therefore, of particular workmen does not check industry, nor raise prices; for these will always be in proportion to demand, and there is no reason why demand should either rise or fall, because a particular workman is extravagant, or consumes a commodity not necessary for his manufacture or subsistence.

From this example there arises a new combination: that in proportion as the industrious do not consume of the produce of their own industry, but come to market with the whole, and then purchase the work of others, they are considered, as to taxes, in the light of idle consumers, who do not work, but purchase with money the fruits of the industry of others. By this operation, the taxable fund is augmented beyond the extent of the general surplus

called (B). The reason is plain. Whatever is brought to market is supposed to be surplus, as it *may* there be bought by the idle, as well as the industrious. The only difference is, that the first do not draw back the tax, and that the second do, as we have already shown.

From this reasoning we may conclude, that the way to carry proportional taxes to their utmost extent, is to draw all commodities to market, to engage every one to carry thither the whole produce of his industry, and buy whatever he stands in need of.

But which way will you engage either a farmer to sell his crop, and buy subsistence from another; or a shoemaker to sell his own, and buy his neighbour's shoes? The thing is impracticable; and were it attempted, it would prove an arbitrary proceeding, and a cumulative tax laid upon their industry: a tax which, by the nature of it, they cannot draw back, as we shall presently see, and from this circumstance alone proceeds the whole oppression of it.

Let me next analyze the price paid by the last buyer, whom we have called the rich and idle consumer of the manufacture, who can draw nothing back from any body.

Is it not composed of the whole value of the subsistence, of the work, of the profits, of the tax? The whole reimbursement of all former payments and repayments lands upon him. Those who have been at all the expense, appear in the light of his servants and agents, who have only advanced money upon his account.

How absurd, therefore, is it either to say, that

all taxes fall ultimately upon land; or as others, for no better reason, pretend, that they fall upon trade. I say, that this category of taxes which I have now been describing, and which I shall still more fully explain in a subsequent chapter, never can either fall upon, or affect any person but the idle; that is to say, the not industrious consumer. If there be found a possibility for any consumer to draw back the tax he has paid, I say he is of the class of the industrious, in one way or other: and I farther say, that such a tax raises the price of the commodity. But by drawing back, I understand, that the repayment is an inseparable consequence of his having paid the tax. I do not, for example, say that a place-man draws back his taxes by the emoluments of his office: but I say a brewer draws back his excise by the sale of his beer.

Let this principle also be retained, that with respect to the consumption of superfluities by the manufacturing classes, they must be considered as being of the class of the rich and idle, as much as the first Duke in England. When therefore the extravagance of the manufacturing classes becomes general, and when the rate of the market can afford them great wages, relatively to the price of necessaries, such profits consolidate into the price of the manufacture, according to the principles laid down in the 10th chapter of the second book. The statesman then must endeavour to create a competition, by introducing fresh and untainted hands into such branches. This will be a sure check upon the industrious, and, if rightly applied, will prevent

all frauds, all pretences for the rise of the price of labor on account of taxes: and, if carried to the full extent, will prevent any industrious person from enjoying either a day's idleness, or the smallest superfluity; except in consequence of his peculiar dexterity, or extrinsic advantages.

C H A P. IV.

Of cumulative Taxes.

I SHALL not here repeat what I have already said concerning the characteristics of this kind of imposition; but after citing some examples, I shall examine it more closely, as to its nature and consequences.

The most familiar examples of it to an Englishman, are tithes, land-tax, window-tax, and poor-rates.

The most familiar examples to a Frenchman, are the, *Taille*, *Fourage*, and *Ustencil*, (which go commonly together) also the *Capitation*, the *Dixième*, the *Vingtième*, and the *Industrie**.

* The *Taille* is properly a land-tax, to which men called *noble* are not subjected. The reason of which is, that it was originally imposed in lieu of such personal military services as were peculiar to the lower classes.

The *Fourage* and *Ustencil* are laid upon all those who pay the *taille*, and are in proportion to it. The first is appropriated for the subsistence of the cavalry, when they are in quarters; the last for kettles and small utensils for the infantry.

The *Capitation* is the poll-tax. The *Dixièmes* and *Vingtièmes*

The nature of all these taxes, is to affect the possessions, income and profits of every individual, without putting it in their power to draw them back in any way whatever; consequently, such taxes tend very little towards enhancing the price of commodities.

Those who come under such taxes, do not always consider that their past industry, gains, or advantages of fortune, are here intended to suffer a diminution, in favor of the state; for which out-going they have, perhaps, made no provision.

When people of the lower classes, instead of being subjected to proportional taxes, are laid under such impositions, there results a great inconvenience. They are allowed to receive the whole profit of their industry, which in the former chapter we called their (B), the state however reserving to itself a claim for a part of it: this, instead of being paid gradually, as in a proportional tax, is collected at the end of the year, when they have made no provision for it, and consequently, they are put to distress.

Besides, how hard is it to deprive them of the power of drawing back what they pay? And how ill judged to trust money with those who are supposed only to gain an easy physical - necessary? An equivalent for procuring the articles of ease and luxury, should not be left in the hands of those who are not permitted to enjoy them.

have been already explained, and tithes are well known to every one.

The *Industrie* is that imposition arbitrarily laid on by the Intendants of Provinces, upon all classes of industrious people, in proportion to their supposed profits in every branch of business.

From this we may conclude, 1. That the more such taxes are proportional to the subject taxed, 2. the more evident that proportion appears; and 3. the more frequently and regularly they are levied, the more they will resemble proportional taxes, and the less burden will be found in paying them. Let me illustrate this by some examples.

The stoppage upon a soldier's pay, either for the invalids, or Chelsea, is a cumulative tax; but the method of levying it gives it all the advantages of one of the proportional kind. 1st, It bears an exact and determinate proportion to the value of his pay. 2^{dly}, This proportion he knows perfectly. And 3^{tio}, Instead of receiving the whole into his own possession, and paying the hospital at the end of the year, it is regularly and gradually retained from him at every payment.

Tithes are a cumulative tax; but they are accompanied with all the three requisites to make them light, although in other respects they are excessively burdensome. 1st, They bear an exact proportion to the crop. 2^{dly}, This proportion is perfectly known. 3^{dly}, Nature, and not the laborer, makes the provision. But they fall upon an improper object: they affect the whole produce of the land, and not the surplus; which last is the only fund that ought to be taxed.

The land-tax in Scotland bears, 1st, a very determinate proportion to the valuation of the land; and has, 2^{dly}, the advantage of being well known to every contributor; so that provision may easily be made for it. But the third requisite is wanting.

the proprietor having the public money in his hands, often applies it to private purposes; and when the demand is made upon him, he is put to distress.

The *taille*, in many provinces of France, bears, first, a very exact proportion to the value of the land*.

But in the second place, the proportion is entirely unknown to the man who pays it; being nowhere to be seen but in the offices of the intendant and his deputies.

And in the last place, the whole payment comes at once.

What hides, and consequently destroys this proportion, is, that after the distribution is laid on, as in Scotland, at so many shillings in the pound of valuation, the full sum intended to be raised does not come in; either because the intendant has given exemptions to certain parishes, on account of the accidents of sterility, hail, mortality among the cattle, and the like; or because the property of a part of the parish has fallen into the hands of people exempted from the *taille*; or that others, who were really bound to pay part of it, are become insolvent. The intendant must then make a second, and perhaps a third general distribution of the deficiency upon all the contributors, in the most exact proportion to the first, but yet by their nature impossible to be

* This sort of *taille* is called *tariffée*; because it is imposed according to a valuation of the land. It is a late improvement; but still is exposed to numberless inconveniences, which are mentioned in the text.

foreseen. It is for these reasons chiefly that the *taille* in that kingdom is so grievous.

These second distributions of the tax, 1st, destroy the proportion between the tax and the revenue taxed. 2^{dly}, They make it impossible to judge of the amount of them. And lastly, the demand comes at once, when, perhaps, the money has been otherwise applied.

The French tax upon industry is more grievous still; because none of the three requisites above-mentioned are allowed to operate.

This tax is supposed to be proportional to the profits made upon trade, and other branches of industry, not having the land for their object. All merchants and tradesmen, in cities, and in the country, pay the tax called *Industrie*; and the reason given for establishing this tax, as I have said in another place, is in order to make every individual in the state contribute to the expense of it, in proportion to the advantages he reaps. Nothing would be more just, could it be put in execution, without doing more hurt to the state, than the revenue drawn from it can do good.

I shall now show how, in this tax, all the three requisites we have mentioned are wanting.

1^{mo}, By its nature, it can bear no exact proportion to the profits of the industrious man; since nobody but the person taxed can so much as guess at their extent.

2^{do}, It cannot possibly be provided for, as no check can be put upon the imposer, unless so far as general rules are laid down for each class of the

industrious; and from these again other inconveniences flow, as shall be observed.

3tio, It comes at once upon poor people, who have been frequently forced to beg for want of employment before the tax-gatherer could make his demand; and those who remain, frequently become beggars before they can comply with it.

I say, that from the general rules laid down for regulating this tax, as to every class, a workman who has a large family to maintain, is no less taxed than one who has no charge but himself: and it will be allowed, I believe, that the profits of one industrious person of the lower classes, is in no country sufficient to pay any considerable tax, and maintain a large family, much less a sickly one. I therefore imagine, that cumulative taxes never should be raised upon such classes of inhabitants as have no income but their personal industry, which is so frequently precarious.

Merchants also ought not to be subjected to any tax upon their industry. They ought to be allowed to accumulate riches as fast as they can: because they employ them for the advancement of industry; and every deduction from their profits is a diminution upon that so useful fund.

When cumulative taxes are laid upon any of the industrious classes, they tend to check growing wealth; and are most familiarly imposed in monarchical states, where riches are apt to excite jealousy, as has been observed.

But as to the class of land proprietors, that is to say, the more wealthy inhabitants, who live

upon a revenue already made, the impropriety of cumulative taxes is much less. They are however burdensome, and disagreeable in all cases, and ought to be dispensed with, when the necessary supplies can be made out by proportional taxes, without raising the prices of labor too high for the prosperity of foreign trade.

From the examples I have given of this branch of taxation, I hope the nature of it may be fully understood, and that for the future no inconvenience will arise from my employing the term of *cumulative tax*. I shall now subjoin its definition.

A cumulative tax, is the accumulation of that return which every individual, who enjoys any superfluity, owes daily to the state, for the advantages he receives by living in the society. As this definition would not have been understood at setting out, I thought it proper, first, to explain the nature of the thing to be defined.

C H A P. V.

Of the Inconveniences which proceed from proportional Taxes ; and of the Methods of removing them.

A PROPORTIONAL tax, as I have said, is that which is levied upon the idle consumer, at the time he buys the commodity; and while, by consuming it, the balance of wealth is turning against him, in favor of the seller. This tax is consolidated as

it were with the price of the commodity, and must of necessity raise it.

I say, it is levied at the time of buying, and affects the buyer, in consequence of his consumption; because we have seen, that when the commodity is not consumed by the purchaser, then upon a subsequent alienation he is refunded all he paid. I consider him therefore, in that case, not as *paying*, but as *advancing* it for another; and while any part of the commodity remains unconsumed, there still remains the equivalent of a proportional part of the tax in the hands of him who advanced it.

I shall now proceed, as in the former chapter, by giving some examples of such impositions; and in examining them, endeavour to show their nature and consequences.

The most familiar to an Englishman are, *excises*, *customs*, *malt-tax*, *stamp-duties*, and the like.

To a Frenchman the *gabelle*, the *traites*, the *aides*, *tobacco*, &c.*

*The *gabelle* is a branch of the general farms, and consists of an excise upon salt. The manufacture of the commodity is in the hands of the farmers; and they, for a liberty to sell salt at a certain price, far above the expense of the manufacture, pay to the King an annual revenue of 28 millions of livres.

This I call a proportional tax, relatively to consumers; although in reality no tax-gatherers are employed for the collection of it, contrary to what is the case of all excises; which have never farmed by government to the manufacturers of the commodity taxed.

The *traites*, or, as they are otherwise called, the five great farms, were established by Colbert, when he took away a

In all kinds of this imposition we find the tax regularly reimbursed from hand to hand; it adheres so closely to the commodity, that it becomes as essentially a part of the value, as carriage, packing, and the like incident charges, enter into the prices of goods. It never can affect the industrious person who does not consume; and never can be avoided by him who does. Such taxes therefore necessarily raise the price of the commodity taxed.

Having already pointed out the principal advantages of proportional taxes, which is to throw the whole of the burden upon the rich, whom we have called the idle consumers, the better to distinguish them from the opulent class of the industrious; I must now enumerate the principal inconveniences

multitude of customs paid upon the transportation of goods from one province to another. They answer very much to our customs, or to the duties of tannage and poundage, and are let to the farmers general for the sum of 12 millions.

The *tobacco* is of the same nature with the salt tax. The farmers general have the exclusive privilege of selling it at a price fixed by the King.

For the farm of the tobacco is paid 15 millions.

The *aides* resemble our excises more than those we have mentioned. They consist in duties upon liquors, either brought into towns, or sold by retail in public houses; and upon all articles of food sold in corporations, except grain of every kind, which is free. They comprehend also a multitude of other duties superfluous to enumerate. They are collected by tax-gatherers at the gates of every town, who also have access to all public houses, where retail is laid under additional rates. The *aides* are farmed at 38 600 000 livres. These were the rates in the farms let in 1755. They have been since augmented in 1762, as has been observed.

complained of, from this mode of taxation, and trace out the principles from which they may be ascertained and removed.

The principal inconveniences alledged against proportional taxes may be reduced to three:

1mo, That they have the effect of raising the price of labor, and the produce of industry, and thereby prove hurtful to the prosperity of foreign trade.

2do, That they discourage consumption, by carrying the prices of many things too high for people of a middling rank in life.

3tio, That they are both expensive in the collection, and oppressive, from the many restrictions put upon liberty, in order to prevent frauds.

In analyzing every one of these inconveniences, it will be proper to inquire, how far the conclusions against those taxes are drawn from matter of fact; how far from plausible appearances only; and so far as they are real, not imaginary, to discover the methods of removing them.

As the first inconvenience lies in raising the price of all kinds of labor, and consequently of manufactures, I must distinguish between the consequence of raising prices at home, and of raising them upon articles of exportation; and I must consider the one and the other relatively to the collective body of a state, and not to some few individuals in it.

High prices at home are no discouragement to the industrious, most certainly, however disagreeable they may prove to consumers; and while they stand high, it is a proof that the demand of the consumers does not diminish.

High prices upon goods to be exported, are to be judged of by the proportion they bear to those in other countries.

Now the price of a manufacturer's wages is not regulated by the price of his subsistence, but by the price at which his manufacture sells in the market. Could a weaver, for example, live upon the air, he would still sell his day's work according to the value of the manufacture produced by it, when brought to market. As long as he can prevent the effects of the competition of his neighbours, he will carry the price of his work as high as is consistent with the profits of the merchant, who buys it from him in order to bring it to market; and this he will continue to do, until the rate of the market is brought down.

It is therefore the rate of the market for labor and manufactures, and not the price of subsistence, which determines the standard of wages. Were proportional taxes to raise the price of subsistence, and by that circumstance to discourage manufactures, we should see the generality of workmen living with sobriety, depriving themselves of superfluity, confining themselves to the plain but sufficient physical-necessary, working with all the assiduity that a man can support, and still not able to supply the market at the ordinary rates.

When in any country the work of manufacturers, who live luxuriously, and who can afford to be idle some days of the week, and live upon their wages, finds a ready market, this circumstance alone proves beyond all dispute, that subsistence

in that country is not too dear, at least in proportion to the market prices at home; and if taxes on consumption have, in fact, raised the price of necessaries, beyond the former standard, this rise cannot, in fact, discourage industry: it may discourage idleness; and idleness will not be totally rooted out, until people be forced, in one way or other, to give up both superfluity and days of recreation.

People are very apt to draw conclusions from what they think ought to be, according to the particular combinations they form to themselves; and for this reason it is generally thought, because taxes are higher in England than in some other countries, that foreign trade should therefore be hurt by them. But the sloth and idleness of man, and the want of ambition in the lower classes to improve their circumstances, tends more, I suspect, to circumscribe the productions of industry, and thus to raise their price, than any tax upon subsistence which has been hitherto imposed in that kingdom.

The whole of this doctrine is proved by experience, and is confirmed by our natural feelings. Many have been amazed to see how well the manufacturing classes live in years of scarcity, which frequently have the effect of doubling the price of the most necessary articles of subsistence. Are they not found, in bad years, more assiduous in their labor? Do they then frequent ale-houses, as in the years of plenty? Are they found idle one half of the week? Why should a tax laid on by the hand of nature prove such a spur to in-

dusttry; and another, similar to it in its effect, laid on by the hand of man, produce such hurtful consequences? Were a tract of bad years, I dare not say an increase of taxes, to continue long enough to bring manufacturers to a habit of sobriety, and application, a return of plenty, and low prices, would throw into their coffers, what many of them dissipate in riot and prodigality.

Even this conclusion will be too general, if every combination be taken in. Manufacturers there are, who work hard, and live soberly six days of the week, and who at the end find little superfluity, notwithstanding the high price of labor. Alas! they have many mouths to feed, and only two hands to supply the necessaries. This is the fatal competition so much insisted on in the first book, and by which a door is opened to great distress. Either the unmarried gain what the married should, and become extravagant, or the married gain no more than the unmarried can do, and become miserable.

The average between the two ought to determine the rate of wages in every modern society.

The remedies for this unequal competition, flowing from the happy liberty we enjoy, have been considered in another place.

The inconvenience here under examination will not be removed by an abolition of taxes; nor will it increase by the augmentation of them, as long as manufacturers, upon an average, enjoy superfluity and idle days.

Under these circumstances I conclude, that if foreign trade suffers by the high prices of commodities

in our markets, the vice does not proceed from our taxes, but from our domestic luxury, which swells demand at home. Were we less luxurious, and more frugal in our management in general, all classes of the industrious, from the retailer down to the lowest manufacturer, would be satisfied with more moderate profits. Let not, therefore, a statesman regulate his conduct upon suppositions, nor conclude any thing from theory, nor from arguments *a priori*, drawn from the supposed effects of taxes; but let him have recourse to information and experience concerning the real state of the matter.

Let him inquire what are the prices abroad; what are the prices at home; how those who work in exportable commodities live; what superfluities they enjoy; and what days of idleness they indulge in.

If he finds that goods are not exported, because of high prices, while manufacturers are enjoying superfluity, and indulging themselves in idleness, let him multiply hands, and he will reduce them all to their physical-necessary; and by thus augmenting the supply, he will also reduce the prices in his markets at home.

If he wants to reduce prices still lower, in favor of exportation, but finds that he has occasion for the amount of certain taxes, which enhance the value of his physical-necessary, to which he has reduced his industrious classes, then let him grant a bounty upon the quantity exported, more than equivalent to all the taxes paid by those who provide it; and let the people at home continue to pay dearer than strangers, in favor of the state. If you only want

to promote exportation by lowering prices, there will be no occasion to lower them universally, any more than there is occasion to put a large plaister over the whole body, to cure a small pimple on a particular part of it.

I have said, that while the rate of the market remains the same, so will the prices of every part of labor and industry, which enters into the composition of the thing brought to market. This is consistent with reason, and experience proves the truth of it; because we do not see wages fluctuate with the price of living. If they do not fluctuate in that proportion, how can we conclude that a rise in the price of subsistence, occasioned by taxes, should raise wages more than when the price is raised by a natural scarcity. It may be answered, that the imposition of a tax gives a general alarm; the effect it must have upon prices is immediately felt; and manufacturers then insist upon an augmentation: whereas, when nature either produces the same, or even a greater effect, people submit to what they think comes from the hand of God, and content themselves with the hopes of better times. I shall allow this argument all its force. But I must observe, that when manufacturers can thus capitulate with their employers, and insist upon an augmentation of their wages, the demand of the market must be greater than the supply from their work. This is the circumstance which raises the price of labor. Let the demand of the market fall, the prices of labor will fall, in spite of all the reasons which ought naturally to make them rise. The workman will

then enter into a hurtful competition, and starve one another, as has been often observed. Let the demand of the market rise, manufacturers may raise their wages in proportion to the rise of the market; they may, in the cheapest years, enjoy the highest wages; drink one half of the week, and laugh at their employer, when he expects they should work for less, in order to swell his profits in the rising market.

I have endeavoured to throw this question into different shapes, the better to apply different principles to it; and upon the whole, I must determine that proportional taxes will,

1^{mo}, Undoubtedly raise the price of every commodity upon which they are properly and immediately imposed; and if they be laid upon bread, and other articles of nourishment, they will directly raise the price of these articles in proportion; but the price of labor will be raised consequentially, only, and according to circumstances.

That if taxes be laid upon the day's labor of a man, they will raise the price of that day's labor. What I mean by this, is, that if every one who employs a man for a day, were obliged to pay a penny to the state, for a permission to employ him, the employer would charge a penny more at least upon the day's work performed by the laborer. Were a tax equivalent to it laid on the laborer by the year, it would be of a cumulative and arbitrary nature, and would not raise the price of his wages in proportion; but were it laid upon the workman at a penny a day, and levied daily, in

this case, he might raise his wages in proportion. But this is not the practice any where.

2do, The price of subsistence, whether it be influenced or not by the imposition of taxes, does not determine the price of labor. This is regulated by the demand for the work, and the competition among the workmen to be employed in producing it.

3tio, If wages rise beyond the physical-necessary of the workman, they may be brought down by multiplying hands, but never by lowering the price of necessaries; because every man will make a profit of the low price, but will regulate his gain by the rate of demand for his labor.

4to, If therefore, the price of his physical-necessary be raised upon him by the effect of taxes, he must work the harder to make it up.

5to, If hands increase, after he is reduced to his physical-necessary, the whole class of the manufacturers will be forced to starve.

6to, The increase of hands means no more than the augmentation of the quantity of work produced. If, therefore, the same hands work more than formerly, it is the same thing as if their numbers were increased.

From these positions it seems to result, that whenever it is found that manufacturers enjoy wages more than in proportion to their physical-necessary through the year, reckoned upon the general average of married men and bachelors, the method of reducing them to the proper standard, is either to multiply hands, if you want to reduce prices

in your own market, or to augment the price of their physical-necessary, if you incline they should remain the same. When the hands employed are really diligent, and prices still too high, then it may be expedient to increase their numbers, providing they enjoy considerable profits. This will cut them off, and reduce the price of commodities; because it will augment the supply.

When the hands employed are not diligent, the first expedient is to raise the price of their subsistence, by taxing it. By this you never will raise their wages, until the market can afford to give a better price for their work. If, when they are brought to be fully employed, you incline to sink the price of labor universally, you must take off some of the impositions which affect subsistence, and at the same time gradually throw in fresh hands, in order to promote competition, which alone will force them to lower their prices in proportion. The whole delicacy of this operation is to prevent competition from taking place after the industrious are reduced to moderate profits; and to promote competition, or to raise the price of their subsistence, until they be brought to the proper standard. Having insisted so fully upon these principles in the xviiith chapter of the second book, I here refer to it.

I have said, that the price of work is not regulated by the price of subsistence, but by the price of the market for the work. Now I say, that the price of the market may in a great measure be influenced by the price of subsistence. This is a new combination.

The first proposition is undeniable. The price of the market at all times *regulates* the price of work; because it regularly makes it fluctuate, in proportion to its own fluctuations. The price again, of subsistence only *influences* it; because two circumstances may destroy that influence. A high demand for work will raise the price of wages in years of plenty: a low demand will sink the price of wages in years of scarcity. When therefore it is said, that the price of subsistence *influences* the rate of markets, we only mean, that the average price of subsistence, when good and bad years are taken together, have a certain influence in regulating prices. But this average price of subsistence cannot every where *regulate* the value of work, as the average price of a ship's cargo can regulate the price of every part of it; because the variations there are at too great a distance of time, to be able to compensate one another with respect to all the manufacturing classes of a people.

Could a plan be concerted, either to preserve the price of grain at one uniform standard, or within the limits of 15 or perhaps 20 *per cent.* at all times; and were this to be executed by the assistance of a tax at one time, and a bounty as it were at another; it would certainly have an admirable effect in every industrious nation. It would in a manner take away the difference between good and bad years. The industrious finding themselves subsisted at all times nearly at the same expense would not feel those alternate motives to be idle and extravagant at one time, and diligent and sober at another.

I have enlarged so much upon the nature of this first inconvenience proceeding from proportional taxes, that I have left myself very little to say as to the second, which is,

2^{do}, That they discourage consumption, by raising prices too high for people of a middling rank in life.

In answer to this, I must observe, that all the amount of proportional taxes is refunded to the industrious consumer, so far as they are raised on articles *necessary* for his subsistence; and when he is either idle, or consumes a superfluity, he is classed along with the idle and rich. Now if the rate of market prices be high, relatively to the income of certain individuals, it can only be because the supply of the things they want to consume is not above the proportion of the demand of those who are richer.

If, therefore, the rate of the market affords such profits to manufacturers as to render them idle and luxurious, how can the augmentation of these profits, by the abolition of taxes, and consequent diminution of the price of subsistence, ever diminish the competition of the rich, unless the supply be augmented?

But if the high prices of our own markets cut off the demand of strangers, then every principle laid down in the 10th and 18th chapters of the second book, must be applied to bring them down: and so far as taxes, which are imposed either to supply the exigencies of the state, or to cut off consolidated profits, enjoyed by manufactures in consequence of
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our own extravagance, have contributed either to raise them, or to support them when raised, above the foreign standard, a full equivalent, in the way of bounty, must be given for them, in order to bring the exportation price of goods below the level of foreign competition.

I come now to the last inconvenience alledged against proportional taxes, to wit, the expense of collecting them, and the oppression which is a consequence of the many restrictions laid upon liberty, in order to prevent frauds.

As to the expense of collection, it is entirely in proportion to the disposition of the people to defraud the public.

In France, the collecting the branches of cumulative taxes, such as the general receipts, comprehending the taille, poll-tax, &c. costs the state no less than 10 *per cent.* or two sols in the livre, which is superadded to those impositions, in order to defray that expense. Whereas in England the expense of collecting the excise, administered by commissioners, who act for the public, not by farmers who act for themselves, does not cost above 5 *l.* 12 *s.* 6 *d.* in the 100 *l.*

This matter of fact is sufficient to prove, that excises, when under a proper administration, are not so very expensive in the collection as is generally imagined; and they would still be attended with less expense, were some proper alterations made in the present method of imposing them. This will appear as we go along.

The *oppression* of levying excises does not, in any proportion, so much affect those who really *pay* them, as those who only advance them for the consumers.

This distinction which we have already made, will appear well founded, upon examining the complaints which are commonly made against the collectors of this duty.

We have seen that in the taxes upon salt and tobacco in France, there are no duties collected upon the people; the farmers of the salt have all the salt marshes and salt pits assigned to them by the King; no person, not privileged, is allowed to make salt for the consumption of those provinces which are subjected to the Gabelle.

In like manner the distribution and sale of tobacco is exclusively in the hands of the farmers: they buy it either from Great Britain, or from the Dutch at second hand; they manufacture it themselves, and sell it over all France, at the price set upon it by the King; and we saw, that during the last war, they paid thirty millions down for a permission to raise the price of it 10 *per cent.* during ten years. This price fixed upon the sale of tobacco, answers exactly to what we know under the name of *affize*, which ought constantly to attend all excises*: for want of observing exactly that regulation, the

* When excises are imposed upon any commodity, it is contrary to all principles in fixing the *affize*, not to superadd the whole duty imposed to the former selling price. This however is sometimes omitted, with an intention to make part of the duty fall upon the manufacturer, to the ease of the subject. The consequences are,

publicans and victuallers in England raised the price of their strong beer one halfpenny *per* quart, in consequence of an additional duty of three shillings *per* barrel imposed *anno* 1761, which is at the rate only of one farthing *per* quart †.

When the sale of an exciseable commodity is vested in a company who manufacture it, by exclusive privilege, the whole oppression of collection is avoided; because the company itself then pays the duty, and they draw their reimbursement from proportional profits on the sale of the goods.

1mo, The manufacturers blow up the spirit of the people against the tax, who never would think of making an outcry, were they not excited to it by the interested motives of the manufacturers. Were high profits allowed on imposing the tax, manufacturers would be quiet: and if the profits were afterwards found to be too high, it would then be a popular measure to reduce the selling price, and also a means of setting people on the side of government, against the manufacturers, who are their real tax-gatherers.

2do, It is impossible to compass the end proposed. A proportional tax, rightly imposed, must be drawn back; and all attempts to prevent it only occasion a multiplication of frauds, and a bad manufacture.

In fixing assizes upon the manufacture or goods, which in different years vary in their price, regard should be had to such variations; otherwise the manufacturer is distressed, and the public is ill served: and the one or the other happening, the people are animated against such duties.

The only expedient to share the profits of the manufacturers of exciseable commodities, is to lay them under some cumulative tax which they cannot draw back, such as making them pay for a licence.

† It must, however, be observed, that the price of beer was not raised, either by the brewers, or by the victuallers, on account of the additional malt-duty, *anno* 1760.

This is the greatest advantage of the farm above the public management of a tax.

When excises are levied upon those who manufacture the commodity excised, the oppression of the laws falls upon the manufacturers, although they only advance the tax, and draw it back from the consumers upon the sale of the commodity.

It is greatly for the advantage of every consumer in the kingdom, that no fraud in the collections should pass unobserved; because all the profits arising from frauds belong to the manufacturer, who in reality is the tax-gatherer, as much as the farmers in France, when they sell their salt and tobacco. But as the farmers appear in the light of King's officers, and that the collectors seem to bear hard on those with whom they live, people foolishly imagine, that were brewers, for example, more gently dealt with, beer would come the cheaper to themselves. This is a mere delusion; because no brewer whatever will sell his beer cheaper than either an assize, or the ordinary rate obliges him to do, let his profit, from frauds, be ever so great, and his address in committing them ever so successful; and the less productive the tax turns out to be, the more the other impositions upon the people must be augmented, in order to make up the deficiency.

If we compare therefore the oppression of excise-laws felt by those who only *advance* these impositions, with the ease which the consumers find who really *pay* them, we may judge of the advantages which the proportional taxes have over the cumulative.

The excise, as paid by the brewer, is really of

the cumulative kind. The exciseman demands money of him, at a time when no alienation takes place, and perhaps when he is not prepared to make the advance for his customers, who must refund it to him with profit: besides the hope of being able to defraud is disappointed, and it is always disagreeable to be disappointed in what we either wish or hope.

Were all mankind honest, the inconveniences of levying such taxes would be less; but as that is not the case, methods must be fallen upon to disappoint the intention of committing fraud. The only way to accomplish this, is, to render it difficult and dangerous. While every individual has a liberty to manufacture an exciseable commodity in whatever place he thinks fit to enter for that purpose, when every one has a liberty to sell liquors, which, upon retail only, are subjected to excise (as is the case in France) must not collectors be multiplied in proportion to the occupation which such policy implies? And will not these collectors oppose frauds to frauds, in order to profit by them, at the expense of the merchant or manufacturer? This will sow discord and hatred between two classes of the same society, and thereby the state is hurt. All discord hurts a state, as it does a private family.

It is out of my way to lay down plans for preventing such inconveniencies. It would require an intimate knowledge of every circumstance relating to the country for which the remedy is intended.

I shall therefore endeavour only to throw out some useful hints, by mentioning the impositions where the inconveniences in levying are the least; and by

comparing these with other impositions, where the oppression in levying appears to be greater, the contrast of circumstances will suggest the principles upon which a plan might be formed.

There are many more frauds and difficulties in collecting excises in the country than in cities, from the number of manufacturers employed in them. It is just so with the *aides* in France, from the number of retailers. There are very few frauds and little difficulty in gathering the malt-tax; because the object is unwieldy, and the places of manufacture are fewer.

The frauds upon tobacco and salt in France, do not proceed from those who manufacture them, but from those who introduce foreign goods to supply the place of those manufactured by the company. This shows that excises should be made as general as possible over a country; because local exemptions introduce, as it were, a foreign country into the centre of a state.

Stamp-duties are seldom defrauded by forging the stamp; but in France, where they extend to almost every *deed* of alienation, the public is defrauded by private bargains.

Customs are defrauded by the liberty given to trade in every port; and from the want of convenient public magazines, as a proper repository for all goods brought by sea.

It may be said, in general, that frauds are most frequent upon the new establishment of taxes; that those who complain most of the oppression of them, are precisely those who have the least reason for it; and that the cause of their complaint proceeds rather from the inconvenience in paying when they are not prepared, and the disappointment in

defrauding, than from any real oppression arising from the laws of excise: the hardships of these laws are owing to the necessity of general rules to prevent frauds; and such rules would be unnecessary, could the liberty of committing frauds be circumscribed.

One very good method of raising proportional taxes, without great expense or oppression, when the situation of a country will admit of it, is to levy no such duties, but at the gates of towns and villages, which in this light appear to be political inclosures. At those gates every produce of the lands, and every manufacture not made in the town, might pay a tax upon coming in; every manufacture made in the town, might pay a tax on going out: all fruits consumed in the country might be free; all manufactures made and consumed in the towns might be free also. If we consider the quantity of exchange between the inhabitants of towns and those of the country, and between town and town; that fund, I believe, would be found sufficient to raise more by proportional taxes than what is raised in any country in Europe.

A second method of diminishing the expense, and also the burden of proportional taxes, is to exact nothing of the manufacturers, but to prohibit the delivery of the manufacture to any one who does not present a permit from the excise office, signifying that the tax has been paid. This is the method observed in the Austrian low countries, where excises are carried to a very great height. There the transporters or carriers of exciseable goods, are formed into a corporation, and none else dare to transport them.

Whoever has seen the execution of those regulations will not be very fond of them ; but the inconveniences which occur proceed from the political situation of all those towns, the public debts of which are so enormous, that to pay the interest of them excises have been carried so high as to banish manufacturers into the country, where few excises are levied. It is from the country and many considerable villages, which have not the privilege of running in debt, that the manufactures of that country are carried on. No industrious man can afford to live in the towns of the Austrian Netherlands, except he who supplies their consumption ; and in no place, I know of, is work so dear as there.

Were great excises levied upon the furnishers of the goods, as is the case in Great Britain, and were as little restraint laid upon their frauds, those duties would not produce what they do ; and the oppression would be intolerable ; whereas by the policy established, nothing but the high price of goods is complained of. A third method of avoiding both expense and oppression in levying proportional taxes, would be to confine the fabrication of all articles charged with them to certain places properly inclosed. Were those undertakings few and large, were spacious magazines of all sorts prepared, at the public expense, in all sea-port towns, and surrounded with walls, an entire liberty might be allowed within the inclosures, and no questions would be asked, but on going in and coming out. Under such regulations a state would reap great benefit. 1st, There would be considerable savings in collecting. 2^{dly}, There

would be great savings on the number of hands employed in the manufacturing: forty men, in a large brew-house, make more beer than a hundred disposed as they are in country villages. This resembles the introduction of machines into manufactures.

The objection from the infringement of liberty is more a pretext, in order to facilitate fraud, than any thing else. Are not those who manufacture exciseable commodities, the servants of the state? Are they not even the collectors of the public revenue? With what face then can they pretend to be indulged in the means of defrauding their customers of those taxes which they wish to put into their own pockets, by withholding them from the public. Has liberty any other meaning, but an entire permission to do whatever is not forbid by general and wholesome laws, calculated for the universal good of the society; and shall this class of men, who are enriching themselves as much by the profits they have in advancing the taxes, as by their industry, be considered in as favorable a light as another who is paying a cumulative tax out of his income, one farthing of which he never can draw back?

If any should misinterpret the doctrine of this chapter, I must put them in mind of my original plan, which was to keep constantly in view those virtuous statesmen who think of nothing but the good of their subjects. Taxes and impositions in their hands, are the wealth of the father of the family; who there-with feeds, clothes, provides for, and defends every one within his house. The increase of taxes on this supposition is national economy, as shall be

afterwards shown; frauds are the thefts of servants impairing the public good, and particularly the means of self-defence against the incroachments of ambitious neighbours.

As it is the duty of every statesman to make his people happy and flourishing, perhaps the speculations of one whose only interest in throwing them upon paper is to fill up his leisure agreeably, may some time or other tend to promote so glorious a purpose.

C H A P. VI.

Cumulative and proportional Taxes compared with one another, and farther examined.

AFTER examining separately the nature and effects of cumulative and proportional taxes, it remains, for the more fully understanding this subject, to take a view of them together; the better to find out wherein they really differ, and how far the difference is only apparent.

It has been observed, that the payment of taxes diminishes no part of the produce of either land, or industry; the whole amount of these remains entire to the subjects of the state.

The taxes are paid out of the money which circulates in the alienation of them: from which we have concluded that they must constantly be confined within a certain proportion to alienation. We have also observed, that the imposition of

taxes augments the mass of circulation, and makes it requisite for a statesman to contrive some method of increasing money in proportion to their increase. I hope these propositions have acquired an additional confirmation, from what has been already said in the preceding chapters.

We have also seen how the amount of proportional taxes is ultimately taken from the superfluity of the rich, whom we have called the idle consumers: and how they are advanced by one set of the industrious, and refunded by another, until at last they fall upon those who cannot draw them back from any body. These last have been said to *pay* the taxes, the others only to *advance* them.

If therefore we suppose all desire of defrauding out of the way, we shall find the whole burden of proportional taxes confined to the inconvenience of advancing their amount by the industrious, and to the payment of them by the rich, which proportionally diminishes their income. Where credit therefore is well established, where payments are regularly made by buyers to sellers, and where people proportion their expense to their free income, the weight of proportional taxes will be very small. I appeal to experience for the truth of this.

Let us next examine the nature of cumulative taxes, as we have called them, in order to distinguish them from the others.

In these, alienation is not necessary at the time they are paid; from which it follows, that, in many cases, they cannot be drawn back. When a man pays his land-tax out of his rent, what remains to

him will not buy more of any thing than if he had paid nothing. Nay, were the state to indulge him and take his tax in corn, the corn which remains to him would not bear an advanced price, unless the state should export the quantity he had given; and then indeed, by diminishing the supply, it might raise the price of grain in general; but every one having grain to sell would profit of the rise upon the price, as well as the landlord, whose share does not commonly amount to one third of the crop.

But were a tax laid on in so regular a proportion to the value of any property, as to prevent the proprietor from making use of that part which the public intends to take from him, those who pay cumulative taxes would thereby acquire one very great alleviation of their burden.

I have said that when a brewer pays the excise, the tax, as to him, is of the cumulative nature. It is so in a certain degree, no doubt, as may be seen without farther explanation; but it still so far retains its own nature as to be easily drawn back from the consumer. But how can a soldier draw back the tax he pays to Chelsea?

From this material distinction between the two impositions, I conclude, that no objection can lie against proportional taxes, so far as they affect the industrious; because they draw them completely back: and that great objections lie against cumulative taxes, when they affect the industrious, because they cannot draw them back; and consequently, they may affect the physical-necessary of the contributor, in case no profit should remain to

him upon his labor. On the other hand, I think little objection can be made to cumulative taxes, when they are imposed upon possessions, which produce a visible annual revenue, clear to the proprietor. This is the nature of the *dixièmes* and *vingtièmes* in France; where the whole amount of the person's income is taken upon proper proof, and taxed in proportion to it, without any subsidiary or second levy's taking place, to make up a determinate sum.

Cumulative taxes would also be far less burdensome to the lower class, could they be levied, so as, first, to preserve the proportion of them to the actual profits on industry: secondly, to make that proportion sensible to the people: and in the last place, to *retain* the tax, instead of allowing them first to receive it, and afterwards obliging them to refund it.

In proportion as these three requisites do not take place, such taxes become grievous to all who have no fixed income.

To put a tax upon a man's dwelling house, in proportion to its windows, or hearths, when the house produces no fixed income to him, and when he has none independent of it, may take away a part of his physical-necessary. To put a tax upon him because he has a head, is more grievous than to put a tax upon his hands, in proportion to what they daily gain.

If cumulative and proportional taxes be compared, with respect to the different effects they are found to have upon our opinions as to taxes in

general, we find that both of them deceive the contributors, but in different ways.

In the cumulative taxes, the person who pays does not always perceive the reason of his paying. He imagines that he is taxed only because it is known that he is able to pay a certain sum.

In the proportional, the deceit is of another nature. When a person buys a consumable commodity, which has paid an excise, he does not perceive that the price he pays for it comprehends a tax upon his past gains, in favor of the public; but he concludes the whole to be necessary, in order to procure what he has an inclination to consume. An example will make this plain.

Suppose a tax laid upon wheel carriages, and that every person in the state were liable to pay a certain sum in proportion to the number of carriages he has for his convenience. The tax-gatherer comes at the end of the year and demands the sum. The person complains that he is not at liberty to have a coach or a chaise without paying duty for it; and that while he has occasion for one carriage only, and has but one pair of horses he is obliged to pay for several sets of wheels.

Now, suppose this cumulative tax were turned into a proportional one, and that wheels were to pay a stamp-duty, or the like, in the hands of the wheelwright. The price would immediately rise; but this rise would soon become familiar to the man who has the carriage; and he would then be no more hurt by this additional expense, than if it had proceeded from some new and expensive fashion of

wheels: in short, wheels would generally begin to bear an advanced price, and very soon no body would inquire how it came about, nor once complain of the tax.

To set this in another light, the difference between the two impositions resembles that between long and short accounts, which to poor people is very great. When the expense of living is insensibly and universally augmented, by the effect of proportional taxes, then the industrious man, who enjoys neither superfluity or idleness, may and can augment the price of his work in proportion. This augmentation forms then a part of what has been called his (A), which he draws fully back when he comes to market. But if the same, or even a less sum be raised upon him by a cumulative tax, it comes upon him at the end of the year, or at the end of the quarter, and let him be ever so provident, he cannot draw it back, or raise the price of his work, because of the unequal competition of other people of his own class, who, from a variety of circumstances, cannot all be so equally loaded by the cumulative as by the proportional taxes. Besides, they may not be so provident as himself, and may work for subsistence, without making any allowance for what they are to pay the state at the end of the year. Thus a double inconvenience ensues. The industrious poor are oppressed by the tax-gatherers, and the tax is ill levied. In the other case, the first never see a tax-gatherer, and the money is paid. Besides these advantages in favor of proportional taxes, there is still another, that if this tax be improperly laid on,

the defect will manifest itself by checking consumption only ; whereas in the other case, it will be known by the distress of individuals.

If the liberty not to consume be taken away, as in the *gabelle* in some provinces in France, then the imposition changes its nature and becomes a cumulative tax, as may be easily perceived*.

It has been said, that so far as the three inconveniences of the cumulative taxes can be prevented, they cease to be oppressive. From which we see the reason why excises are so easily paid when those who manufacture the commodities charged with them, are contented to compound for them. This changes the tax into one of the cumulative kind ; but gives it every requisite to make it easy. Let me take an example.

A brewer who pays excise for all he brews, is exposed to the daily visit of the excise-man, to whom he pays the duty. Here the brewer's imposition participates of several of the inconveniences attending

* The *gabelle*, or salt-tax in France, is not levied in every province ; because of certain privileges of exemption, which some have all along enjoyed.

This opens a door to the general abuse, by smuggling salt from places where it is free, into places where the tax is imposed, at many 100 *per cent.* above the value ; and obliges the King to use great severity upon those who are loaded with this duty.

The consumption of every family is fixed to a certain quantity ; and if it be found that they have not bought, from the King's granaries, to the full extent of what is reckoned necessary for them, it is supposed that the deficiency has been made up from contraband salt, and the deficiency is exacted.

cumulative

cumulative taxes. But let me suppose that after a certain time he finds that 100 *l.* is the annual amount of his excise. If he makes a composition for it at that rate, he comes under a regular cumulative composition, with every advantage. He thinks no more of frauds; he no more grudges what he pays; and becomes in a manner collector of that imperceptible duty paid by all his customers.

The easy method of transforming those taxes into one another shows their resemblance sufficiently, and the differences which we have pointed out, show the principles which regulate the proper manner of imposing them.

C H A P. VII.

Consequence of Taxes when the amount of them is properly applied.

WE have now seen the objects affected by taxes; and the inconveniences which result to those who are obliged to pay them.

It comes next to be examined, whether or not taxes of all kinds be a great load upon a people, a grievous infringement of their liberty, a means of bringing many honest and industrious people to great distress, and a great discouragement to marriage. I answer without hesitation, that taxes may be, and most commonly are accompanied with all these and many more inconveniences; but I must add, that

they proceed from the abuse, and not from the nature of taxes.

In my inquiries, I have constantly in my eye, how man *may* be governed, and never how *he is* governed. How a righteous and intelligent statesman may restrain the liberty of individuals, in order to promote the common good; never how an ignorant and unrighteous statesman may destroy public liberty, for the sake of individuals.

Raising money by taxes must always be burdensome, less or more, to those who pay it; and the advantages resulting from taxes can only proceed from the right application of the money when raised.

When individuals only make a profit of the inconvenience of taxes, the public loses, no doubt; because they are paid for the advantage of the public, not for that of private people. If the money raised be more beneficially employed by the state, than it would have been by those who have contributed it, then I say the public has gained, in consequence of the burden laid upon individuals; consequently, the statesman has done his duty, both in imposing the taxes, and in rightly expending them.

Taxes, in this last view, may be considered as a saving out of every private fortune, in order to procure a public fund to be expended for the public benefit.

I have frequently recourse to the familiar examples of private economy, in order to make applications from it to the political; which, however different it may appear, will be found easily deducible from the same principles.

Let me suppose two persons, (A) and (B), living in the same neighbourhood, of the same rank and fortune, enjoying great superfluity, but spending yearly the whole of their income in different ways.

Let the income of both be supposed to be 2100 *l.* sterling; and let the branches of their expense be ranged under six different heads. Let (A) be supposed to spend upon the first 100 *l.* on the second 200 *l.* on the third 300 *l.* on the fourth 400 *l.* on the fifth 500 *l.* on the sixth 600 *l.* in all 2100 *l.*

Let us suppose (A) to enjoy in every one an ample sufficiency.

(B), on the other hand, spends upon his first article 1600 *l.* and upon each of the other five, no more than 100 *l.* Here the first article of (B's) expense is sixteen times greater than any of the rest; and by the supposition, 100 *l.* is supposed to denote an ample sufficiency upon each article.

I come to (A), and I say to him, you disapprove of the extravagance of your neighbour (B) upon his first article of expense, where he spends sixteen parts of his income, and where you spend but one; and yet you must allow that upon every other article of his expense, he is a better economist than you. Would it not be for your interest to bring the other articles of your expense down to his standard, without increasing any thing upon your first article, which is already within the compass of what may be called sufficient.

To what purpose, says (A), would you advise me to so strict an economy? And what should I do with so great a saving on my annual income? Be in no

pain about that, I shall lay it out for you in discharging your debts; in providing for your children, and giving them a good education; in improving your estate; repairing your house; making up your inclosures; all shall be usefully spent; and out of 600 *l.* a year, you shall have every thing necessary for your family.

Here is the representation of a scheme between a good statesman, and a people whose interest he consults.

After the imposition of taxes, the individuals of a state, whose income is already formed, begin to pay greatly more than they used to do for every thing they consume. A great part of this additional price goes to the public, and is thereby laid out for national purposes. The whole of such expenses are thrown into circulation, as much as if the rich proprietors had laid it out upon articles entirely adapted to their own taste.

Is it not evident, that in this way of appropriating the income of a country, it must produce a more extensive encouragement to industry of all kinds, than if the proprietors only had spent it? They never would have thought of becoming merchants, or of setting up manufactures for the supply of foreign markets: their whole expense would have been calculated to supply their own wants; and it would have been indifferent to them whether these were supplied by natives or by strangers.

Let us apply this doctrine to common experience. Let us compare the nature of circulation in a trading town, with that of a country place, where many

gentlemen of large fortunes reside. How extensive the objects of the first! how contracted those of the latter.

Let us compare again the exigencies of government, with those of a trading city, what a variety of *new* wants here occur to be supplied, which the city never could have occasion for?

I have shown that the great amount of taxes is taken from the income of those individuals whose fortune is already made, or whose daily profits are considerable; I have suggested how circumscribed the expense of this class must be, when considered with respect to the employment it procures to the body of a people. Does not the experience of former ages show how apt private opulence is to sink into treasures, when a taste for industry does not animate the lower classes to create new objects of desire in the wealthy? Wherein is a state benefited by the luxurious gratifications of the rich, unless it be by the employment they procure for those who provide the objects of luxury? Those very gratifications are, in one sense, taxes upon the rich in favor of the industrious: they increase expense, and throw money into circulation. In Spain and Portugal, where industry is not introduced among the lower classes, it is the strangers who in effect levy such taxes upon them. Were the taxes they pay, properly applied to the encouragement of the arts, instead of being appropriated to private purposes, and to enriching private men, whose taste for expense is always circumscribed to the objects of their own wants, how soon should we see them vying with us

in every market of Europe, and supplying themselves as far as their country is calculated for it.

The reciprocal wants of industrious nations, resemble the reciprocal wants of tradesmen; all may be employed in supplying one another, as well as themselves.

When the amount of taxes is properly laid out in premiums, for the encouragement of the industrious, the prices of labor upon articles of exportation, may be brought so low, that all nations who do not follow the example, must languish and decay. Luxury at home will then cease to hurt the trade of the nation. In her treaties of commerce, she may throw open her ports to many articles of foreign consumption, without running any risk by such allowances; and on the other hand, she will reap the greatest advantages from a reciprocal permission.

The example I have given, by which I have illustrated the nature of public contributions, must not be understood to tally with respect to proportion. It would be both ridiculous and impossible to reduce all the expenses of rich men to the purely sufficient. All I meant was, to show how taxes, when properly applied, *may* be considered as public economy; and how the levying of them has no direct tendency to hurt a nation in point of ease and prosperity.

C H A P. VIII.

Of the extent of Taxation.

ONE good way to discover the nature of taxes, is, to examine how far it may be possible to carry them. This is my intention in this chapter.

I have said that the object of taxes was income, and not stock. I have shown how those of the proportional kind affect the income of stock already made, and persons who enjoy large profits upon their daily industry. I have pointed out the impropriety of cumulative taxes, when imposed upon such as draw nothing more from their industry than an easy subsistence; and I have given a general preference to those of the proportional kind; because they constantly imply both alienation and consumption: alienation in those who *advance* the taxes, *consumption* in those who pay them.

Could, therefore, taxes be levied upon every alienation, where consumption is implied, and that in proportion to the whole superfluity of those who are to consume, proportional taxes would be carried to their utmost extent.

I shall now analyze this subject, in order to discover how far that extent may reach; and by this inquiry, the principles of taxation will be the better understood.

The objects of alienation comprehend all that is in commerce among men, moveable and immoveable.

What is moveable is generally consumable, what is immoveable is generally not so.

As consumption is a requisite, together with alienation, in order to form a proper basis for proportional taxes, we see how contrary to principles it would be, to tax the alienation of lands, houses, &c. in the same proportion as consumable commodities. These are *funds*, not *income*; and the money with which they are purchased, must be considered in the light of a fund, while it is in the hands of the buyer. When once it comes into the hands of the seller of the immoveable objects, it frequently, indeed, partakes of the nature of income; that is to say, it is spent in the consumption of fruits, and of the labor of man; and then it will be affected by taxes.

This may suffice to recal to mind the principles we laid down in the 26th chapter of the second book, concerning the effects of the vibration of the balance of wealth between the members of a modern state.

The next thing we are to consider, is the state of circulation. As to that, we have frequently observed, how it must be in proportion to alienation.

This proportion is not determined by the value, or denominations of the money circulating; but by that value combined with the frequency of transitions from hand to hand; as the force of a cannon ball is estimated by the weight of the ball, and the swiftness of the motion at the time it strikes.

Let us now lay aside the consideration of immove-

able property; and examine the nature of consumption, alienation, and sale, with respect to other things.

Consumption comprehends every thing produced by the earth, or by man; alienation is confined to that part which is exchanged between men; and sale to that part of alienation which is exchanged for an equivalent in money.

Whatever part is consumed without alienation, ought, I think, to be out of the reach of proportional taxes, unless, by some circumstance or other, it can be made to fall under the eye of the public, in a manner *resembling* its coming to market. Thus a tax upon malt is levied at the malt-house, as if it were sold to the maltster, although it be made for the consumption of the grower of the barley. In like manner, a tax upon corn for bread may be levied either at the mill where it is ground, or at the oven where it is baked*.

The worst kind of proportional taxes are those which are levied upon *private* manufacturing, and upon unmanufactured consumption, where no alienation takes place. An example of the first we have

* Examples of these kinds of taxes were familiar in former times. Vassals were obliged to grind in their Lord's mill, bake in his oven, press their wine in the public press of the territory, &c.

This was found very useful, in ages when alienation and sale were little known; but now they are considered as oppressive, and so I think they are, when compared with proportional taxes, which only take place upon the sale of the commodity: but still they are far preferable to many taxes of the cumulative kind.

in the excise upon malt, cider, candles, &c. made in private houses for private use: the last is known in Holland, where a man cannot kill his own pig, or his own calf, without paying a tax. Were taxes of that nature extended to the making of bread, cooking of victuals, &c. I apprehend they would become of a nature more burdensome than any hitherto invented, unless public cooks were established, as public ovens are in many parts of France: in such cases, taxes might be levied upon every part of consumption.

Investigations of this nature are so disagreeable, that it is with reluctance I mention them; but when, in fact, such taxes are found established in different countries, it is highly proper, that the nature of them should be inquired into.

Taxes in Holland are so multiplied, as to descend to this category, in many places, as we have seen by the example just given; but even these, however oppressive they may appear to those who are not accustomed to them, are still less so than many of the cumulative kind we have mentioned, particularly the tax upon industry and the capitation in France. They approach nearer to proportional taxes, and derive every alleviation of their burden from that circumstance. He who pays such taxes, sees that he can avoid them, by retrenching his consumption; and when they fall upon the necessaries of life, he may draw them back, providing he be an industrious man, and that every one who enters into competition with him for employment, be equally subjected to the same burden. But they are more burdensome than those where

sale takes place; because when a poor man, who wishes to consume, wants money, he considers himself in the same light as if the thing were not to be sold; but when he has that which he has acquired by his labor, and cannot consume it for want of money to pay for a permission, as it were, he must either starve for hunger in the midst of plenty, or be reduced, perhaps to beggary, for having preserved his life by defrauding the tax.

What has been said, is, I think, sufficient to show the varieties which occur, when taxes are imposed upon bare consumption, where no alienation takes place: they must, in every respect, be ranged under those of the proportional kind, although some principal requisites be wanting to engage any one to approve of their institution.

It appears still more difficult to establish a proportional tax upon barter, or the exchange of commodities one for another, unless sale be understood. This would be the case were a private person, not subject to the excise upon malt made in his own house, to pay in that commodity. He would not there escape the imputation of fraud; and might, with propriety, be considered as a retailer. I do not, however, doubt but examples of taxes upon barter might be found; some even occur to myself; but they are almost too trifling to mention*.

The last and principal requisite, to render proportional taxes easy and light, is sale. There the

* Two gentlemen in France exchange casks of their wine, they are both obliged to pay a tax upon removing the wine from their cellar. This duty is called *Reinuage*.

burden must be proportional to the buyers purse; and if it prevents the consumption of the thing taxed, the defect will manifest itself.

Of these taxes we may say, that they are in proportion to circulation; and accordingly, we see how difficult it was to raise them, so long as circulation remained confined to the small quantity of coin in the country. As money increased, both by the increase of trade and alienations, they became more productive; and were the nature of them rightly understood, and were they properly imposed, they would soon be more generally adopted.

In treating of public credit, I have said that it is the duty of a statesman to augment the quantity of money, in proportion as he intends to multiply taxes on his people. I shall now, before I conclude this chapter, explain the meaning of what was there thrown out relatively to another subject.

The money of a country, we have said, bears no determinate proportion to circulation; it is the money circulating, multiplied by the number of transitions from hand to hand. Again, we have said, that the prices of all things are determined by demand and competition. The meaning of this, as it concerns the present question, is, that in proportion to the competition of those who appear with money, in order to acquire what comes to market, a larger or a smaller sum is brought into circulation.

Now according to the principles laid down in the first chapter, we saw how the full value of the industrious seller's expense and profit were made up to him in the sale of his work; and if he even advanced any

tax upon any part of his work or consumption, that it was refunded to him by the buyer, who, if he consumes in the light of an idle man, pays for the whole.

Farther, when a proportional tax is imposed, we said it was, in a manner, as if the state interposed at the time of alienation, and exacted of the purchaser a certain value in money, in proportion to the commodity, as the price of the permission to acquire what his own industry had not produced. From this I draw the following consequence, that in proportion to the tax an additional sum of money is drawn into circulation, which would otherwise have remained in the pocket of the purchaser; consequently, on imposing proportional taxes, they cannot, at first, exceed that proportion of money which is found in the pockets of the consumers, over and above what they used to pay for what they consumed.

The truth of this proposition is established upon many facts. First, in countries where people keep their money locked up, proportional taxes are very well paid. Hence the great amount of the *alcavala* and *cientos* in Spain, which amount together to 14 *per cent.* upon every consecutive alienation of the commodities, chiefly indeed for the consumption of the rich.

Secondly, when excises were augmented in England, in the reign of King William, Davenant tells us, that the price of the goods excised fell.

Thirdly, When a war has lasted any time in France, taxes cease to be so productive.

Are not all these, and many other appearances, resolved upon the same principle, viz. that taxes must come out of that money which exceeds what was necessary for carrying on alienation before they were imposed?

In Spain they draw money from the chests of the hoarders, and increase circulation for a while.

In England, during King William's wars, the quantity of money being very small, and trade being very low, the tax upon malt could come out of no other fund than the price usually given for barley.

In France, people are better acquainted with taxes, and the great bulk of excises are administered by the farmers, who never lower their price; so that the diminution of the mass of coin diminishes consumption.

But when methods can be fallen upon to increase money according to the uses found for it, taxes will continue to produce, consumption will not diminish, and circulation will keep pace with them.

Could we suppose, that before the imposition of taxes, every person in a state had laid it down as a rule, to spend the whole of his income, but none of his treasure, in the consumption of what is brought to market, it is plain, that in a luxurious nation, taxes might be carried so high as to draw the last farthing of the treasure into circulation, even though it were supposed to exceed the value which demand had fixed for all that was brought to market. But without a luxurious turn this would

not be the case. There are countries abounding with coin, which it is impossible to come at by proportional taxes. The reason is plain: the value which demand fixes upon the total of the articles of consumption exposed to sale in the country, bears but a trifling proportion to the coin which remains locked up. This was the case in ancient Greece. In that case, proportional taxes can never exhaust the treasure; because were they to be made high upon articles of the first necessity, all the poor would starve; if upon articles of superfluity, demand would stop.

Proportional taxes, therefore, can only be raised in proportion to the desire of spending money; and as this desire depends upon the spirit of the people, so must the extent of taxes.

Let me now trace a little the progress of money brought into circulation by proportional taxes in a luxurious nation. I shall call the value, fixed by demand, for all that comes to market (Y). The sum levied in consequence of the alienation of it, or in other words, the sum of the proportional taxes (X). And the whole money of the country (Z). This premised, it will follow, from what has been said, that so soon as all the money of the country is brought into circulation, then (Z) will be exactly equal to the sum of (Y) and (X).

Let us next suppose the whole alienation to be made at once. Will not (Z) then immediately appear divided into (Y) and (X)? What then will become of those two sums which we suppose to enter into circulation at the same time? I answer that (Y) will go entirely free to the industrious seller:

that it is, or should be, nearly equal to the former value of what came to market before taxes were imposed: and that (X) is an additional sum drawn from the idle consumers, who live upon an income already made. But suppose (X) to be augmented, until it exceeds the quantity of money formerly superfluous for carrying on alienation: then I say, that either taxes will become proportionally less productive, or consumers must melt down the capital of their funds into paper money, to the amount of the deficiency of (X); and this will supply circulation with the additional sum required in consequence of the imposition of taxes.

Now, I think, it is a lucky circumstance, that the additional sum of taxes should be paid by those very people who are the best able to borrow it upon their funds.

Let us proceed to examine the progress of (Y) and (X) as they continue in circulation. (Y) is no sooner come into the hands of the industrious seller, but he has occasion to go to market: that moment I consider him as one of the rich; and the money which, at the time he sold, had acquired the denomination of (Y), now resumes that of (Z). When he comes to buy a commodity with what was formerly his (Y), there is immediately a part of it converted into a new (X), and the remainder keeps the denomination of (Y) in the hands of him from whom he buys. By this progress it is plain, that after a certain number of alienations, or transmutations from hand to hand, the whole quantity (Y) will be converted into (X).

Experience

Experience shows this to be the fact; because the amount of taxes, in a short time, far exceeds the value of all the money of a country.

Let us next follow the progress of (X).

Upon the first alienation of any part of what comes to market for the consumption of the proprietors of (Z), a proportional part of (Z) is transformed into (X), and is carried into the public coffers. Were it there to be locked up, and not thrown back into circulation, it is plain, that in a short time the whole of (Z) would be converted into (X), and would be shut up in the exchequer.

When the amount of taxes, therefore, is sent out of the country in time of war, must not this produce a similar effect? Has not the exporting that amount the same effect with the locking it up, since the one and the other equally take it out of circulation? Does it not then follow, that if more money be not obtained either by borrowing it back from strangers; or by melting down more solid property, that selling must stop, and (Y) disappear as well as (X). The rich, therefore, must give over buying, and the proprietors of all that comes to market must deal by barter with one another.

How naturally do all these consequences follow one upon the other! and how exactly do they correspond to the principles which run through that part of the last book where we treated of banks and public credit!

Taxes are not raised, at this time, to remain in treasures, but to answer the exigencies of the state. The moment, therefore, that the money arising from

them comes out of the public coffers, it loses the character of (X) and resumes that of (Z), in the same manner that (Y) was transformed into (Z), by being brought to market to buy a commodity. This new (Z), as we may call it, no sooner returns into circulation, than it becomes again converted into (Y) and (X), with this difference, however, that what came from the exchequer, so far as it is converted into (X), returns directly into it again.

Hence it follows, that states commonly pay their servants the full of their salaries, and make them refund a part in consequence of cumulative taxes, instead of proportionally diminishing what is due to them. And when the salaries themselves are intended to be laid under poundage, which in fact is an actual diminution of them, they chuse that the tax should appear to be a deduction out of what is supposed due; because it seems less arbitrary to impose a tax, than to diminish a salary, without assigning any reason for it; but indeed, besides this reason, it commonly happens, that the particular appropriations and administration of the revenue render that method easier.

With respect to proportional taxes they affect the expenses of the state in the same manner as those of individuals; with this difference, as we have said, that the part (X) returns into the exchequer; but the part (Y) is fairly spent by the state, as by the idle consumer.

From what has been said, we may gather the principles which lead to the most extensive establishment of proportional taxes, viz. either to draw by particular regulations, the whole real and gross produce

of land and work to market; or at least to bring it under the eye of the state, in consequence of some modification or manufacture performed upon it, as was observed with respect to malt-houses, mills, and public ovens. When, by such contrivances, the whole gross produce falls under taxation, the proportional taxes must be gently laid on, and gradually raised until they begin to interrupt consumption; then they must be diminished for a while, until dissipation increases; a case which will probably happen, as it commonly keeps pace with industry.

If we suppose the rich to set out on a plan of living upon their capitals, instead of living upon their incomes, as we have hitherto supposed, then indeed taxes may augment to a degree not to be estimated. This combination has already found a place in the 26th chapter of the second book, where we examined it with regard to the progress of industry. In that place it was said, that in proportion to credit and industry, it might be possible in the compass of a year, to produce commodities to the value of the whole property of the most extended kingdom. Were that the case, to what a height might not taxes be carried?

(Y) then would represent the whole value of the country, and consequently, (X) would swell in proportion, according to the competition among the inhabitants, to purchase every particular article. Subsistence and necessaries might be taxed low in proportion to the abilities of those of the lower classes; articles of luxury might be taxed in a higher proportion, in order to draw the more into the exchequer.

Were taxes thus carried to their utmost extent, still every person in the state must be left at liberty to save, or to spend the whole, or any part of his stock, or income; which is not the case when cumulative taxes are imposed. Proportional taxes, though carried to their utmost extent, will not deprive an industrious man of his physical-necessary, nor of the reward of his ingenuity, nor of that rank in wealth, to which his birth or expense entitles him*.

When taxes have the effect of interrupting this harmony of expense, of restraining, the liberty of squandering, or of saving, or of oppressing one set of men more than another, in all such cases, they are improperly imposed; and instead of being too high, as it is commonly supposed, I think it is a demonstration that they are really lower than they need to be. The classes of men in a modern state, resemble the horses in a team. When every horse draws fairly and equally, the whole force is exerted; but if any one happens to be strained by an overcharge thrown upon him, the force of the team is greatly diminished.

When proportional taxes are carried to their full extent, I then presume every one will be obliged to pay as much as possible; I do not mean that every one will be forced to pay to the extent of his abilities, but I say, that the generality will; and therefore, were cumulative, or personal taxes, to be super-added on those who already pay all they can, they

* A man's rank, in a modern society, seems to be determined more according to his birth, or to his expense, than according to his stock, or income.

would, by affecting them unequally, deprive many of their physical-necessary, or small profits; and consequently destroy the proper balance of their competition. The setting the lower classes free from cumulative taxes, will only have the effect of putting the growing wealth of the penurious and saving part of the industrious inhabitants out of the reach of taxation. This ought in good policy to be done, as has been shown in another place. But, farther, we have observed, that taxes can only be increased in proportion to the spirit of dissipation in the people. To force money, therefore, out of the hands of those who do not incline to spend it, is forcing the spirit of the people; and if not tyranny, is at least great severity. Besides, we shall presently show, how these savings cannot escape being taxed, whenever they begin to produce an income; and allowing that they may be greatly accumulated, and thrown into trade, yet still they must in one way or other appear in alienation, and become subject to the proportional taxes. The only part, therefore, of the savings not affected by taxes, will be confined to that which is locked up. This in a prodigal nation should never be touched. The inconveniencies resulting to the state from so small an inequality of taxation, is too trifling to be attended to, and too difficult to be prevented.

I come next to examine the extent of cumulative taxes.

If we suppose the proportional taxes to be carried to their full extent, there will be little place found for the cumulative, as has been said. The only objects

left for them are the savings locked up, and the pure profits upon trade.

But let us suppose proportional taxes out of the question, as they must be when contrary to the spirit of a particular nation; and then inquire into the principles which regulate the imposition of cumulative taxes, in order to discover to what extent they may be carried, and what consequences may follow when they are brought to a height.

This branch has two objects; first, income, which is determinate; secondly, profits from industry, which are and must be very uncertain.

Income, I divide into two sorts; that which proceeds from every branch of solid property, capable of producing it: Land, houses, even cattle, furniture, &c. all may, in some respects, produce an income, more or less permanent according to circumstances. This sort of income is established by lease. The second sort is the interest of money, constituted by the contract of loan.

In imposing cumulative taxes upon income, it is very proper to consider the nature of every species of it, with respect to stability. Landed property is fixed, and can not escape taxation, were the tax to be carried to the extent of the full income, as has been observed. Were the same proportion to be laid on houses, they would soon fall to ruin, because the annual proprietor would not keep them up. Like circumstances must be attended to, in taxing every other article of revenue.

The method of ascertaining the value of this kind of property, is to oblige all leases to be recorded,

under a sufficient penalty. This is the method in France, for the sake of the *contrôle*, which is exacted upon recording them; and this, no doubt, facilitates the raising of the twentieth penny, which operates upon all such incomes.

The value once ascertained, the whole income is at the mercy of the state, in proportion to the impossibility of avoiding it, by any change on the nature of the fund. It is from this circumstance that I call all such taxes arbitrary impositions. And I call them also cumulative; because the reason given by the statesman for imposing them, is, that it is just every one should pay a general tax, for the support of the state, in proportion to his abilities.

As these taxes cannot be carried beyond the value of the income which the proprietor cannot withdraw from under the burden, we see the impossibility of establishing them upon that income which proceeds from money. If a tax of so much *per cent.* be imposed upon money lent at interest; the lender may immediately call in his capital from his debtor, and send it away beyond the reach of the tax. If the calling it in be prohibited, then all credit is destroyed for the future, and no more money will be lent. If the statesman should incline to profit of the advantage found in securing money upon land-property; and if, trusting to the desire monied-people have of settling their capitals in that way, he should take one or more *per cent.* upon capitals so secured; it will still have the effect of hurting the credit of landed men,

who have frequently no good security but their land to give.

It was formerly the practice to allow the landlords to retain a part of the interest, in consideration of the tax they paid upon that part of their land, which was pledged for the security of the money borrowed; but when credit is once established, that regulation has no other effect, than to oblige them to borrow so much dearer than other people, who have no retention to claim. Where indeed credit is precarious, such a regulation would be a premium for good security.

In general, I believe, we may safely determine, that all attempts to lay a tax upon the income of so fluctuating a property as money, where the capital is demandable, will prove unsuccessful.

The case is different, when the capital is not demandable, as has been observed in the end of the 8th chapter upon public credit; where we were suggesting a reason for taxing the interest of national debts, when grown up to the full amount of all the income of a country. But a material distinction was there made, between those debts which were supposed to be consolidated into a permanent property, and new contracts which were to be considered as debts upon that property.

We see, therefore, the extent of cumulative taxes upon possessions which produce an income. Let us next examine how they may be made to affect other articles.

We have observed how improper, and how contrary to principles it is, to impose proportional

taxes upon those branches of sale, which do not change the balance of wealth between the contracting parties. Yet cumulative taxes may then take place; because there is no reason to make them general, or proportional.

When lands, for example, carry titles along with them, as is the case in many countries; and when, as with us in Scotland they carry a right to vote for a member of parliament, a very heavy tax might be imposed upon the alienation of them. The same may be said of every other estate which requires a feudal investiture to complete the right. Thus the *Lots & vente* in France, which is a portion of the price of such lands due to the superior or lord-paramount of the fee, amounting in many cases to the sixth part of the price, is a hint for a cumulative tax to be raised upon the alienation of this kind of property.

Were cumulative taxes properly laid upon personal service, a regularity in levying them at short intervals, and according to some determinate proportion, would do a great deal towards communicating to them all the advantages of those of the proportional kind.

Thus a tax laid upon those who work by the day, may be levied in such a manner as to be tolerably easy. A penny a day (or more if necessary) paid by every industrious man, regularly, once a week, would soon enable him to raise his price in that proportion. But then deductions must be allowed for all accidental impediments; and were a plan to be concerted, many other

considerations would enter into it, which it would be superfluous here to mention, and which, perhaps, may occur in another place.

The two articles which, in analyzing the extent of proportional taxes, we observed had escaped that imposition, to wit, money locked up, and the pure profits on trade constantly accumulated into the stock, are equally ill adapted to bear a cumulative tax. I can see no way of taxing money locked up, any more than money lent, without opening a door to the greatest oppression. And as to the pure profits on trade although they appear to be income, I rather consider them as stock, which, according to principles, ought not to be taxed. My reason for not considering them as income, is because we have supposed them to be accumulated by the merchant into his trading stock. They resemble the annual shoots of a tree, which augment the mass of it, but are very different from the seed or fruit which is annually produced, and is annually separated from it. If they are spent by the merchants, then they are undoubtedly income, and will be affected by proportional taxes; but as they may also not be spent, and become stock, the cumulative tax will affect them in both cases.

C H A P. IX.

The consequences of an Abolition of Taxes.

HAVING endeavoured to deduce the principles of taxation, by examining the combinations which occur when we suppose it augmented to the highest degree, I must now look for new combinations, which will suggest themselves upon examining the consequences of a total, or a partial abolition of taxes.

So far as taxes are absolutely necessary for the support of government, no body, I suppose, can wish to see them abolished. The object, therefore, of a statesman's attention in levying taxes for indispensable national purposes, should turn upon the principles we have been examining. What now follows relates to the consequences of abolishing taxes once established, so far as it proves a revolution in the economy of a state. This will lead us to examine the consequences of taxes, considered as voluntary public contributions, independently of the absolute necessity of raising them to supply the exigencies of the state. We are therefore to examine the consequences of so great a change to the whole body of the society, considered as a nation, which requires a public stock, to which it may have recourse upon every extraordinary occasion.

When the interest of a whole people is examined with respect to taxes, they may very properly be divided into the following classes.

1mo, Those who receive the amount of taxes, viz. the creditors and servants of the state, and those to whom they give employment.

2do, Those who advance the taxes, viz. all the different classes of the industrious.

3tio, Those who pay the taxes, viz. all the rich and idle; or, in other words, all those who cannot draw back what they have paid.

In these classes are comprehended those who pay the taxes, and those who receive the amount of them; consequently, in whatever concerns taxes, the common interest of the whole taken together is what must regulate the conduct of the statesman.

In order to determine this first and general question, viz. the consequence of abolishing taxes relatively to the cumulative interest of a whole state, it is proper to inquire.

1mo, What will be the consequence of abolishing taxes, relatively to those who now receive the amount of them, viz. the creditors and servants of the public, and those to whom they give employment.

2do, What will be the consequences of abolishing taxes relatively to trade, industry, and manufactures: that is, whether these great objects are carried on to most advantage, when every individual contributes largely in providing a fund to be administered by a statesman; or when no body contributes any thing, but when every one retains the whole of his income, and the profits of his industry, and disposes of them as he thinks proper.

3tio, What will be the consequence of abolishing

taxes, relatively to that part of the people who now complain that they are forced to contribute to every tax, although by their exclusion from the emoluments of lucrative employments, they bear a greater burden than others not better entitled to exemption, who thereby profit at their expense?

To determine so intricate a question, several combinations of circumstances must here be examined, and from the particulars resulting in every case, we shall, towards the end of this chapter, endeavour to point out the general conclusion. I begin by examining the consequences arising to the creditors, and to those who serve the state, from the cessation of those expenses which flow from the produce of taxes, either in paying the interest of debts, or in defraying the whole *actual* expense of government.

As to the creditors, this question has been already discussed. We have seen that the withholding the interest due to them would have the consequence of bringing on such a convulsion in the state, by the breach of faith, and ruin of public credit, as would throw every thing into confusion. But with respect to the servants of the state, we must inquire, whether the raising taxes for defraying this article of expense be more hurtful to the people in general, than the consequences of such a revolution in circulation and employment, which would follow, if the taxes were to be suppressed, and the servants employed by the state dismissed.

When the necessity of raising taxes is out of the question, the hurt they do in general to a country

is when, by the imposition, the money is taken out of those hands who would have employed it for the advancement of the prosperity of the state, in order to throw it into those who will employ it otherwise. From this let us now draw some conclusions.

1mo, That if money be taken from those who would have employed it in feeding themselves, and in continuing their industry, the cessation of such a tax is in a manner giving bread to those who are starving.

2do, If money were to be taken from those who, having more than bare necessities, would, by its use, increase the demand for domestic industry, and were that money bestowed on a set of men who would employ it in the purchase of foreign commodities; the cessation of taxes, in such a case, would, so far, take the bread out of the mouths of foreigners, and give it to our own countrymen.

The abolition of the first species of taxes is advantageous to a state in every combination, let the money arising from it be ever so well employed. As to the second species, the abolition is not necessary; because the vice lies only in the misapplication of the amount.

Let us then suppose taxes to become unnecessary, and all those of the hurtful kind, depriving the industrious of bread, and enriching foreigners at the expense of citizens, to be taken off.

Suppose that after all, there should still remain more taxes than are sufficient for supplying all the necessary charges of government, when administered

with prudence and with economy, and that this surplus is bestowed in gratifying individuals, beyond the value of all the services they do the state: I ask whether this superfluous expence is immediately to be cut off, and taxes diminished in proportion; or whether it would not be more proper to let the taxes subsist, and to think of a better method of applying the amount of them?

I answer, that according to the state of the question, the body of the people, who are all made to contribute towards the enriching of a few of their number, may justly complain of the inequality of their condition, and have a title to demand an abolition of their taxes, unless it can evidently be made appear, that by granting their request, there would follow a prejudice to the state, which would affect their own interests as individuals.

To discover how far this may be the case, let us form as many combinations as we can, relative to the effects of diminishing taxes, and candidly examine the most natural consequences of every one. If we find that the mass of a people gain, in general, more than they lose by paying taxes imposed with moderation and propriety, and still more if it appears that their ease and prosperity depend upon the levying and expending of such taxes; I think we may conclude, that all diminutions of them which hurt the interest of the greater body, are in general hurtful to the society.

Let me first suppose a general reform of all unnecessary expence to take place at once, and a proportional abolition of taxes to go hand in hand

with it. Would not all those who at present subsist by the superfluous expenses of government, be reduced to misery? Would not all those who supply unnecessary want, equal to the whole amount of the taxes suppressed, be forced to be idle in proportion? The millions who contribute in paying those sums would be differently affected. Those who pay out of a fixed and certain income, would feel an immediate benefit from it; those who contribute by proportional taxes would also be gainers, providing they be of the idle class; but all the industrious would lose in proportion, if the prices of subsistence should not fall with the diminution of their taxes. All the manufacturers of exciseable goods, who had been used to *advance the taxes*, as we have observed, would gain considerably. For the diminution of the taxes would be total as to them, though not to their customers; because traders would never want pretences for keeping up the price of their commodities beyond the proportion of what it ought to be, when duties are taken off.

I decide with the greater certainty as to this particular, from the analogy it bears to the consequence of changing the denominations of the coins in France, which long experience shows never to have the immediate effect of regulating prices proportionally.

But as we are here considering the consequences of a sudden abolition of taxes, let us, for a moment, consider, with an eye of humanity, the scenes which would unavoidably open to our view, both in the formerly opulent habitations of those who were wont to wallow in public money, and in the comfortable

comfortable dwellings of many others of every denomination, who, either as the reward of merit, or as the recompence of painful industry, had supplied the wants of useless armies, navies, arsenals, dock-yards, &c. formerly paid out of taxes, now abolished, and who thereby had subsisted and brought up their families.

Are not all these children of the state? Have they not had fathers and mothers who have been greatly relieved by procuring such outlets for them? Have they not children who are educated and brought up with the amount of their salaries, and profits of their service? Have they not had people of every class of industry, who have gained their bread by providing for their wants, while they were supplying those of the state, now become superfluous? In one world, does not the money they receive, circulate and return to the grand river, as I may call it, in the same manner as that of other members of the state?

For these reasons, I say, that taxes once properly imposed, and brought to circulate through a certain channel for a long time, cannot, *suddenly*, be suppressed, without occasioning far greater misery and distress than can arise from them, when levied with any degree of intelligence. This is nowise peculiar to the suppression of taxes; it is equally the same, in every sudden revolution of property. When the Templers were universally rooted out of Christendom, who doubts of the afflictions, misery, and distress, which followed to every class of inhabitants employed by them, in every king-

dom in Europe? Could so large a consumption as that of so great an order cease at once, without drawing along with it numberless inconveniences? Did not the reformation itself, otherwise so great a blessing, starve a multitude of poor who were fed by the monasteries? Did not the secularization of so many ecclesiastical benefices do great prejudice to many families, by blotting out an infinity of ways of procuring an easy livelihood for their children? Let those who do not feel the truth of what I here advance, examine the state of the protestant nobility in Germany, where you find the same hardships still subsisting, though in a degree much inferior to what it must have been at the time of this sudden revolution, which took bread from thousands of the younger sons of noble families.

Such revolutions have happened; such inconveniences have been felt: but they were not the deliberate act of any particular statesman. They were the effect of those convulsions which the human passions occasion. No body can justly impute them as necessary consequences of a reformation in religion. But let any statesman now, from a cool reflection upon the unnecessary load of employments in church, state, army, navy, finances, and law, and from a principle of distributive justice, abolish *at once* all that is superfluous, and the taxes, at the same time, out of which the emoluments arise, he will very soon set before the eyes of his people, such a scene of compassion, as will quickly blot out the remembrance of the favor.

We should not then find some individuals reduced

to want, but numerous families; not a parcel of beggars starved, but industrious manufacturers; not a set of ecclesiastics, who from their state of celibacy and retreat, appeared already, in a manner, separated from the commonwealth, but a multitude of people connected by marriage, by society, and by all the tender bonds which unite mankind. Such a scene, I say, would not fail to excite compassion in the heart of those very men in whose favor the desolation was to be brought on; and the statesman would thereby lose the whole merit of his ill judged zeal for distributive justice, and be considered in the most unfavorable light that passion or prejudice could suggest.

This is a digression introduced with no intention to favor a misapplication of public money, but to point out how far a reformation in this particular is a delicate operation.

A good physician never attacks a disease by violent remedies, when mild ones, with time, may be made to produce the same effect. Nothing can resemble an ingrained disease in a human body, more than an ingrained vicious habit in a state. The spirit of a nation is influenced, as has been said, by the administration of its government. So large a sum of misapplied money creates a political disease, which must be purged away by degrees; and new doors must be opened to receive those whose former method of subsistence is thereby intended to be cut off.

Let me next examine the consequence of a gradual and insensible reduction of taxes, relatively to trade, industry, and manufactures.

It would be both tedious and superfluous to trace the steps by which such an operation ought to be conducted. Let me suppose it complete; but let it not be so very gradual as to blot out all remembrance of the age of taxes, and of their effects.

We have sufficiently analyzed the whole progress of circulation; we have shown how it must constantly be in proportion to alienation, and how, when deficient, industry suffers a check. Even when peace is restored after an expensive war, we have shown how circulation diminishes, from the abatement of public expenses, how money stagnates, and how it is consolidated upon property of a more permanent nature.

Let us now apply these principles to the question before us. Let taxes be abolished ever so gradually, the circulation of the exchequer must cease in proportion; consequently, the whole alienation, and the whole industry which is the object of that alienation, must cease also. The money issued from thence at present, continues its progress from hand to hand, and all is found necessary for circulation, in this age of taxation, as we have called it. What a deal of industry is implied in the circulation of a sum equal to all the taxes! Let those who chuse to calculate, state the following proportion, because I will not here interrupt my subject.

As the whole money of the country is to all the alienations performed by it, so is the sum of taxes to that part of alienation which will fall with them.

If a gradual diminution of taxes must have the effect of extinguishing so much industry, it will

have the effect of starving the industrious who lived by it. But before they starve, the price of work must fall below the price of the narrowest subsistence: because the never failing foreign demand for subsistence: will keep it above the rate of their slender abilities, as long as any trade remains.

To imagine a foreign outlet for cheap manufactures, while the subsistence of workmen is at par with other nations, is against all principles; as it is against experience, to see a country without revenue, and without taxes, carrying on with success the operations of industry and foreign trade.

Compare, therefore, the situation of such manufacturers with those in the age of taxes. Compare those who would augment a supply far beyond all the demand for it, with those who are paying large taxes, and as regularly drawing them back, either upon the sale of their work, or in consequence of wages which enable them to be idle two or three days in a week.

In such a situation, how ardently would the former wish to see the idle consumers furnishing again a copious supply of money to government, for removing such inconveniences. They would then quickly perceive that they had not been of that class which had felt the load of taxes; they would recal to mind the joyful hours they had spent in public houses; the fortunes which every industrious man might hope to accumulate, while every branch of industry was kept alive, by the means of a copious circulation.

If, therefore, the industrious classes of a people cannot be benefited by an abolition of taxes; let us next inquire, to whom the advantage would accrue.

It has been said, that the idle consumers pay all taxes of the proportional kind; the proprietors of lands, houses, &c. bear every where a very large share of taxes both proportional and cumulative. This class of men, therefore, are those who bid the fairest to reap a benefit from an abolition of them. But the proprietors of lands are by no means included in the class of idle consumers, in every respect; although they may be considered in that light, with respect to such taxes upon their consumption as they do not draw back from their direct industry, in producing some manufacture which they may sell again, with a profit proportional to the tax they paid. They are masters of a property, which, in a country of industry, is daily augmenting in its value. Their fortunes; often swell faster than those of any one class of the industrious; but they augment by annual income; the fortunes of all the rest, increase by the capital. Every penny raised in a landlord's rent, is equivalent to half a crown gained by a merchant.

If it be true that taxes, rightly imposed, do no prejudice to any of the manufacturing, or any-wise industrious classes of a people; and if it be true, that an abolition of those taxes, by contracting circulation, would discourage industry; then we may determine that the landlords would lose much more in finding the improvement of their lands interrupted, than all they can gain by adding their taxes to their present fortunes.

Combinations of this sort are so involved, that I cannot pretend to unfold them step by step, as might be done in cases of a more simple nature. The conclusions therefore drawn from researches of this kind, do not command that assent, which we find in a manner extorted from us upon other occasions. In this chapter, I have not undertaken to demonstrate that the judicious imposition of taxes is advantageous to a country in every respect. My view is to point out the advantages they actually have. The common opinion is that they are hurtful. Our feelings, however, have raised doubts with many great men concerning the truth of that proposition. If my investigations, however imperfect, and however liable to objections, should facilitate to others the clearing up a point, which is beyond the reach of my capacity to extricate, this consideration will be a sufficient encouragement for me to proceed.

Let me, therefore, lay aside the thoughts of analyzing the effects of taxes, with such accuracy as to form a demonstration of their being more beneficial than hurtful to an industrious nation, and that the throwing them back into circulation does more good, than the raising them does harm. But let me show, in general, that the interest of landed men, who, I think have, beyond all doubt, been proved to be those who, in the first place, pay a considerable part of proportional taxes, does by no means require an abolition of them.

The proprietors of lands, whom we have hitherto considered as being of the class of the idle consumers, advance their rents by the great demand produced

for subsistence, in consequence of industry. This, if it does not raise the price of subsistence, keeps it, at least, at an equal standard; and that standard must bear a proportion to what it is worth in other nations, as long as trade subsists. But let trade decay, let domestic industry fail, it will not be the foreign price which will then support the rate of our markets. What a multitude of circumstances contribute to the exportation of our superfluity! I can send from Charing-cross, any parcel whatever, to the distance of fifty miles, cheaper than from my own country habitation, where I can have a man, with a cart, for two shillings a day. From Charing-cross, I can send, at an hour's warning, many thousand tons weight: here I could not do the same in many weeks. Near London, an extended common may be inclosed and improved in a season: here, the improvement of a small field is the business of a man's life. Let me even consider how matters are changed within these fifty years. Undertakings which now are executed with little difficulty, were then absolutely impracticable. An army was necessary thirty years ago to make a road of a hundred miles, and the inhabitants were astonished at the execution of it*.

Were it necessary, at this time, to do as much every year, if money be but provided, hands will not be wanting, either to conduct or execute the plan.

The number of people, *well employed*, makes the prosperity of a state; and the profits of the opulent classes, by the augmentation of industry, more than

* Wade's road through the highlands of Scotland.

compensates all the burden of their taxes. They grow in relative wealth; and the acquisitions they make, are commonly exempted from the cumulative taxes raised upon their possessions. In proportion to their industry in improving their lands, their fortunes augment. The present system of taxes does not interrupt their operations. Were any great change in that particular to take place, which might sink the market prices of subsistence, even allowing that it would prove an advantage to foreign trade, they, I am sure, would be the first who would feel the inconvenience.

It may be wondered, why I have not suggested, as a consequence of taxes, the increase upon the price of the earth's productions, which is a direct indemnification to all the landed interest, more than equivalent to the taxes they pay. But taxes upon land, do not augment the price of grain, as they raise the price of exciseable goods. The reason is plain. The tax upon land affects only the proprietor's share of the produce of his lands: were he to attempt to raise the price of his grain, in proportion to the tax he pays, his farmer, who pays no land-tax for his portion, would undersell him in the market. A tax never can raise a price, except when it is laid on so universally, as to make it impossible for any person to avoid it, who sells in competition with another who pays the duty. It is from this principle that smuggling often ruins fair traders: the smuggled goods are sold cheaper than those which pay duty, and the fair trader is thereby forced to sell below what he can afford.

On the whole, I believe that when this question is thoroughly understood, it will be found, that taxes affect prices far less than any one could imagine; except in the case of excises, rightly imposed, and levied without fraud. There indeed they have their effect, but in every other mode of imposing them, I am apt to believe that they do not produce the consequences commonly ascribed to them. I have already suggested the reason in a former chapter upon this subject; where the influence of competition in the markets where commodities are sold, has been proved to work more irresistible effects in regulating the price of work in general, than any thing that taxes, not immediately imposed upon the very article of consumption, can produce. But if in spite of all that has been said, it should be urged that the prices of labor and manufactures rise in proportion to taxes, I answer, that the difficulties resulting upon this hypothesis, would be many more than could be objected to the other theory. Could, for example, any man assign a reason, why a pound of the best snuff in England should be sold dearer than in France, where it pays a duty of above two shillings sterling; why many articles of manufacture can be afforded cheaper in England, than in Scotland, where taxes are certainly lower, and although a day-laborer in the first be paid a shilling, and in the last little more than eight pence; why subsistence should be absolutely dearer in Scotland than in England, taken upon an average; why universal experience should prove, that when the price of subsistence is raised by scarcity, work instead of rising, is constantly lower than at other times?

From all these appearances, added to the arguments I have used to prove that taxes are not prejudicial to industry, I conclude, that the theory I have attempted to give is just in the main; and that when taxes are judiciously imposed, and actually levied without oppression, they enrich a nation.

1mo, By putting into the hands of a good statesman, the means of removing every abuse; of rendering the state respected by its enemies; of supporting every class of industrious inhabitants, when their particular branch falls under distress; of providing an outlet for many young people, who in time become ornaments to their country, and instruments of her defence; of supporting foreign trade by bounties on exportation; of encouraging the improvement of lands, the establishment of colonies, the extension of fisheries, and every other scheme for augmenting the production of subsistence and manufactures.

2do, That the multiplication of taxes, exclusive of the encouragements just mentioned, which are bestowed gratuitously on trade and manufactures, do, of themselves, and independently of the proper application of their amount, augment, demonstratively, the mass of circulation, alienation and industry; and in this respect may be considered as a voluntary contribution, in the first place at least, from the rich who pay them, to the industrious who directly draw them back.

3tio, As to that part of the people, who pay their taxes without sharing the advantages of those who serve the state in lucrative employments, I say the

industrious part of them pay nothing; and the demand for what they produce, is greatly increased by the expence of those very men who are the objects of their envy: and farther, that if an alteration were to be made on the revenue, by any abolition of taxes, those who imagine themselves hurt at present, might find, by sad experience, a much greater, and much more real hurt, from what would disturb the harmony of the present system.

To conclude, we have a tolerable notion of the state of industry in former times, when taxes were little known: we may see the progress it is making in countries where, at present, impositions are comparatively lower than elsewhere; and we may compare the state of those countries with our own, as to ease and happiness. From such inquiries, nothing, I apprehend, can be concluded in favor of the progress of industry, from an abolition of taxes.

That such an abolition may produce some good effect, as yet unknown, I shall not pretend to deny: we have not lived long enough to see any experiment of this kind put in practice.

From the exposition I have given of this matter, there arises a great difficulty to be solved.

Taxes are paid, no doubt, and no body according to this theory seems to pay them. The industrious draw them back; the proprietors of land and solid property are said to be indemnified; prices, it would appear, are not to fall by a diminution of taxes, in favor even of the most idle consumer; they are not made to rise in consequence of an augmentation on them: Whence then do taxes proceed? From

what fund do they arise? What interest do they affect? I can solve all these difficulties, by an answer to another question. From whence arises the value of a small parcel of flax, when wrought into fine lace? It arises from the price paid for time well employed; which produces nothing when spent in idleness. This is the fund out of which the greatest part of taxes is paid; it is a fund created by the industrious Britons, which I hope will increase for many centuries, tho' taxes should increase in proportion. It is worth more than ten times all the taxes which could be raised, and all the landed property without it. Let that time be spent in idleness, and the whole produce of this island would not supply the expenses of government for a month.

C H A P. X.

Are taxes a spur to industry, as some pretend?

IT is not easy to find out, *a priori*, how taxes should prove a spur to industry. What makes several people adopt this opinion is their feelings, in consequence of many circumstances arising from experience, rather than what reason, or the nature of the thing has pointed out. But as nothing can be produced without an adequate and natural cause, it is proper to examine this political problem, by an application of the principles we have laid down in the former chapters. If these be just, we shall discover by them, how it happens that in countries where

taxes are high, where living is dear, and where every circumstance seems to render the means of subsistence difficult to obtain, people live in the greatest plenty, are best and most easily subsisted, and that industry there makes the greatest progress.

For the solution of this question, let us call to mind the principles which influence the multiplication of mankind, and the increase of labor and industry, laid down in the first book. We there explained how the wants of mankind promote their multiplication.

Money, the instrument of alienation, was represented as the *primum mobile* in this operation; a desire in the rich of acquiring every thing with money, that is *demand*, was shown to be the spur to industry in the poor. It was said, that if riches did not inspire a taste for luxury, that is for the consumption of the labor of man, these riches would not circulate; and that they would then be adored rather as a god, than made subservient to the uses of men.

Connect herewith that the imposition of taxes is a method of bringing money into circulation; that those of the proportional kind have the effect of drawing from the rich, an additional price upon every thing they buy, which goes for the use of the state, and which otherwise would not have entered into circulation at that time.

From these principles, I conclude, that taxes promote industry; not in consequence of their being raised upon individuals, but in consequence of their being expended by the state; that is, by increasing demand and circulation.

From the principles above laid down, I cannot discover the shadow of a reason, to conclude that the taking arbitrarily away from some individuals, a part of their gains by cumulative taxes, or proportionally from others, by augmenting the price of what they buy and consume, must in any respect imply an incitement in the consumers to demand more; and without this it never can excite the industrious to augment the supply.

I readily allow that every one who has been obliged to pay a tax, may have a desire to indemnify himself of the expense he has been put to, by augmenting his industry; but if on the other hand, taxes have put every one to a considerable additional expense, in proportion to his estate, it would be absurd to alledge this diminution of his fortune, as the cause of a desire to augment his consumption.

Examine on the other hand, the use made by the state of the money raised, and you will easily perceive the justness, I think, of the above mentioned principles. This money belongs to the public, and is administered by private people. Public expense is defrayed with a full hand; they who bestow the money, bestow it for the public, not for themselves; and they who work for the public, find, or ought to find, the greatest encouragement to be diligent.

Every application of public money implies a want in the state; and every want supplied, implies an encouragement given to industry. In proportion, therefore, as taxes draw money into circulation, which otherwise would not have entered into it at that time, they encourage industry; not by taking

the money from individuals, but by throwing it into the hands of the state, which spends it; and which thereby throws it directly into the hands of the industrious, or of the luxurious who employ them.

It is no objection to this representation of the matter, that the persons from whom the money is taken, would have spent it as well as the state. The answer is, that it might be so, or not: whereas when the state gets it, it will be spent undoubtedly. Besides, had it been spent by individuals, it would have been laid out for the supply of private wants, which are not near so extensive as those of the public: and farther, when money is so taken from rich individuals, it obliges them to find out a way of procuring more, out of their solid property; and when this facility is not procured for them by their statesman, we see how taxes become both oppressive and ill paid. On the contrary, when it is provided, either by the returns of foreign trade, which greatly augment the coin of a country; or by banks, which melt down property into paper circulation; we see taxes augmenting constantly, without creating any impediment to consumption, or discouragement to industry. All these consequences hang in a chain, and hence the solidity of the principles upon which they depend may be gathered.

After this solution of the question proposed, let those who are versed in history combine circumstances, and examine whether facts do not prove the truth of what I have said.

During the time of the Roman empire, when the
riches

riches of Asia flowed into the coffers of Rome, and were constantly exhausted by the prodigality of the emperors, we perceive, from many circumstances, to what a degree the consumption of superfluities augmented. The price of certain commodities rose to an excessive height; industrious people, of the lowest extraction, were daily seen to amass prodigious fortunes: these are proofs of circulation. But when we consider the expenses of a Lucullus, or of a Crassus, who consumed, it is said, the work of ten thousand slaves, and compare the consequence of that consumption with the expense of a modern, who should consume the industry of ten thousand freemen, we shall find a wonderful difference in the effects of the one and of the other, with respect to circulation, and the encouragement given to industry.

There was no alienation between Crassus and his ten thousand slaves, notwithstanding all the work consumed; consequently, the only circulation implied by this consumption was in proportion to the necessaries which the master was obliged to purchase for so great a multitude: and if we still suppose all those necessaries to have been produced by their own labor, then the state of Rome could not, but by an arbitrary imposition laid upon Lucullus and Crassus, draw one farthing out of their coffers; consequently, industry could not increase in proportion to the loads of wealth brought from Asia by those generals. Whereas were Lucullus now at London, or at Paris, he would not be able to spend a shilling, without giving a penny, and perhaps more,

out of his treasure to the state, which would immediately throw it back into circulation.

As we are now on the subject of circulation among the ancients, let me briefly trace the progress of it in Europe, through different modifications, to our own times, and so close this chapter.

When the seat of empire was translated to Constantinople, and all the Asiatic provinces attached to the Emperors of the East, a stop was put to the augmentation of coin and bullion in the empire of the West. A considerable part of what had formerly been there returned to Constantinople, and the remainder fell a prey to the barbarous nations which over-ran it. This may be called the first period.

These barbarians, by enslaving all the ancient inhabitants, and by forcing them to perform every kind of service, must have had little use for coin. What they coined appears to have been broad and thin.

Let any one reflect upon the insensible waste of silver plate, and the still greater loss on coin which circulates; the vast sums carried off in the time of the Croisades; the quantities buried or thrown into rivers in times of devastation; and add to these circumstances, that from the fifth century after Christ, till the discovery of the Indies, there was, probably, little or no silver or gold brought into Europe; and it will appear very natural, that coin should have been at that time much more scarce than formerly.

How contracted circulation was during the 13th and 14th centuries, may be gathered from the an-

eccdote concerning alienation in France, mentioned in the third chapter upon public credit.

But farther, the great subordination established by the feudal form of government, and the military services to which such numbers were bound, had the effect of preserving the ancient simplicity of manners, so unfavorable to industry. The consequence was, that Princes could raise no taxes; and that all the money the people had was locked up in their chests. We know there were in those days abundance of wealthy people; but their wealth inspired them with no disposition to consume at the expense of ready money.

The discovery of the Indies opened a third period, and threw great riches into the hands of the Spaniards: the house of Austria was the first enriched, and appeared with great splendor for some time. Charles V. by his extensive dominions, had an opportunity of distributing this new gotten treasure among his subjects in Flanders, his native country: this set industry to work in that quarter. The Portuguese discovered the East Indies: a new enticement to luxury; a new motive to become expensive. The Hollanders became a trading people, and with the money which their industry had drawn from the magnificent Spaniard, they shook off his yoke. Money insensibly began to circulate. Princes immediately found, as has been said in the second book, that it was necessary for them also to augment their revenue, in order to maintain a proper superiority over their subjects in point of riches. The increase of circulation among individuals made it more easy

to raise taxes; and the throwing the amount of them back again, in gratifications to the chief people of the state, engaged those who came by money in a manner gratuitously, to expend it as freely as they received it. No wonder, then, if Princes found it an easy matter to load their subjects. They were supported in this scheme by the great men of the state, who found a benefit from it. This revolution has totally changed the face of affairs in the present period of circulation. Courts are splendid; armies are numerous; buildings, in cities and in the country, are magnificent; an old city, compared with a new one, appears hideous; all public works are carried on with that solidity which we admire in those of ancient Princes and states, when nations led into captivity were employed to perform them. In those days the magnificence of Princes was in proportion to the groans of their subjects; now they are in proportion to their wealth and ease. Whence proceeds the difference, the effects are the same? From good government, and a well regulated political economy.

C H A P. XI.

Considerations upon Land-Taxes, with some Observations upon those of England and France.

OF all the kinds of cumulative taxes, that which is properly imposed upon lands seems the best: that is, it implies the fewest inconveniences to the persons

paying, and to the state in raising it. That it is an unequal imposition is plain and certain: this character is unavoidably attached to every species of cumulative taxes, in one way or other. It has also the effect of casting a general discredit upon the purchase and improvement of land; because the proprietors are naturally exposed to augmentations, which may, almost with the same ease, be carried to the total amount of the income, as to any proportional part of it. This has been mentioned in a former chapter, where the interest of a nation's debts was supposed to increase so as to equal the value of all the land-rents, and the whole revenue of individuals.

Land-taxes are imposed in various forms in different countries, and all are supposed to bear a determinate proportion to the rent. This, however, is never, nor indeed can it ever be the case. The value of land is varying perpetually, from the industry of the inhabitants. Besides this inequality, there are other inconveniences proceeding from the unequal distribution of property. In Scotland, for instance, land is divided into large portions; very few small lots are to be found. The class of farmers, for the most part, labor the lands of others, who have large possessions. This is less the case, I believe, in England, and still less in France and in Germany. A land-tax, therefore, being supposed universal, would, in Scotland, do little harm: in England, it falls heavier upon the small proprietors; because the sum exacted bears a greater proportion to the supposed superfluity of the proprietor. In France, it is still worse; for there the exemptions of the num-

erous class of nobles, and many other circumstances mentioned above, entirely destroy even the shadow of proportion. It is out of my way to enter into any long detail upon this head, with respect to different countries.

I shall therefore confine myself to a very few observations upon the method of laying this tax in England; and upon a project which has been long in agitation in France, to raise their land-tax by way of tithe upon the fruits.

This scheme was first proposed to the late King of France, by the *Maréchal de Vauban*, in 1699, and the proposal was renewed some years ago in a performance called the *Réformateur*. But as it would prove hurtful and burdensome to France, in a great degree, from a circumstance which has not been attended to, the examination of this system of taxation will serve as a good illustration of this part of our subject.

The land-tax in England has, in my humble opinion, two remarkable defects. First, The sums imposed at so many shillings in the pound * upon every district of the kingdom, whether cities, towns, universities, or open country, even upon the King's palaces, inns of court, &c. are not distributed according to any rule of proportion upon the pro-

* That the assessments, in the annual act for the land-tax, are generally understood to be at the rate of 1, 2, 3, or 4 shillings in the pound, is true; but it is to be observed, that no such rate is mentioned in the statute with respect to real estates or land. The rate of a certain number of shillings in the pound occurs only with regard to personal property.

perty of individuals; but this operation is left to assessors.

Secondly, All personal estates, except property in the public funds, and stock upon land, supposed necessary for agriculture, are charged in the same proportion as land-rents.

I shall now point out the inconveniences and bad consequences of these two capital defects.

When a tax is imposed at so many shillings in the pound upon the income of a whole district, every article of the property which produces it ought to be specified. If this be omitted, there is a legislative authority vested in those who make the distribution.

The articles which compose the whole property, and the revenue of each article being once determined, the state has it in its power to impose the tax according to what proportion it thinks fit; of one, two, or more shillings in the pound. But then, in favor of the contributors, the different articles which produce the supposed total, ought either to be specified in the law, or reference should be made to a book of valuation where they are recorded.

It is no easy matter to frame the valuation of all the property of a country: and it is a scheme I should be very far from proposing, unless the spirit of a nation took such a turn as to wish for it. But where a determinate sum has been in use to be levied upon a certain district, it does not appear so difficult to make a proportional distribution of it according to equity, and to adhere for the future to that

distribution, considering it as a *proportional* valuation, if not a *real* one. This is done every year, and without it no such tax could be raised. But when annual distributions are made, discontents constantly arise; and the pretended equality thereby observed, produces worse effects than the inequalities which would follow from the other scheme: because the change in the relative value of possessions would then be chiefly owing to the industry of every proprietor in improving his lot.

How valuations in England were made originally I cannot tell*; but in Scotland, it is very certain, that as to lands they were all set down in a book of valuation at their supposed rents at that time. So let the sum raised be what it will, every man at least

* There is no vestige in the history of England, since Doom's-day book, of any regular valuation being made of all the *lands* of the kingdom, nor of any tax imposed, *singly*, on that branch of property.

The subsidies, monthly assessments, and pound rates, in the different stages of the monarchy, have been mixed duties; composed of a charge upon the lands, upon the money and personal estates of the subject, and frequently including a poll-tax, where qualities, that is rank, were differently charged.

The whole operation of distributing and raising this duty, has been by commissioners named by the King, or by parliament, who sometimes upon oath, and sometimes not, inquired into the extent of every one's private fortune, and assessed them accordingly. Whoever wishes to have a more full account of this confused method of raising a land-tax in England, may consult Davenant's *Ways and Means*, Article of Monthly Assessments, and Aids upon a Pound-rate.

knows that his proportion must be according to his valuation in the general register.

In England, the case is totally different. The proportion every district is to pay, is indeed recorded by an original distribution made many years ago in King William's time. By this it appears what every city, county, university, &c. is to pay according as the tax is imposed at one, two, three, or four shillings in the pound. This is precisely the regulation in France, as shall be more fully observed; but still such regulations nowise prevent the most grievous inconveniences which attend this tax; because the burden of it does not consist in the total amount, so much as in the partial distribution upon the inhabitants in every subdivision.

In England, let me suppose the proportion of the general sum for a particular district to be ten thousand pounds, at four shillings in the pound. How is this to be levied as the law stands? Instead of books of valuation, which show at least the proportion of every man's property, if not the real value of it, assessors are constantly called in, who examine the rents of all the lands according to the last leases of them. If they have been improved and let at a higher rent than formerly, the proportion of the tax is augmented. If they have not been let, but still remain in the possession of him who improved them, the tax is not augmented. If the tax be found to fall too heavy upon the lands and houses, then personal estates are made to contribute, as is the case in London. All questions or disputes about the repartition of the tax are determined, without appeal to the courts of law, by the commissioners appointed for laying on the tax;

as in France they are determined by the Intendant. Without this regulation all would run into confusion, for the reason I am now going to mention, and which regards the second defect in this tax.

Any proprietor of lands is entitled, from the words of the statute, to insist that the whole personal estates of those of the district shall enter into computation of the total value upon which the sum imposed is to be assessed. Were such questions to come before a court of law, where the judges are obliged to determine almost according to the letter of it, I believe no land-tax could be levied in that kingdom. But manners, not laws, govern mankind. The spirit of the English nation is such, as to be incompatible with every thing which favors of oppression. Hence the few complaints against the assessors, or those who judge between parties. And as the land-tax is levied without any complaints, except as to the total amount; while that remains the case, the fewer the innovations made upon it are, the better.

In France, the sum of the *taille* to be raised upon the kingdom for the year is determined in the King's council; and the proportion of every district (called an *Election*) is there particularly specified. The district of an Intendant is called a generality, and comprehends in it several elections. The Intendant, therefore, makes the distribution of the general sum imposed upon every election, and upon every town, village, and parish in it, according to a certain proportion; and rules are prescribed to the

collectors of every parish, concerning the method of taxing every species of income, every emolument of industry, even every animal in the possession of those who are subject to this tax. This proportion is calculated to carry the most scrupulous attention to every man's gain, upon all effects belonging to him, and upon every possibility of making profit by industry. All this is carried into execution with the greatest seeming equality in the minute subdivisions.

But as the first imposition of the tax is not proportioned to the actual value of the income it is intended to affect, and as the Intendant does not set out by a particular valuation of every man's possession, before he distributes the tax upon the several parishes, he is obliged to make up the deficiencies by second and third distributions.

Although this *taille* affects every species of property producing an income, as well as every kind of industry and employment, it does not affect every landlord for his rent, so much as every cultivator under lease, for his supposed profits.

Land-rents in France belong, for the most part, to the higher classes; and these, whether they be well born or not, are exempted from this tax, providing they be *noble*; a word which has no reference to birth, but to certain privileges which any man, who has money, may acquire.

It was in order to avoid this exemption, that the Maréchal de Vauban wanted to substitute a tenth instead of the present *taille*; for a reason we shall presently see.

All the land-rents, therefore, of the nobles are

exempted from the *taille*, and are only affected by *vingtièmes* and *dixièmes*; but when they cultivate their own lands, their privilege of exemption from the *taille* is confined to as much as four ploughs can labor; and this farming must be carried on by menial servants, unmarried, in order to prevent such proprietors from defrauding the tax, by really letting their lands under pretext of holding them in farm.

This exemption, as to their land-rents, is more apparent, however, than, real. It is not the *lands* of the nobles, but the *rent* paid out of them which is exempted from the *taille*; consequently, by imposing an exorbitant *taille* upon the lessee, very little remains for the land-rent; and this tax being laid upon a set of people who are loaded with many others, is in the end more burdensome to the proprietor, than if he paid it himself. But a change in this policy is impracticable. The gentlemen of France will probably never submit to a *taille*; and although, by yielding up that point of delicacy, their rents might be raised in the end; yet as matters stand, they know they enjoy the rents they have, free of tax, and if once they were made to pay any part of them, they do not know where such payments might terminate.

To avoid the infinite oppression which results from the French principle of sharing every man's profit as soon as he makes it, the Maréchal de Vauban proposed to abolish the *taille*, as it is paid at present, together with the *capitation*, *industrie*, and all the train of cumulative taxes committed to

the management of the Intendants; and to establish in their room what he called a royal Tenth, meaning by this term, a proportion of all the fruits of the earth, similar to what is established in favor of the clergy. This he proposed to lay on, according to the exigencies of the state, from one twentieth part to one tenth upon every article of the gross produce of land, over all France. This he imagined to be equal to one tenth of the land-rent. And the author of a book published under the title of the *Réformateur*, containing a new plan of taxation, in which there are some things worthy of observation, follows in this particular the Maréchal de Vauban, without ever considering the true nature of a tax of this kind.

Of all the taxes upon the income of land-property, the tithe is the worst; and it has undoubtedly been established among men, before agriculture or taxes were understood. Lands in all countries are of different qualities: some are proper for bearing rich crops of grain, others are indifferent; some produce pasture, others forest; the revenue of some consists in wine, in mines, and in a thousand different productions, which cost, some more, some less expense to cultivate. The tithe takes without distinction a determinate proportion of the fruits, in which is comprehended the tithe of all the industry and expense bestowed to bring them forward. As an example of this, let me suppose a field of corn, which cannot pay the proprietor above $\frac{1}{4}$ of the grain it produces, many I know cannot pay above $\frac{1}{5}$, but let me suppose it $\frac{1}{4}$: another

may pay with ease $\frac{1}{3}$; another even $\frac{2}{5}$; the fields about Padoua pay $\frac{1}{2}$; grass fields pay still more; and rich hay fields will pay in some places $\frac{2}{3}$, and even $\frac{3}{4}$.

How then is it possible there should be any equality in a tax which carries off, without distinction, a certain proportion of the fruits, when those fruits bear no determinate proportion at all to the expense of raising them? But besides the inequality of this tax among proprietors, I ask how it is possible that any rent should be determined for lands, which are subject to a *variable* tithe, sometimes at $\frac{1}{10}$, sometimes at $\frac{1}{20}$ of the produce? Let me demonstrate the impossibility of such a plan, by an example.

I suppose the Maréchal's plan established, and that the tithe to be imposed is to be deducted from the rent stipulated between master and tenant. This was his intention: he has in many places declared, that all tithes were to come out of the land-rent, which indeed is the only fund upon which a land-tax ought to be established. And he has as often declared that he never intended this land-tax should exceed one tenth of the rent, or two shillings in the pound.

I suppose a field, producing every year 1000 bushels of grain, to be let: it is to pay a variable tithe, sometimes of 100 bushels, sometimes of 50, according to the exigencies of the state. I farther suppose one third of the produce to be equal to what the farmer can pay the landlord for rent. And I suppose the rent to be paid in bushels of grain.

According to these suppositions, the rent must be

333 $\frac{1}{3}$ bushels subject to the tithe. Suppose it to be laid on at $\frac{1}{10}$, or 100 bushels. Deduct this from 333 $\frac{1}{3}$, remains to the proprietor 233 $\frac{1}{3}$. The tithe comes next year to $\frac{1}{20}$; this makes 50 of deduction, remains to him 283 $\frac{1}{3}$. So instead of 10 *per cent.* of his rent, he pays in the first case 30 *per cent.* and when at the lowest, he pays 15 *per cent.* which is thrice as much as the Maréchal proposed to take.

But how are masters and tenants to reckon with one another? Lands are not let according to a determinate proportion of increase. Suppose an estate in lands of different kinds, how is the tithe to be deducted then? Is the master to take the tenant's word both for the quantity and the value of every article he has paid as tithe, of every field, of every article in his possession, even of the chickens in his yard? If on the other hand, this variable tithe is to be thrown upon the possessor, which, indeed, is the only possible supposition, which way are lands to be let, when we see that the difference of the imposition, at different times, is no less than 15 *per cent.* or three shillings in the pound? This, however, would be the only method for masters and tenants to reckon.

But let me suppose another proprietor to let a grass field adjacent to that which bears grain, and that both were to be of an equal rent, supposing all tithes out of the way. The gross produce of the grass would be to the rent, little above the proportion of 4 to 3. Let us then call the gross produce 1000, as in the other case, $\frac{3}{4}$ of which would be 750, for the rent. One tenth of the whole taken from that would leave the rent at 650, or little above 13 $\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.*

deduction at the highest tithe, and $6\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. at the lowest.

What inequality, therefore, would not such an imposition occasion upon land-rents, and what inextricable difficulties in letting of grounds? From what has been said, without farther inquiry, we may declare that no land-tax can possibly be raised, with any equality, by a royal tithe; and the Maréchal has never considered farther, than how the King could with certainty and ease to himself, appropriate a portion of the lands in his kingdom, leaving the proprietors and their tenants to settle accounts the best way they could.

On the whole, nothing can make us approve of the Maréchal's royal tithe, unless it be the present oppression which proceeds from the method of levying the taille; by which it happens that in France few incline to acquire the full property of lands.

Most of the great estates consist of fee-farm rents. A man of three thousand a year land estate, covers sometimes with his nominal property (*dominium directum*) a whole country of fifty parishes; but the real property (*dominium utile*) of this vast extent is subdivided into a number of small fees, of which he is only lord paramount; and what remains is the property of the lower classes, who pay what is called *Rentes Seigneuriales*, or noble rents, consisting in money and grain. These rents can nowise be affected by any tithe imposed, because they bear no proportion to the produce: and supposing they did, as in some provinces, where they are called *agriers*,
which

(which is the $\frac{1}{6}$ or $\frac{1}{8}$ sheaf paid to the lord) the tithe, instead of taking a tenth of the *agrier*, takes a tenth of the whole crop; consequently, only one tenth of this sixth or eighth sheaf falls upon the lord; the tithe of all the rest falls upon the poor proprietor or lessee, who the more he is industrious, is oppressed the more by this imposition; because it carries off the tenth of his expense and labor, as well as of the farm which he rents.

This is the tax which the Maréchal de Vauban recommended to be raised universally over all the land-property of France, when the tithe was at the highest. To this the late reformer adheres; but proposes the twentieth instead of the tenth; and after a nice calculation of the gross produce of France, he estimates one twentieth part of it to be worth about 95 millions of livres *per annum*. Hence I conclude, that the twentieth part of the income, or one shilling in the pound of all the revenue of solid property in France, fairly collected, would not much exceed one third of that sum, or about 30 millions, or 1 333 333 *l.* sterling. This first part, therefore, of the Maréchal's tithe, imposed at $\frac{1}{20}$, would lay a tax equal to three shillings in the pound on the poor lessees and vassals of the nobles, while, contrary to his express intention, the whole fee-farm and noble rents of France, would escape taxation. From this we may conclude, that no tax upon land-rents can possibly be raised by way of tithe: as also that when it is taken in kind it is the most oppressive, the most unequal, and the

most discouraging to industry, that ever was contrived.

The Maréchal's principal motive for proposing this mode of taxation, was to avoid the difficulty of obliging the nobles to pay the taille. He found also, that there would be great ease in collecting this revenue for the King, without demanding money of the lower classes. The consequence, however, would have been, either to ruin all lessees, if they continued to pay the same rent for the lands as formerly, or to introduce the greatest inequality imaginable among proprietors, if the tithe had been totally cast upon their rents: but as to the method of settling accounts between master and tenant, in consequence of this tithe, both the Maréchal and the reformer are totally silent.

The Maréchal's *Dixme royale*, with all its defects, is a book of great value, from two considerations.

The first, that he had all possible access to come at the true state of the nation. The second, that he wrote with great impartiality, and with a sincere desire to serve the landed interest, without intending to hurt that of the King his master. From this book, we have an opportunity of judging of his notions of taxation; and from the consequences he himself points out, we discover the miserable state of the common people in France, whose situation at this day is not much changed for the better.

The Maréchal's scheme was to reduce the whole revenue of France under four heads.

The first, a general tithe of all the fruits of the earth, without distinction, which we have already explained.

The second, a tithe upon every income whatsoever, even upon the profits of labor, servants wages, employments, possessions, and trades of all denominations.

The third, was a modification of the *gabelle*, or the duty upon salt.

The fourth, which he calls the fixed revenue, was to be composed of the domain, and several other branches of taxes which he allowed to subsist, judging them, I suppose, not hurtful to the state.

I shall now show wherein the Maréchal's plan of taxation is contrary to principles, and leave the reader to make his conclusions.

First, he has declared in many places, that his intention was only to impose a tax upon the income of land, which he understands to be that part which remains after the deduction of all expenses of cultivation &c. in other words, what every one understands by land-rent, and which, no doubt, is the only proper object of taxation: but in order to impose upon this part his royal dixme when at the real tenth, he taxes the tenth part of the whole produce, instead of the tenth part of what goes for the rent; and as far as I have been able to discover, he never perceives that there is the greatest difference between these two quantities.

The second article was the tithe of every income, not consisting of the fruits of the earth.

Where an income arises from a branch of property which can render it determinate, I shall form no objection to a tithe or two shillings in the pound upon it. But when he comes to tax lawyers, attor-

neys, physicians, &c. according to the value of their emoluments, I own I cannot find a possibility of preventing abuse in the collection, or inequality in the imposition of the tax.

The Maréchal's principal point in view was agreeable to the standing maxim in France, to make every one contribute according to his income. Very right, so far as it is possible, without implying much greater inconveniences than what can be compensated by this imaginary equality. I call it imaginary, because in the execution it will be found, that no body will really pay what they ought, except those whose income cannot be concealed. Whenever any part can be hid, there must, in my opinion, result a great inequality, and great oppression, in endeavouring to ascertain it.

A short observation will suffice to give a view of his notions with regard to merchants and trade in general. His intention was to be very indulgent to this class of inhabitants; and he feels all the advantages of trade. He proposes, however, to proscribe all notes of hand payable to bearer, as it is a method of concealing wealth and exacting interest for money; which he supposes to be contrary to scripture. Trade would be ill carried on with the Maréchal's restrictions.

When he comes to the lower classes, which he supposes to comprehend one half of the people, to wit, all tradesmen, manufacturers, and day-laborers, their wives and children; he takes the example of a weaver, as a middle term, to judge of the gains of the tradesmen and manufacturers.

He supposes this weaver to have a wife and family, to work 180 days only (because of the many holidays, as well as accidental avocations) at $10\ 1\frac{1}{2}\ d.$ sterling a day. This makes his year's labor worth $7\ l.\ 17\ s.\ 5\ d.$ sterling. Of this he takes $10\ s.\ 10\ 1\frac{1}{2}\ d.$ for the greatest tithe. Besides this, he exacts of him for his salt-tax, for four persons in his family, $12\ s.\ 9\ d.$ So that this man, whose whole labor is only worth $7\ l.\ 17\ s.\ 5\ d.$ sterling, is to pay $1\ l.\ 3\ s.\ 7\ 1\frac{1}{2}\ d.$ of cumulative taxes out of it. which is above $\frac{1}{7}$ of the whole fund of his poor subsistence: after which he adds, "This in my opinion, is a tax high enough for a weaver, who has only his two hands to gain his bread with, and who has house rent, meat and clothes to provide for a family, who frequently can gain very little for themselves." To this I must agree.

I shall give one specimen more of what the Maréchal considered as an ease procured to day-laborers, in their then situation; which relief, however, they have not hitherto obtained.

These he also supposes to work 1890 days in the year, at not quite $8\ 3\frac{3}{4}\ d.$ sterling. He values his year's labor at $6\ l.\ 10\ s.\ 6\ d.$ sterling, and here is the employment of this sum according to the plan.

He is to pay for tithe of his <i>industrie</i>	£	0	8	8	$1\frac{1}{2}$
For his salt-tax	-	0	12	9	
For five English quarters of rye	-	4	7	1	
For clothes to the family, utensils, and repairs	1	1	11	$1\frac{1}{2}$	
		6	10	6	

I have been the more particular upon this part of the plan, because it gives us a notion of what the Maréchal thought a moderate easy tax laid upon 8 000 000 of inhabitants, to wit, 2 000 000 men and 6 000 000 women and children, according to his calculation.

I come next to the tax he proposed to lay upon salt, of which mention has been made.

This tax is of the nature of an excise, and is called the *gabelle*, which we have explained already in a note; and the objections to it, as the Maréchal has proposed them, are no less than three very material ones.

First, the proportion of the duty is far too great, considering the value of the commodity. The second is, that being imposed upon an article of subsistence, it operates immediately on the price of the salt, and only consequentially on the price of labor. This is no great objection, were the proportion moderate; because insensibly the price of labor would rise, were the tax generally and exactly levied in proportion to the consumption: but this was not the case; and this circumstance opens the last objection, and the greatest of all, to wit, that the tax, proportional in its nature, is rendered cumulative, by being raised at the end of the year, in order to oblige every one to consume the salt required.

Now by this mode of levying the tax it loses every advantage, and becomes an addition to the tithe laid upon the industry of the consumer. If every man in England were to be rated at the end of the year, in proportion to the excise of as much

beer as he may reasonably be supposed to consume, would that be an excise? certainly not. It would be a poll-tax to all intents and purposes, which no man could draw back.

I have little or nothing to object to the fourth article of the Maréchal's plan. He proposed no essential change, either as to the imposition, or method of levying the taxes which composed it. The principal heads of them are,

1^{mo}, The royal domain, or the king's landed estate, together with all casualties attached to royalty, or feudal superiority; stamp-duties, and the *contrôle* of public acts by notaries.

2^{do}, The customs upon importation and exportation.

3^{tio}, Certain taxes of the purely proportional kind; among which was one upon tobacco, and one upon liquors drank in public houses in the country. Here entire liberty is left to the consumers; and the taxes are principally calculated to affect, or, as he calls it, to punish luxury, intemperance, and vanity. With this view, he wittily proposes an imposition upon large and ridiculous wigs, at that time much in fashion, and upon several other articles of extravagance.

This is a short sketch of the Maréchal's system of *royal tithe*, considered as to the principles only, upon which the several taxes were intended to be imposed. The treatise contains several admirable things; especially with regard to recapitulations of inhabitants, lands, houses, animals, &c. highly deserving the

attention of the statesman, who intends to execute any plan for national improvement.

I shall now set before the reader the Maréchal's calculation, as to the amount of the four articles, when at the lowest, and at the highest taxation.

When the tithe is understood to mean the 20th part of the fruits, &c.

	Livres.
I. The tithe of all the lands - - -	60 000 000
II. The tithe of all revenue and industry -	15 422 500
III. The salt-tax at eighteen livres the <i>minot</i> *	23 400 000
IV. The fixed revenue - - -	18 000 000
Total of the four articles, when at the lowest taxation - - -	116 822 500

When the tithe is understood to mean the tenth part of the fruits, the two first articles are just

double of what they are stated at above, viz. 150 845 000

The salt-tax at thirty livres the *minot* - 39 000 000

The fixt revenue never changes, and stands always at - - - 18 000 000

Total of the four articles, when at the highest taxation - - - 207 845 000

* The *minot* is a measure of capacity equal to three Paris bushels, or the fourth part of a septier, which is about one half of an English quarter. This makes the *minot* to be about an English bushel. The Maréchal proposed that this quantity, when at the lowest price, should be sold for 18 livres, or 1 l. 6 s. 1 1/2 d. sterling; and when at the highest, at 30 livres, 2 l. 3 s. 6 1/2 d. from which we may judge of the exorbitancy of the gabelle, even after all the diminution he thought proper to make upon it. The French money mentioned in the Maréchal's *Dixme royale*, is here converted into 52 1/4 d. sterling, for the French crown of three livres: because the silver coin in France, at the time he wrote, was 30 livres 19 sols the marc (Dutot, chap. 1. art. 6); and at present it is at 49 livres 16 sols.

In imposing this tax upon the fruits, he allowed no exemptions, not even in favor of the princes of the blood: for this he gave an excellent reason. Tithes, said he, were the ancient patrimony of kings. The Roman emperors and kings of France enjoyed them. From those duties no noble was exempted. This appears from the ecclesiastical tithe, which, he alledged, to be nothing but the royal patrimony, alienated in favor of the church; consequently, there is nothing derogatory in paying the tithe, although nothing be more so than paying the taille. So great is the difference between terms, when the ideas of a nation are connected with them!

C H A P. XII.

Miscellaneous Questions relating to Taxes.

THE subjects of credit, debts, and taxes, have been so extensively treated of in the two last books, that I hope no question I now can propose will serve for any purpose, but to suggest the solution of it, so far as it comes under the principles we have been deducing.

QUEST. I. What is the most proper method for imposing a land tax?

I answer, that according to equity and justice, all impositions whatsoever ought to fall equally and proportionally on every one, according to his superfluity; but in land-taxes this equality is not so essential as in most others. The great hurt arising

from inequality in taxation proceeds from the inequality occasioned thereby in the competition between the classes of the industrious. When the same tax affects people of the same class differently, those who bear the heaviest load gain less, though their industry be equal. But in land-taxes the case is different: the tax there only diminishes an income already made, and in fact diminishes the value of the property; so that were land-taxes made perpetual deductions, the whole loss of the tax would fall at once upon the actual possessors at the time it is imposed. Every subsequent purchaser, by deducting the land-tax out of the rent, would calculate the value of the remainder only; and the consequence of the tax would be, virtually, to transfer a part of the land-property to the state.

The consequences of such a change upon property may produce a variety of new combinations. The state may then sell this portion of their property; they may with the price received pay off part of their debts; they may acquire certain districts of the country, where, being both sovereign and proprietor, they may abolish taxes, which would then in a great measure affect themselves only, and establish manufactures for foreign exportation.

Although an absolute equality in this tax is not so very requisite, still the inequality to be ascertained, and every income intended to be affected by the tax should be specified in one way or other. For this purpose, the best method seems to be, to make the regulation of any one year a rule for the subsequent years, until it be judged proper to make a new

general valuation of every part. This is a consequence of what has been said: a fluctuating annual valuation, which is the case in France, produces numberless inconveniences; and upon the whole, they are far greater than those which it is intended to avoid.

I agree that the same land may be worth more one year than another; but it is impossible by a fluctuating valuation to ascertain that difference over a whole country, to the satisfaction of every one; and although, by fixing it at one rate upon every possession, inequalities must take place, yet fixing it from rising in proportion to improvement, will prove an encouragement to industry, which will greatly overbalance such an inequality. Every one then will be in the way of acquiring an addition to his income, free of land-tax; and if this be thought too great an encouragement to improvement, let the regulation be only fixed for a determinate time; suppose a century. This is no more than giving every one a lease as it were of their land-tax for a hundred years; and experience shows, that without granting long leases it is impossible that lands should ever be improved.

Were innovations practicable, according as right reason and plain principles direct, it is very certain that a land-tax might be imposed in a better way than I have here suggested. But to what purpose would it be to lay down schemes beyond the power of execution, when the principles already deduced so plainly point them out?

QUEST. 2. Which is the best method of levying

taxes; by farm, or by the management of commissioners appointed by the state?

The best way to answer this question, is to show the inconveniences and advantages of both. The arguments against farming are,

1^{mo}, The great fortunes made by the farmers occasion jealousy, and expose to the eyes of the people a set of men who are become rich at their expense; hence envy arises, and hatred against government.

2^{do}, In years of scarcity, war, or public calamity, deductions of the rent, or annual sums paid by the farmers, are demanded, and can hardly be refused, and the farmers always overvalue their loss; here therefore is an unequal bargain: the farmer *must* gain, the state *may* lose.

3^{tio}, The people pay less willingly to the farmers than to the King; magistrates in general support the raising of duties with more unwillingness, and severities upon delinquents are less easily born.

These inconveniencies are avoided in the management. There men of the best abilities may be intrusted with that employment; experience shows that many branches of taxation have been carried to great perfection under management, and men of probity and capacity will act with as great zeal for the public as for themselves.

The principal arguments for farming are; the advantage of having a fixed and certain revenue to depend on at regular terms; that the farmers act with more zeal for themselves, and with greater impartiality in employing under-officers, as well as

more frugality, and therefore can afford to give a higher rent, with considerable profit to themselves, than can be made effectual under the best management: besides, every one judges himself capable to administer the King's affairs, because he finds profit in it; but people think twice before they undertake to be farmers of a revenue they do not well understand.

In the administration of taxes, it ought to be the object of a statesman's attention and care to profit of every advantage attending the different modes of levying them. It is not sufficient to inquire into the general consequences of the two modes of administration, the management and the farming of taxes: those of the cumulative kind especially, affecting the lower classes, would be very improper objects of a farm; because it would be in a manner delivering over the greater part of a people to the rapacity of tax-gatherers.

On the other hand, the farming of proportional taxes is not liable to so many inconveniencies. The farmers there are principally employed in watching over those who *advance* the taxes, and who are themselves, as has been said, in reality the tax-gatherers over the people.

When therefore circumstances permit, without inconvenience, the fabrication of exciseable goods to be incorporated with the farm, this of all others is the best method of levying taxes. Examples of this are familiar almost every where. The farmers of the salt and of the tobacco in France are in this situation. In retailing those commodities, they

collect the price they pay for the composition; that is, for the farm of them. It is not the same of the aids in France. There the farmer superintends the immediate tax-gatherer, to wit, the retailer of spirituous liquors, or of other things subject to the tax. The circumscribing the number of places where exciseable commodities are fabricated, and the shutting them up within inclosures, would greatly facilitate the levying of all excises, whether by farm or by management.

In order therefore to decide whether the preference ought to be given to the management or to the farm, circumstances are to be weighed. When a tax is new, or has been ill managed, or has fallen, without any visible cause, below what it formerly produced, or ought to have done; when the amount is unknown, by being of an extensive collection: in such cases, short farms, and even several subdivisions of them in a country, may be of use. But when a tax is well understood, and a good plan of levying it laid down, it may be well raised, and perhaps better improved, under a management; as also, when it is of a nature to be easily understood, and when the very exercise of levying it points out all the frauds possible to be committed.

Davenant, who well understood this question, in his 4th Discourse upon revenues, recommends farms which are not *absolute*, but *limited*, as the best. By limited, he understands, that the farm should first be given for a fixed sum; that the farmers should carry on an open administration, liable to the government's inspection in every particular;

that in case the profits of the farm should exceed the rent stipulated, a certain sum should be ascertained for the charge of management, and the surplus should belong to the King, allowing a certain poudage to the farmers to animate their diligence.*

He very justly observes, that a tax, when farmed, in order to be improved, will naturally draw, at first, a less rent than the sum liquidated as a free profit by the former management; because the farmers will be willing to secure to themselves a good profit; and next, because they will be obliged to make a considerable advance, as a security for fulfilling their engagement, which must also be considered as a deduction out of the produce of the tax.

All the advantage therefore in farming must be looked for after the expiration of the lease; for which reason, the shorter the term is, the better: three years, it seems, was the common term in England, in Davenant's time.

All new imposed taxes ought to be raised with the greatest lenity, not to revolt the minds of the people: the first year's deficiency is well bestowed, if government can but discover the different ways which may be fallen upon to defraud the tax, and form a good judgment how far the amount of it may go in time, when the management is brought to perfection. As long therefore as a management continues to improve a tax newly laid on, I should not think of farming it: but when, either from the extent

* This plan of Davenant's was carried into execution in France by Monsieur Silhouette, in 1759.

of the imposition, or the nature of it, frauds begin to multiply, and management begins to become more and more difficult, then is the time immediately to put it into farm, either for different districts of a country, or in sub-farms. If this be delayed, frauds will daily increase; and the difficulty of preventing them will carry government to the expedient of imposing penalties, severe in proportion to the frequency of the crime. Commissioners will constantly put these in execution with reluctance; the management will become slack; or if penalties are rigorously exacted, they will become a handle for oppression; and even though justice be done, and none but delinquents be punished, yet still the people will be ill affected with the punishment of an action which in itself they are too apt not to consider as a crime: whereas in farming, frauds will be prevented by vigilance more than by fear of punishment; and this is by far the better expedient. Thus instead of feuds daily increasing, they will daily diminish, and the tax will improve yearly.

Here Davenant well observes, that *nothing but divine wisdom can at first create perfect order; but in all human affairs it must be the work of time, and the result of much labor and application.*

One good reason for managing a tax before it be farmed, is to learn the nature of it, and of the frauds it is liable to. When these are not rightly known, the farmer can more easily surprise the government, and obtain from it new regulations, under the pretext of preventing frauds; which regulations they may abuse, and turn to other purposes than those intended.

Davenant

Davenant has a very good remark, p. 154. That a new tax, imposed upon consumption, and ill levied, equally raises the price upon the consumers, and the whole profit centres in the hands of those who retail. That when an old excise becomes ill levied, the profit is divided between the inferior officers (who collect it) and the retailers. The reason is, that a branch which is well understood, is not so liable to *frauds* as to *collusion*. This shows that in every case, such a duty should never be imposed without exerting every endeavour to have it rightly collected. The state should also keep a watchful eye upon the augmentations made in the price of excisable commodities, in order to keep the augmentation justly proportioned to the duty. If this be neglected, the overcharge hurts consumption, diminishes the produce of the tax, and enriches the retailers only. Here competition is necessary to be introduced: the public may even erect a manufacture which may regulate prices, and so soon as they are properly ascertained, the selling price may be fixed by an assize.

An ill levied imposition is attended with this additional inconvenience, that it establishes, inequality among the industrious of the same class; consequently, an unequal competition. This happens when particular officers are diligent and exact in doing their duty, while others are remiss. The profits of retailers are *high* in proportion to the *negligence* of the officers of the revenue; and their extraordinary profits, enable them to undersell and to ruin those who are exactly looked after: the consequence of

this is, to diminish the number of retailers; to introduce hurtful monopolies; and in general, to hurt the whole branch of the manufacture. All remissness, therefore, in collecting an excise, draws along with it a prejudice to the Prince and his people: and the relative profit, which balances this loss, falls into the pockets of the fraudulent manufacturer, and the corrupt and negligent collector. This is not all: the deficiency must be made up in another way; for taxes must produce the sums wanted. Thus the remissness in collection occasions a new additional burden to be laid on the people.

QUEST. 3. What is meant by *income*, when applied to individuals, and to a state, and what is the nature of the *expense* which must diminish it, when it is considered as the object of taxation?

The great intricacy of this question proceeds from hence, that what is really an expense to one is the income of the other: so that without applying our reasoning to every particular fact, no general explanation can be rendered intelligible. My reason for proposing it in this place, is, that in commenting upon some passages of Davenant, in his discourses upon the revenues of England, I may have an opportunity of illustrating some things which have been already examined.

Davenant was an admirable writer; he had a remarkable genius for political theory, and his sentiments upon many things are very generally adopted. My intention here is not to refute opinions, but to avail myself of his combinations, in order to explain my own ideas.

In his first discourse upon revenues, we find the following passage.

“ The number of the people leads us to know
“ what the yearly *income* may be from land, and
“ what from mines, houses, and homesteads,
“ rivers, lakes, meers, ponds, and what from
“ trade, labor, industry, arts and sciences: for
“ where a nation contains so many acres of arable
“ land, so many of pasture and meadow, such a
“ quantity of wood and coppices, forests, parks
“ and commons, heaths, moors, mountains, roads,
“ ways, and barren and waste land; and where
“ the different value of this is computed, by proper
“ mediums, it is rational to conclude, that such a
“ part of the people’s expense is maintained from
“ land, &c. and such a part from mines, houses,
“ &c. and that such a part is maintained from trade,
“ labor, &c. and the poor exceeding so much the
“ rich in numbers, the common people are the
“ proper medium by which we may judge of this
“ expense.

“ There is a certain sum requisite to every one
“ for food, raiment, and other necessaries, as for
“ example, between 7 and 8 *l. per annum*; but
“ some expending less, and some more, it may
“ not be improper to compute, that the mass of
“ mankind, in England, expend, one with another,
“ near 8 *l. per annum*: from whence it may be
“ concluded, that an *annual income of so many*
“ *millions* is needful for the nourishment of such
“ and such a number of people.”

The reasoning here takes a wrong turn. It is of

no consequence to compute the value of things consumed without alienation. It is of no use to know that the value of the physical-necessary of an Englishman is 8 *l.* a year; because if this sum is supposed to be an exact quantity of income, not one farthing of tax can be imposed upon it. So that imposing, for example, 5 *per cent.* upon this article would only be raising the physical-necessary to 8 *l.* 8 *s.* which 8 *s.* must be paid, not by the physical-necessarian, but by some body having superfluity who employs him; and if there was not superfluity enough in England to answer to 8 *s.* a head, such a tax could not be levied.

He afterwards supposes that the income of this class may amount to about twenty millions a year, which at 8 *l.* each, answers to two millions and a half of people. He states the income of lands at fourteen millions, and the income of trade at ten millions, in all at forty-four millions a year: and hence he concludes, that taxes ought to be imposed in some proportion to this total.

Now if he supposes the first article of twenty millions, arising from the income of those who are employed in arts and manufactures, according to the former calculation of 8 *l.* a head, to be as ready a fund for taxation as the land-rents, we must examine, by the principles we have deduced, whether there be any ground for such a supposition.

Let me suppose one of this great class to work a whole day for his victuals only. Here is an alienation of work for food. It is impossible, however, to raise a tax in money upon this alienation; because

it may easily be supposed that neither party has a farthing. The only method therefore, in such a case, to impose a tax, would be, either to oblige the workman to set apart a portion of his day's work for one who would pay the public for the value of it, or to oblige the person who gives him his food, to pay the public for the privilege of employing him in his service. The one and the other are examples of proportional taxes. But this method of taxation is absolutely unknown. In this example there is an alienation, which, I have said, constantly implies a superfluity of one kind or other. The labor of the person working is, here, superfluous to himself; therefore a part of it may be applied towards the public. But the bread he receives is in no part superfluous, and therefore cannot be laid under taxation *as to him*. But then the bread given for the labor is superfluous to the person who gives it; and as this implies that he has a superfluity of bread, the state may demand a share of that superfluity.

By this exposition of the matter it appears, that in order to raise a tax, in whatever way it be done, some kind of superfluity must be supposed. It also points out how it should be laid on: for if by mistaking the proper object, a part of the *bread* should be taken from the *workman*, instead of being taken from the *man who employs him*, the tax would affect the physical-necessary of the laborer, instead of affecting the superfluity of the employer.

Let us next suppose a workman able to do no more than what is requisite to dig the ground for

roots to eat, instead of digging it to procure bread from a man who has bread to spare; still there will be no alienation; consequently, no possibility of establishing a tax: for if you either take a part of his labor, or of his food, you deprive him equally of his physical-necessary. Yet the work of this man and his food, may be valued at so much money; and thus may enter, in one sense, into Davenant's general article of income or expense; but it does not follow that any tax can be raised upon such an income.

To estimate, therefore, the total value, in any nation, of what is the object of taxation, we must go another way to work. The first article must be the *annual income* of all *funds*. By funds, here, I understand the capital wealth already made, in opposition to the produce of industry, which may be considered as the materials of which such funds are composed. The fund therefore is the accumulation of savings, which, not having been spent by the industrious, form a capital of a nature to produce an income, either from land, or from any other valuable thing. Thus land-rents, annuities, interest of money, emoluments of offices, salaries, even wages of servants, in short, every fixed income, I range in this first article, which I call *annual income*, produced from a capital already formed, either real or supposed.

This may be laid under taxation by a pound-rate, or otherwise, and forms that kind of tax which I call cumulative and arbitrary; because a man who has any sort of visible revenue, comes under this

general rate, let him have ever so many necessary deductions out of it, ever so many debts and incumbrances. From such circumstances, cumulative taxes frequently turn out extremely burdensome.

The second object of taxation is upon alienations made for money. Whenever we come to dispose of money in the purchase of any thing, the state has an opportunity of exacting a part of it as a tax; but while it remains hid, it can neither be come at, or laid under contribution, without extortion or violence.

All branches of expense may be laid under taxation by excises, which I call *proportional taxes*; because a man is never subjected to them, but in proportion to his expense; and his expense ought naturally to proceed from his income.

As for trade, I do not clearly see how the profits of it can be regularly taxed. In France, indeed, they are taxed under the first head, and are considered as income. Such an imposition is not well judged; because *there* the materials for making the fund are taxed as if they were the income of a fund already made. It is only the savings out of the profits upon trade, placed so as to produce a permanent revenue, which properly can be considered as a fund: the *income* therefore of these savings, and not the savings themselves, should come under that branch of taxation.

Customs are improperly called taxes upon trade. If ill imposed they stop trade, or render it less profitable, by diminishing the demand for the

goods so taxed; but they take nothing from the profits already made.

In a trading nation, the great branches of commerce produce a certain determinate profit, subject, I allow, to augmentations and diminutions, from accidents and circumstances impossible to be foreseen: and the customs imposed upon exportation and importation differ from excises more in the method of levying them than in any thing else.

Davenant, in my opinion, would have given a better idea of the sum which taxes might have been supposed capable of producing in England, had he examined the amount of all the branches of revenue, and of all the species of sale, than in the manner he has done. These two points known, it would be expedient next to inquire, in what manner the several articles could be made subject to either cumulative, or proportional taxes.

I must now take notice of another passage of Davenant, where he explains himself upon the question before us: it is in his fifth discourse upon revenues, where he says,

“ By annual income, we mean the whole that
“ arises in any country from land and its product,
“ from foreign trade, and domestic business, as
“ arts, manufactures, &c. and by annual expense
“ we understand what is of *necessity* consumed to
“ clothe and feed the people, or what is *necessary*
“ for their defence in time of war, or for their
“ ornament in time of peace: and where the an-
“ nual income exceeds the expense there is super-
“ lucration arising, which may be called wealth
“ or national stock.

“ The revenue of a government is part of this
“ annual income, as likewise a part of its expense,
“ and where it bears too large a proportion with
“ the whole, as in France, the common people
“ must be miserable and burdened with heavy
“ taxes.

I must comment a little upon this passage.

I have no objection to this exposition of the matter; the ideas are intelligible and clear: but I object against the application of his doctrine to taxes; because it would lead to error. Here are my reasons:

1^{mo}, Income is called the whole of the earth's productions: this I may admit to be just, except when we consider income as an object of taxation. But if we retain the same definition to express the income of one, for example, who labors the soil for his own subsistence, as well as of another who labors it as a trade, the difference in paying their taxes out of it will be very great. He who draws nothing from the ground but his physical-necessary, can be laid under no taxation; because he has no superfluity. And if he be obliged either to give a part of his crop in tax, or to sell any part of it for money to be paid to the public, this diminishes his physical-necessary, and forces him to starve: whereas the other who exercises labor as a trade, may be obliged to pay a part of his surplus by way of tax or rent; and still his physical-necessary may remain untouched.

It is for this reason, that in treating of these matters, I am always at the greatest pains to point

out, that nothing can be the object of taxation, except what is over and above the physical-necessary of every one.

In all countries where a *land-tax*, *steuer*, *taille*, or by whatever name it goes, is established, care must be taken to prevent the husbandmen from confining their labor to such a small spot of ground as is barely sufficient to produce their own physical-necessary, unless when they have a trade to assist them in paying what the public demands of them.

From this circumstance, and this only, it happens, that the land-tax in England is so little burdensome, comparatively to what it is in many nations of Europe. Lands in England are let in large portions: no body will let a farm so small as to be proportioned to the supplying of the mere physical wants of the farmer. But in other countries, where the economy is different, where inheritances in land are constantly divided, as moveables among all the children; the lots become so small, that the proprietor can draw no more from them than his own subsistence; and then when a land-tax is imposed, this poor little portion being valued in proportion to what it can produce, as well as the greatest estate in land, the husbandman is starved, although the tax demanded of him be laid on in the exact proportion to the produce of his land, while he that has a surplus is quite easy.

I would therefore recommend, in countries where this minute subdivision of lands has taken place, that for the future none under a certain extent or value should be suffered to be divided among the

children, but ordered to be sold, and the price divided among them; and that the same regulation should be observed upon the death of such proprietors whose lands are not sufficient to produce three times the physical-necessary of the laborers. This would engage a people to exercise agriculture as a trade, and to give over that trifling husbandry which produces no surplus, and which involves so many poor people in the oppression of land-taxes. This plan can never be recommended as a plan to be executed all at once: it must be done by degrees, and in proportion to the progress of industry. The principle is so evident, that I never found any one who did not immediately agree to the justness of my observation; although in imposing land-taxes I have nowhere found it attended to*.

Here then is the use of theory; it directs us in practice to avoid difficulties, which might otherwise be judged unfurmountable.

2do, I farther observe, that it is a more hurtful error still to mistake the produce of industry for the taxable income arising from it, than to mistake the gross produce of land for the rent: because the profits upon industry bear a smaller proportion to its produce, than the rents of lands do to their full fruits.

The best method of raising money upon the lower classes of the industrious, is rightly to lay their

* Some small attention is paid to the poorer sort of landholders in England: for, by the annual act for a land-tax, no poor person shall be liable to the pound-rate, whose lands, &c. are not worth 20 s. *per annum* value.

consumption under proportional taxes, which they may easily draw back: because they will raise the price of their work proportionally.

From this we may conclude, contrary to the common opinion, that the test of well imposed taxes is to raise prices in proportion. When they are rightly imposed, every one who sells a commodity which has paid a tax, will draw it back, whether he be industrious or not. If he consumes it, he cannot draw it back, but by raising the price of his work; which again he cannot do, unless the tax be made so general as to affect all his competitors; and unless the consumption he has made be unavoidable to every one of them.

When we reflect upon the large quantities of exciseable goods which are consumed as superfluities, we must conclude that the rise of prices, daily complained of, proceeds more from our manners than from the taxes we pay.

3tio, The expense of a people is not merely what is sufficient to subsist them; but what they consume, either in fruits, or manufactures. Had indeed Davenant computed the value of this necessary quantity, and deducted it from the income, according to his acceptation of income, the remainder would have been a tolerable good representation of what I mean by income, or taxable fund; because whatever a people consume beyond the necessary, I consider as a superfluity which may be laid under taxation.

4to, I must also differ from him in his idea concerning superlucration, wealth, or national stock.

According to him, this is the quantity of income

remaining after the following deductions :

1 *mo*, What is *necessary* to clothe and feed the people.
2 *do*, What is *necessary* for their defence in time of war, and ornament in time of peace. But according to my notions, I must also deduct all that is consumed in superfluities ; for what is consumed, whether *necessarily* or *superfluously*, never can make an article of superlucration, wealth, or national stock.

The superlucration then of a nation consists in the augmentations made upon her stock of every kind, capable of producing a proportional income: it is the converting into something durable the well employed time of the inhabitants. In this sense the new pavement of London, the roads, buildings, ships, &c. in England, are all articles of superlucration, as well as the improvement of the lands, and consolidation of the balance of her trade, which has created that part of the public funds belonging to natives.

QUEST. 4. Is it possible to convert a land-tax into one of the proportional kind?

This is a curious speculation ; and as it is a short exercise upon several principles of this science, it comes in properly at the conclusion of our work.

To make a land-tax proportional, the proprietors of land should be enabled to draw back the burden, in the sale of the earth's productions. This they cannot do, as matters stand. The farmers who pay no land-tax undersell them ; because they have no tax to draw back.

Since the tax, therefore, cannot be drawn back directly, let us apply our principles to discover a method how this might be done indirectly.

Let nothing but lands be subject to this imposition.

Let every part of them be valued, and recorded in a general register.

Let bread, butchers-meat, and subsistence of all kinds, be laid under an excise, *in all markets*, and nowhere else, at a rate sufficient to raise the tax intended to be laid upon the lands; and let the amount of this tax be drawn back by the landlords, in proportion to the valuation by which they have paid the land-tax.

That this is a reasonable imposition, appears from the whole plan of this work. We have seen, in the first book, how the great body of the people is divided into laborers and free hands; that the free hands are the inhabitants of towns, who go to market for subsistence, and consume what corresponds to the land-rents; consequently the landlords, who at present pay a cumulative tax, which they cannot draw back in any shape, are justly entitled to the amount of this proportional tax, laid upon the great articles which produce their land-rents, and which are consumed by the inhabitants not employed in agriculture.

Every one who has writ concerning taxes has endeavoured to contract the object of them as much as possible: more, I imagine, with a view to ease the public than the people. I have followed another course. I have been for multiplying the objects of taxation as much as possible, and for making them more in proportion to expense than to property or income. But that I may conform myself in some measure to the ideas of those who have examined the

same subject, I shall propose a tax, which would fill up the place of every other; and could it be levied, would be the best perhaps ever thought of.

It is a tax, at so much *per cent.* upon the sale of every commodity.

C H A P. XIII.

Recapitulation of the Fourth Book.

PART. I. *Of the Interest of Money.*

INTROD.

I INTRODUCE the subject of credit and debts, by giving a general idea of its extent. It comprehends the method of establishing a solid security for money borrowed; of extending the object of such security in proportion to circumstances; of supporting the credit of the borrowers, when overstretched; and of preventing, as far as possible, the fatal consequences of a bankruptcy, when it can be no longer supported.

I show how all mysteries relating to credit proceed from our ignorance only of its true nature; which is confidence established upon a visible and palpable fund of payment. I observe how delicate a thing credit is, and how gently it must be dealt with; how incompatible the forms of common law are with the discussion of questions which arise between merchants; how necessary it is to form a jurisprudence peculiar to trade, and to support it by manners more than by authority; and when credit is once set upon

its true basis, how all aerial schemes, bubbles, and public bankruptcies will be avoided.

CHAP. I. Here I show how impossible it is to establish credit by authority; how inseparably it is connected with liberty and independence; and still how compatible it may be with that supreme power which is vested in every government.

CHAP. II. The object of credit is money lent; the basis of loan is the payment of interest. If money be wanting, credit will die; consequently, there must be a method found for augmenting and diminishing the quantity of money in proportion to the demand for it. It is augmented, by converting land into paper-money; it is diminished, by relieving the land of the engagement upon it, and extinguishing the paper-money. This is no more than a contrivance for turning into a *circulating value*, which is the principal characteristic of *money*, the obligations of private men, which in all countries are considered to be of an equal value with any coin.

I here explain what is meant by money *stagnated*, and by money *realized*. Money, while it is employed in circulation, can carry no interest; the moment it lies idle to one man, were it but for a day, it may be worth interest to another, who willingly pays for the use of it, when he has occasion either to buy what he wants, or to pay what he owes. If no body be found who wants it, then it is said to *stagnate* in the hands of the proprietors. This denotes that circulation is full. He therefore desires to *realize* it; that is, to purchase with it some kind of income. For this purpose, if it be coin, he sends it to some place

place where coin is wanted. If it be paper, he demands of the debtor in the paper either to give him an interest for it, or to convert it into coin, which is the money of the world. Both are called realizing; and in proportion as money is realized, circulation diminishes.

Hence I conclude, that as the use of circulating money is to carry on alienation, so the use of stagnated money is to produce an interest; consequently, a perpetual interest is better than money, when it is not wanted for the use of circulation. If therefore, by the policy of a country, the capital of every perpetual interest can be immediately converted into money for the use of circulation, the inconvenience of capitals not demandable is removed; because although you cannot make the debtor pay, you can sell what he owes you to another, who will; and this equally suits your convenience.

CHAP. III. The simplicity of manners among the primitive christians, circumscribing very much the uses for money in circulation, a great quantity of the coin was consequently locked up. Paper money *then* was superfluous; because even coin itself so far exceeded all the uses of their circulation, that it was considered in the light of jewels and plate with us.

Taking interest for it, when lent, appeared to them as unreasonable, as if a lady, in these times, were to ask a price for lending her jewels to a friend.

However, as money was necessary on many occasions to those who had none locked up, the Jews, who have always despised land-property, made a trade of lending; and this drew an odium upon

the practice. I can ascribe it to no other cause. Our manners are totally changed; and Christians lend money at interest as well as Jews. Neither trade, industry, or credit, can subsist without it; and as money cannot be lent, without allowing interest to be taken, interest is become the basis of the whole system of credit, and comes to be examined in the following chapters.

CHAP. IV. Before industry was established, the calls for money to borrow were few, and chiefly confined to Princes in time of war, and prodigal proprietors of land in time of peace. Their demands were urgent, and the interest they paid was in proportion. The lenders possessed but a small part of the coin of the country; because the bulk of the people locked up all they could. Those who hoarded, would not lend; and this greatly diminished the fund of borrowing: besides, Princes and prodigals had no sooner spent the money borrowed, than it fell again into the hands of those who hoarded; and the lenders found, no doubt, great difficulties in procuring fresh supplies.

When industry and trade brought money out of its repositories, when the necessity of permitting interest appeared evident to the church, the coin then began to make its appearance, and was ready to be lent. This opened a market for money. The price of money is the rate of interest. At this market, the borrowers and lenders appear in competition among themselves, according to circumstances. If more money is demanded to be borrowed than is offered to be lent, the competition takes place among the

borrowers, and interest rises. If more is offered to be lent than is demanded to be borrowed, interest falls. Those who borrow money may be divided into two classes, viz. those who intend to spend it, and those who intend to trade with it.

When more money is to be lent than the first class demands, the rate of interest will be regulated by what merchants *can* give for it: when there is less, it will rise to what the prodigals *will* give for it.

But this first class must have good credit, or their borrowing will be cut off. When therefore a statesman finds, that the borrowing of such people hurts the commercial interest of his country, by keeping interest high, he should weaken their credit, by tying up their lands by entails. When their borrowing becomes necessary for the encouragement of industry, and for bringing all the money there is into circulation, then their credit should be enlarged, by promoting an expeditious sale of every branch of their property.

CHAP. V. Thus, without the aid of law, the interest of money is regulated by demand. But a state must not totally overlook the interest of the class who spend more than their incomes. It would be inhuman to throw them into the jaws of usurers. Statutes therefore prevent interest from rising above a certain rate. This preserves them, and renders the dissipation of their fortunes more gradual.

But although a statesman has it in his power to guard his people against the oppression of usury, by preventing the rate of money from rising above the ordinary standard of demand, he cannot

equally force it down below this standard, even although the interests of trade should require it; because if the monied men can lend their capitals abroad, at a higher interest than they can procure for them at home, they will distress the landed interest, by demanding what they owe, and all the money will be sent abroad, as was the case in Scotland in 1762.

This was not the case a hundred years ago. No money then could be lent abroad by Englishmen; because those who would give high interest had no credit. Thus government could bring it down at will; monied men were forced to consent; and the price of land rose in proportion as interest fell.

As it is the extravagance of men of property which raises the rate of money above what is consistent with the interest of trade, the expedients to bring it down, are, 1. To circumscribe borrowing by the prodigal: 2. To suspend borrowing by the state: and 3. To throw as much public money as possible into the market, by paying off debts. When a statesman has by such measures brought the rate of money considerably below the legal price, he may, by a new statute, prevent its rising again so high as formerly; but still he must keep in his eye the rate of money, and state of credit in rival nations, in order to avoid the inconveniences already mentioned.

CHAP. VI. If Great Britain were to regulate the rate of money below what the fluctuations of demand are commonly found to carry it, then in time of war,

as soon as demand, which can be subject to no statute, got up to the high standard, the whole landed interest would be torn to pieces by their creditors: for the debtors could not borrow from one to pay another, because no man would give them credit. This would put an end to all their expense; the funds which supply it at present (the land-rents) would be carried off by creditors; and all the industrious who serve such proprietors of land would suffer considerably for want of employment. The conclusion which the generality of people would draw from this phenomenon would be that high interest, instead of being hurtful, is advantageous to trade.

CHAP. VII. Hence we may conclude, that low interest is principally advantageous for carrying on foreign commerce, and that the best method to keep it low, is to keep circulation full, by facilitating the melting down of property.

This expedient has been contrived by merchants in the establishment of banks upon mortgage; and there is a possibility that landed men, some centuries hence, may find out that they may imitate the example of traders, and contrive the means of borrowing cheaper than they can do at present.

Were a particular nation to carry such expedients into execution with success, it would have the effect of bringing down the rate of money every where. This would sink the general average of the whole, but never would prevent the operation of those principles by which it had been brought down; and the most intelligent nations would still

have the same advantages as before, of keeping their interest low relatively to their neighbours, which is the great *desideratum* for the support of public credit, as well as of foreign trade.

CHAP. VIII. But although it is of very great advantage to trade to have interest low, we cannot judge of the prosperity of trade from this circumstance alone.

That nation gains the most upon her trade who draws the greatest balance from the rest of the world. Now the balance cannot be judged of by the rate of interest; because this depends more upon manners and policy than upon the state of industry. Industry must be supported by superior dexterity, natural advantages, and promptitude of payments, as well as by low interest. Prompt payment alone, is of more consequence to the industrious populace, than a small difference upon the rate of interest. That encourages the whole class of manufacturers. Low interest is principally an advantage to the merchants who are obliged to employ credit for collecting their work; and merchants themselves who trade upon credit, often gain more by quick returns than what will compensate a considerable difference in the rate of interest. Low interest may more properly be called the barometer of public credit than of foreign commerce.

CHAP. IX. From what has been said, I conclude, that the rate of interest does not sink as wealth increases; because it is influenced by many circumstances, which do not depend upon opulence. It depends upon the spirit and manners of a people, and will fluctuate with them.

PART II. *Of Banks.*

CHAP. I. **H**AVING deduced the principles which regulate the rate of interest, I proceed to investigate those which influence domestic circulation; and as banks are the great engine by which circulation is carried on, in tracing the nature of banks we shall fully understand its policy and principles.

Banks either circulate notes, or transfer credit written in their books; the first are called banks of circulation; the latter banks of deposit.

All banks are founded on credit, and according to the nature of their institution, I may divide the credit they are built on into three kinds, viz. private, mercantile, and public.

Private credit is when the ground of confidence is real property, pledged for the security of the loan.

Mercantile credit is when the cause of confidence is in the trading stock, abilities, integrity, and good fortune of the person who obtains it.

Public credit every one understands. It is when the ground of confidence is a fund secured by public faith, in favor of the creditors, for the interest and capital due, which last however is never exigible from the state.

Private credit is the most solid of the three; mercantile credit is the most precarious; and public

credit depends entirely upon the maxims of every government with regard to public faith.

It is the object of confidence, not the quality of the person obtaining credit, which determines the nature of the credit. A merchant may grant bond on the credit of his lands; a landed man's bill, as member of a mercantile company, may only affect his stock in trade, and a Prince may pledge a province for a sum of money.

The debts of a state, and the bills of merchants, are more easily transferred than private securities.

Public and mercantile credit stand upon a more precarious bottom than private security. A suspicion of insolvency will shake the two former; real insolvency only will destroy the latter.

These are some of the peculiarities which characterize the differences between the three kinds of credit. The justness of the distinctions I have made appear from them, and from other circumstances mentioned in this chapter; and the utility of such distinctions will appear from their application as we proceed.

CHAP. II. To establish private credit, on the most solid and extensive bottom, the effects of debtors should be rendered of a ready conversion into money; the sale of lands should be rendered easy and expeditious; no entails or clogs by mortgage and the like, should be allowed; debts upon possessions ought to be registered, and those due to banks (the great public debtors) should always be considered in a most favorable light.

CHAP. III. Banks of circulation upon private credit, are of great use in the infancy of industry. in countries where it is only taking root, the greatest obstruction it meets with is a scarcity of money. When money is scarce, payments are ill made; and when the uses for money increase, if money be not made to augment in proportion, alienation will cease to go on, and payments will daily be more precarious. This is so evident that I shall not insist upon it.

Now as every individual in a state does, less or more, support industry by consuming its produce, money must be provided for every one in proportion to the value of his property. This opens at once the principle of banks upon private credit.

He who has money will, every where, willingly lend to every one who can give good security for it; and the obligation granted by the borrower is considered by the lender as better to him than the money he lends. Before the establishment of banks, such loans were made in coin; but as people discovered that a good obligation was as good as coin, they discovered also, that when obligations could be made to circulate, they might supply its place.

For this purpose, banks found out an expedient of dividing obligations secured upon property into small parts of the capital sum; and by delivering them back to the borrower, with an obligation to pay them in coin to the bearer on demand, they constituted themselves debtors to the public for every note. The consequence of this was,

that the coin of the country became less useful in circulation; and as the banks demanded it, and even gave premiums for obtaining it, it came into their hands, and served the purpose of changing notes; that is, of subdividing the sums mentioned in them, into the lowest denominations of the money of the country.

There is not a nation in Europe so ignorant as not to feel the use of this policy; but there are few who have discovered how to establish the confidence of the public in this general debtor, the bank. The reason is, that people imagine a bank should at all times be able to turn all their paper into coin. Were this possible to be done, where would be the use of banks? How could they multiply money?

From this short exposition, we may understand the difference between banks upon private, mercantile, and public credit. The first lend upon the security of possessions; the second, upon bills of exchange, which is called discounting; the third, upon the security of the public funds.

CHAP. IV. A scarcity of money only being found to stop the progress of industry, and thereby to circumscribe the gains of merchants who supply consumption; and they perceiving that men of property become bad customers, more from the impossibility of making payments than for want of an inclination to consume, joined together, and formed a considerable stock which they exposed to the eyes of the public. This gave them credit, and every one who had money to lend

was fond of placing it in their hands. Other people who wanted to borrow, applied to them for money. Their answer was, we have no coin; but if you want money for any purpose, we can assist you in credit, if you will give us security upon your estate. Here is, said they, a note of ours, which any body will take from you as payment for what you want. This was the same thing to the man who wanted money for a particular use, as if they had given him coin; and as such demands became frequent, the notes were printed, and insensibly banking was established.

States perceiving the abuse which might follow were every one allowed to issue paper in this manner, judged it proper to erect companies, who lent them considerable sums as a security for their faith to the public; and the superior credit of such companies drew the confidence of the public, and circumscribed the dealings of individuals. Thus the trade of Lombards, who had formerly supported circulation by their bills of exchange payable to order, received a farther extension by the establishment of banks, who, by issuing notes payable to bearer, rendered them, in all commercial countries, every bit as useful as any coin.

Banks once established, regulations became necessary; and of these the first and fundamental one, was, to issue no notes but upon good security. If it be asked, what security should be taken? The answer is, the best those who want credit can give. In a country where trade and industry are little known, but where a taste for refinement is

taking place, demand must be encouraged, in order to augment the supply. And as this demand for consumption should, naturally, come from men of landed property; the bank, therefore, should first resolve to issue notes upon the security of that kind of property.

When industry becomes more extended, and when trade becomes more secure, from the solidity of mercantile funds, banks may then begin to discount bills of exchange, and as this branch of credit enlarges, the bank will by degrees participate of the nature of those secured upon mercantile credit.

When public credit, again, is well established, they will lend upon government securities, pledged in their hands, and thus become founded upon public credit.

According therefore to the principal object of their trade, they are said to stand upon private, mercantile, or public credit.

When a proprietor of lands gives his bond to a bank, it should be understood, that as long as he regularly pays the interest of the money borrowed, the bank is not to demand the capital.

For this bond they give notes, which are considered as ready money, and therefore carry no interest. So the profit of the bank is to receive interest for what they lend, and to pay none for what they owe.

What they owe is the paper they issue. They owe this to the public; and the security which the public has, is the security which the bank received from the person who borrowed from them.

Hence the solidity of banks upon mortgage. Their notes become money, and this money is secured upon the whole stock of the bank, and the whole property engaged to them.

But as the stock of the bank is of a determinate value, and as the notes they issue may very far exceed it, the credit of a bank will be precarious, unless the value of the securities upon which they lend, be equal to all the notes in circulation. It will also be precarious in proportion as the securities themselves are so. Hence the interest the public has to take care that banks give credit upon nothing but the best security.

CHAP. V. A bank, therefore, which lays down a rule to lend upon the mortgage of solid property only, would destroy confidence, if it should launch out in giving credit to those who have no solid property to pledge.

CHAP. VI. The use of all banks is to support domestic circulation: this is two-fold; that carried on by consumers, and that carried on by traders and manufacturers, who supply consumption.

The circulation carried on among the first is in proportion to their income, and their credit should be in proportion to the funds which produce it. The circulation carried on by the last is in proportion to the demand for their industry.

If a bank be established on the credit of solid funds, it is very plain that they cannot support the circulation of manufacturers and dealers upon the same terms, or in the same way they do that of proprietors. They may indeed discount bills;

but they cannot give a permanent credit upon a security which is not founded upon property. This opens a new combination.

Trade and industry are dispersed through many hands, and if the stock of those who carry them on be compared with what is necessary for that purpose, it will appear very small. What is deficient in stock must be made up to them in credit; and this will be in proportion to their integrity, capacity, and good fortune. A frail security for paper, which is to become the money of a nation! Such securities must either be rejected by every bank whatever, or the whole fabric will tumble into ruin. But this subaltern class of dealers may have recourse to merchants, whose wealth and funds are solid and extensive. To these a bank may give credit, and they again, in their dealings with the other class, may indemnify themselves of all the risk they run, by profits in proportion to it.

This class of merchants I call *exchangers*; because they deal principally by bills of exchange in the credits they give, which are of the greatest advantage to an infant trade and a growing industry.

CHAP. VII. When banks were first established, there was no money known but coin, and many there still are, who do not clearly see how money can possibly be made of any thing but metal. The scarcity of coin raised the rate of interest, and when banks began to lend their paper, they exacted the same interest as if they had been lending coin. Hence they were obliged to promise payment of their notes, in coin, upon demand. In

consequence of this, the policy of circulation proceeds upon the supposition, that bank-notes are equal to coin in every respect; and when any interruption happens in the ready exchanging them at the bank, all runs into confusion. I shall afterwards show how this might be prevented.

While a country has a balance of trade, either at par or in her favor, no body has occasion for coin, except to reduce bank-notes to their lowest denomination of money. But when a balance is due to other nations which must be paid in gold and silver, every one who wants coin for that purpose, runs to the banks, which are obliged to pay in it, and then they are thrown into distress. Hence we may conclude, that a bank taking upon itself the obligation of paying in coin, without carrying its policy farther than the banking trade, cannot stand its ground in a country which owes, upon an average, a balance to other nations. This opens a new and a most curious combination.

CHAP. VIII. In the mechanical operations of trade, when they are not combined upon principles, and directed by a superior policy, every balance due from one nation to another upon the whole of their reciprocal payments, that is, in consequence of their debts and expenses abroad, as well as in the course of their mercantile operations, must be paid in the metals.

For transacting this balance, there is a set of merchants who deal in the business of exchange. Every debtor to another country is supposed to have value in his hands for it, which he converts into

bank-paper; with this he buys a bill of exchange, drawn upon the place where he is debtor, and the exchanger who sells it, demands coin of the bank, which he sends off for payment of his bills. If during this operation the bank should stand with its hands across, and only think of expedients to provide coin, it is evident, that if specie should totally fail in the country, trade must be at an end, and the credit of the bank would be undone: for no body will enter into every combination necessary to discover the impossibility of converting the whole paper currency of a nation into gold and silver. Thus a bank which cannot pay in coin, will be supposed to be ruined, though in reality it may be worth half the property of the state.

Is it not then of great consequence to banks, and to a nation, that the principles of their trade, and the security of their paper, should be well understood? And is it not wonderful, that they themselves have not made evident a thing which they must understand far better than any one who has not had their experience?

CHAP. IX. When a country gentleman owes money in town, beyond what his rents can pay, does he not borrow from some body who has money? Does not this borrowing prevent his lands and his houses from being torn to pieces by those who have a right to demand money of him? Would he not be laughed at, if he were to delay pledging a part of his property, in order to secure the whole?

The case is just the same with banks. They owe a sum of coin equal to all the paper they have in circulation.

In

In this they represent the country gentleman. Foreign nations demand payment from them in coin; because it is the same thing whether this demand be made directly on the bank, or on those who can demand it of the bank. Such nations represent the town. Must not then the bank borrow upon the credit of the securities pledged at the time they issued their notes, and which to them represent the gentleman's lands? And can they borrow from any but those who have money? Their own country can have none to lend, while they owe a balance; they must therefore borrow from other nations, and transfer what they borrow to their creditors abroad.

Hence I conclude, that as nations which have coin pay what they owe with it, and thereby diminish its quantity; so nations whose money is their land, must pay in land, to the diminution of that species of property: and as a man who owes a thousand pounds upon his estate is only proprietor of it for the remaining value; in like manner, a country which pays an annual interest to other nations, is only proprietor of what remains.

CHAP. X. If the country gentleman, who is pushed by his creditors for money, which he cannot expect to draw from his rents as they become due, should borrow, for a few weeks, from one who, after that time, will have occasion for his money himself, he will be put to all the expense of giving security for it, and at the end of that short time, he will be at as great a loss as ever to find money to reimburse the man who had lent it him. This represents the expedient used by banks to obtain temporary credits,

instead of a permanent loan upon a regular interest.

CHAP. XI. When trade goes on well, and produces a regular balance in favor of a country, the trade of banking is easy, and few employments require less capacity. But when the balance begins to be unfavorable, and when, in self-defence, they are obliged to deal in exchange, the case is different.

Whatever balance is due abroad must be paid by the banks, as has been said, either in coin or in credit. As long as they pay in coin, the business of paying the balance is left to exchangers, who conduct the operation. But whenever banks borrow abroad, upon a permanent loan, and thereby acquire a fund to draw upon, the business of exchange falls naturally into their hands, and they may profit of it according to circumstances. In this case, not one shilling of coin can go out of the country, in the way of payment; because there will be a loss to any one who sends it away, when he can pay cheaper by a bill.

CHAP. XII. But the most complicated combinations arise from the consequences of a wrong balance on the state of domestic circulation. I hope this matter will be more easily comprehended, from the short recapitulation I am now to give of it, after all that has been said upon the doctrine of taxes, and of the difficulty of paying them, when money is sent abroad.

Money is the instrument of alienation; and when this instrument is taken away, alienation must cease. Now, it is a matter of indifference as to circulation, whether money be rendered scarce by being sent

out of the country by the state in time of war, or by the subjects who owe it to strangers in time of peace. A determinate quantity of money is requisite for domestic circulation. In whatever way this comes to be diminished, it is the duty and interest of banks to fill up the void as fast as possible, by readily furnishing credit at all times to those who can give security for what they demand. If banks, by paying balances, shall have exhausted their fund of coin, the fault is their own. Why did they not in time provide the necessary funds abroad? But in whatever manner they pay the balance, the consequence is, to take a sum of money equal to it out of domestic circulation; and this cannot be replaced but by more money lent by them upon new securities. If an ill grounded fear should at such a time engage them to refuse credit, when demanded, the country will be in a worse situation than if banks had never been established, from the sudden diminution of money, which, without that establishment, never could have happened.

But if banks would consider the whole foreign balance as immediately their own debt (and it is so, when they are obliged to pay it) they would provide the easiest method of acquitting it: since none of the expense incurred can fall upon them, in any proportion to the gain they make, in receiving interest for all they lend, and in paying none for what they owe within the sphere of their own circulation.

CHAP. XIII. Whatever contracts circulation, hurts a bank, and offers no relief to it with respect to the payment of balances. If they borrow money at home,

they cut off the branch they stand upon, unless they continue at the same time to give credit to all who demand to borrow upon good security. This last combination was omitted in the chapter I am now recapitulating; because of the multiplicity of those I was obliged to introduce, in order to demonstrate how hurtful it is for banks voluntarily to diminish the circulation of the country where they are established. I shall therefore bring it in here, and refer to the chapter for the other combinations which cannot be abridged.

Did banks, upon mortgage, make it a rule to borrow all the money offered to them, at a small deduction from the common interest, while at the same time they continued to lend as formerly to every person of good credit; the consequence in a little time would be, that they would become the absolute centre of all borrowing and lending, and the greatest part of the expense of drawing securities would be saved.

Every person who had money to lend, would lend it to the bank; and every one who had money to borrow, would borrow it of the bank. Upon these two operations, the difference of interest paid, and received, would more than balance the additional expense of so great a detail. But then indeed some new law would be necessary to facilitate securities. The clogs laid upon solid property oblige the bank to insist upon conditions, which put it out of the power of many persons of good credit to borrow from them. But I do not propose plans: my aim is confined to principles; and from those I have

mentioned a new clause in bank-notes would arise, viz. to pay in coin, or by a transfer of interest at a determinate rate, at the option of the bearer, not of the bank.

CHAP. XIV. This would be an optional clause, very different from that lately introduced into Scotland, where the option of paying interest was left to the bank. This has since been wisely suppressed; because it proved a heavy clog upon circulation, and enabled the bank to avoid doing what their own interest, and that of the nation, required of them, viz. the ready payment of all balances against the country. But in suppressing optional clauses, government should facilitate the means of paying balances, and of providing coin. This is done by establishing and supporting the credit of the banks, in proportion to the solidity and extent of their funds. An example of this nature occurred in Ireland, in April 1760, when the parliament interested itself directly in the support of the credit of some private bankers. A mint also is necessary; or if this should be judged improper or superfluous, some assistance at least should be given in conveying coin from the place of its fabrication.

CHAP. XV. All branches of policy are brought to perfection by degrees, when, instead of being established at once on sound principles, they introduce themselves mechanically, by custom and practice only. When therefore a national bank is not found to answer all the purposes expected from it, private people imitate their plan, and fill up the void. Thus in Scotland, when the banks of Edin-

burgh did not sufficiently support circulation in the more distant parts of the country, private banking companies were erected, and degenerated into a great abuse. Every one issued notes payable to bearer. Thus the public was filled with paper money, the credit of which was quite unknown to many, who were however forced to receive it.

Whatever is payable to bearer, is payable to the public; and no doubt the public has a good right to prevent the issuing of notes by any but such as it has confidence in. When a note is payable to order, every one who circulates it is reponsible for the value; but when it is payable to bearer, there is no recourse upon any but the first grantor of the obligation. Such regulations therefore should be made in this respect as may give a solidity to the paper, facilitate a general circulation, and prevent the establishment of a currency confined to particular districts within the same country, which tends to introduce a course of exchange from one town to another. This would be the case, were the circulation of every county carried on by the county bank. A communication, therefore, of interest between the banks of a country is requisite, or else the obligation to pay should not be confined to the place where the bank is established.

CHAP. XVI. Here I resume the principles I have deduced, in a short sketch of a general plan of regulations for a bank of circulation.

CHAP. XVII. If proper regulations upon the banking trade should be found inconsistent with the laws and manners of a people, which require a more extensive liberty to every one to carry on

what commerce he thinks fit, I think it is reasonable that every company of merchants who issue paper, payable to bearer, without the sanction of government, should be obliged to subject their books to some kind of public inspection, that it might be seen whether the credit they grant to individuals be of a sufficient solidity to answer for the notes they circulate.

CHAP. XVIII. The numberless distresses of the Scots banks at the end of last war, made it necessary to show, in a particular chapter, what the consequences might have been, had the banks at that time totally withdrawn their credits, and given up business. This step would, *1mo*, have cut off their whole profits of banking. *2do*, It would have ruined the whole class of exchangers; and with them, *3tio*, the whole trade and manufactures of Scotland.

CHAP. XIX. Here I take a farther step into those intricate combinations. I now show how the whole obligation, both of paying in coin, and discharging foreign balances, may be taken off from those who administer a national bank. Their notes are proposed to be paid by a proportional transfer of interest. All interest due by banks on that account, and to banks for credit given, is proposed to be paid in coin at certain terms. Those who have occasion for coin are to buy it at the mint: but this coin is entirely calculated for domestic circulation; and therefore a very moderate quantity of it will be necessary. And for the payment of all sums due to foreign nations,

I lay it upon government, according to the plan proposed in the 5th chapter, upon exchange.

Thus the whole policy of circulation is divided into three distinct branches:

1mo, The melting down of property, and keeping circulation full at all times. This is the business of banks.

2do, The providing of coin is the business of mints.

3tio, The granting bills on foreign parts, for value in the national currency, is the business of the state.

CHAP. XX. The objection to this doctrine is, that if notes are not payable in coin, they cease to be of value. The answer is short. The use of paper money is to keep reckonings of value between people who have property; the use of coin is to avoid giving credit to people who have none.

The value of the paper in the country is ascertained by the value of the interest which is paid for it in coin; and by not paying the capitals in coin, you prevent its being carried off without necessity, whenever a balance becomes due; which balance might be paid by the means of credit.

CHAP. XXI. I show, by many arguments, (afterwards employed in the 10th chapter, upon public credit, and which render this combination more simple than I should otherwise have been able to make it in this place) that the return of a favorable balance of trade will clear the bank of all the foreign debts contracted by it, for the relief of the country; as a like favorable balance on the trade of Great Britain has the effect of setting that nation free

from a proportional part of the money due to strangers. In this case, the favorable balance is incorporated in the public funds due to natives: in the other case, it is incorporated with the stock of the bank securities, and enables them to relieve that part of them which was engaged for the interest paid out of the country.

CHAP. XXII. The constitution of the bank of England differs essentially in some particulars from that of banks upon mortgage, and private credit. It is not so much calculated for multiplying the currency, by melting down private property, as for facilitating the circulation of the trade of London, and exchequer of Great Britain.

The grounds of confidence upon which the notes of this company stand are very great.

1mo, A capital of eleven millions sterling, for which they are creditors to the nation.

2do, A sum of credit-cash at all times in their hand, of about eleven millions more.

3tio, The bills of exchange of all the great merchants of Europe, which they discount.

4to, When they issue paper to government upon the faith of taxes, or circulate exchequer bills, they have the security of the public faith for the short advance of a few months.

This bank, I have said, is more useful for promoting circulation than for augmenting it. It has however lent its assistance in this respect on very critical occasions. It has circulated exchequer bills; and tallies, which, from discredit at the time, were as ill calculated to supply the use of money, as lands or houses are, from their un-

wieldy nature. The great advantages the public reaped from such operations, abundantly show the utility of banks, which are calculated for that very purpose.

The principal operations of this bank are, to receive and pay away the greatest part of all the national revenue, expenses, and debts; to discount bills of exchange payable at London, and to supply the country with coin.

The demand of London for subsistence and manufactures from the country of England is so great, that the whole amount of what is sent up to that city, for taxes, and for land-rents there expended by the proprietors, does not compensate it. From which it follows, that by the bank's not giving credit upon private securities, the whole of their paper is in a manner confined to the capital; and if any part of that paper casually goes into the country, it quickly returns, in payment of what would otherwise be remitted in bills. So that paper circulation in the country of England is very inconsiderable, when compared with the coin.

The intention of this chapter is to examine and compare the principles of the two species of banking, and to point out their several consequences as to circulation; from which I am led to think, that if banks of circulation were to be established in the country towns of note in England, they would greatly promote industry every where, and occasion no inconvenience from their contrast with the national bank.

CHAP. XXIII. After deducing the principles

upon which the solidity of paper money is established, I proceed to point out the bad consequences of issuing bank-notes upon a precarious security. The bank established in France by Mr. Law, and the fatal catastrophe it brought upon that nation, furnish excellent matter for illustrating the doctrine of paper credit.

The late King of France left, at his death, a debt upon his kingdom of 142 millions sterling; the coin being at 28 livres the marc of silver.

CHAP. XXIV. In a few months after his death, the debt was reduced to 100 millions, by the turn of a wheel. The coin was put at 40 livres the marc. But as the hundred millions sterling, *in intrinsic value*, after the reduction, contained as many livres *in verbal denomination*, as the hundred and forty millions did before, the greatest inconvenience discovered by the people was confined to the necessity imposed upon them to sell their old coin at the King's price.

At this time Law set up his bank, and without doubt assisted people in that respect, with very great benefit to himself.

CHAP. XXV. He divided the capital stock of the bank into 1200 shares, of 5000 livres each (the livre at this time was exactly a shilling sterling); and the purport of the notes he issued was, that payment should be made, at all times, in livres of the same intrinsic value.

This bank was established on the principles of the Scots banks, and lent sums upon every species of good security. The consequence was, that in less

than three years, France, from being in the most miserable situation for want of money, credit, consumption, and industry, was raised, as by magic, to the greatest affluence. The reason was plain: there wanted nothing but an instrument to set all the inhabitants to work. This Law gave them in a moment; and their own work was the cause of the affluence which astonished them.

This effect was produced by an inconsiderable sum of notes: they did not exceed three millions sterling when Law gave up his bank. But credit and confidence were established by that small sum; and the notes brought out all the coin which had been formerly locked up. It is not a great quantity of money, but an exact proportion of it, according to demand, which supports trade and industry. That proportion may be sustained by the means of banks, but by no other expedient whatever.

CHAP. XXVI. Law's bank was no sooner established, than he sought to enlarge his bottom. He found a trading company ruined in their affairs, though entitled to great privileges. He found also large sums of public state billets circulating at great discredit, from an ill paid interest. He got a grant of the company to himself and associates. He opened a subscription for 200,000 shares, of 500 livres each. He took payment in those discredited obligations; and when he had got the state billets, (given in at subscribing) he engaged the Regent to promise punctual payment of the interest. This was no sooner done, than the discredited paper, which was become an action, or a share, as we

have called it, only by being subscribed for to Mr. Law, rose above par. The nation cried out, a *Miracle*! Law was a faviour, in the eyes of some, a conjuror in the opinion of others.

His credit and his capacity for conducting the greatest undertaking within the power of numbers and computation, being established, inspired the Duke of Orleans with a scheme of unbounded ambition, which, in favor of many who have never rightly comprehended the nature of it, I have been at very great pains to trace, in the eight following chapters. And as a recapitulation is useful to assemble ideas within a small compass, which have been dispersed through many combinations in the work itself, I shall here, in a few lines, give a general idea of the whole plan.

The Regent perceiving the use of paper money, well secured on solid property, resolved to take the bank into his own hands, in order to issue paper sufficient to pay off the whole debt of France. Now paper issued for paying debts is secured upon no fund at all. It is the same as if it were issued for payment of meat and drink. The whole security therefore was his own word.

But the difficulty was to prevent this paper from instantly returning upon the bank; because it far exceeded all the uses of circulation, and, consequently, could not be suspended in it.

The expedient fallen upon was to raise the value of the actions of Law's company, (which by the subsequent incorporation of new privileges were multiplied beyond 600 000) to a great height, by

promising great dividends upon them. The company accordingly promised a dividend of 200 livres a year, upon a capital which was originally worth no more than 500 livres.

The great quantity of paper money dispersed had sunk the rate of interest to 2 *per cent.* The dividend, therefore, combined with the rate of interest, carried the market price of the action to 10 000 livres. Here was a new fund provided as an outlet for all the bank-notes paid to the creditors; and in proportion as they bought the actions from the Regent, or the company, whom I here consider as the same, the notes were to be cancelled.

By this operation all the debts of France were to be converted into actions of the company of the Indies, and were to share its fate. But then it must be remembered, that this company had in a manner the whole revenue of France in farm; and by a recapitulation of the different branches of their profits, their income amounted to eighty millions of livres a year. So that if matters had been well managed, had credit been supported by fair dealing, had no arbitrary acts of power, in tampering with denominations of coin and money, taken place, and had the Regent supported and encouraged the company; they in fact might have been able to pay more than all that was required of them; and the very diminution of the interest of the public debts, by the fall of money to 2 *per cent.* was, in effect, cutting off one half of the capital. So that if we suppose the total value of the 2000 millions of debt equal to 100 millions sterling, the debts of France,

by this scheme, would have been reduced to an annuity of 2 *per cent.* on a 100 millions, or two millions sterling a year paid to the company, who then represented the creditors of the nation.

But the project was too great; the capacity of those who were in the management was too small, and the time was too short for bringing about so great a revolution: thus it failed; but in a way which suggests no reason to believe that it might not have been supported.

CHAP. XXXIV. The denomination of the paper was reduced to one half by an act of power: a man who, for example, had a bank-note for 100 *l.* had it reduced to 50 *l.* This at once destroyed the whole credit of France. But it would have stood its ground, without doubt, had the Regent called the fifty pounds with which he paid such a note, one hundred pounds; although, if you abstract from the interests of debtors and creditors, which never were attended to, it was absolutely the same thing. The altering the denomination of paper implies, however, this additional injustice above that of altering the denomination of coin, that it changes the value of the paper in all cases; because it contains no other value than the denomination: whereas coin has a value independent of that, which no law can alter.

CHAP. XXXV. The form of a bank proposed for France, in this chapter, is pretty much the same with that mentioned in chap. 16; only here I have not even admitted the payment of the interest in coin, for fear that an act of power, by carrying off a

few thousand louis d'ors on a present exigency, might totally ruin the credit of such a bank, and consequently draw ruin on the whole nation.

This bank is intended merely as an office for keeping accounts between people of property, and thereby of greatly increasing and supporting circulation.

CHAP. XXXVI. Having dismissed the subject of banks of circulation, I come next to those of deposit. Here I deduce the principles upon which the bank of Amsterdam is established.

This bank issues no paper, and grants credit upon no security but coin locked up in their vaults. Consequently, the ground of their credit is the faithful preservation of this coin. Were it at any time to be diminished below the value of the credits written in their books, the nature of the bank would be changed. Were the coin to be lent on good security, such a bank would then immediately become a bank of circulation upon mortgage; since it would be the same as if the credit had been at first granted upon that security. Were the coin disposed of for no value, the bank would be from that moment bankrupt in fact, although the secret might be kept for a long time.

CHAP. XXXVII. The intention of establishing a bank of this nature at Amsterdam was to fix the seat of trade in that city. The ordering all bills of exchange to be paid to the bank in coin, and the giving to the holders of the bills only a credit in bank for the value, was an effectual means of obliging the proprietors of that credit to carry on their trade in the place

place where their funds were established beyond a possibility of removing them, except by transferring them to others who, by accepting of the transfer, came under the same necessity. Were indeed trade to become incompatible with the situation of the city, as if an earthquake should fill up the port, then the bank would either be removed elsewhere, or the credit writ in their books would become of no more value than gold in an inaccessible mine. This regulation also prevented the circulation of bad coin; because when payment of bills was made to the bank, they took care that nothing but good coin should be received.

From these regulations it appears that money cannot be multiplied by banks of deposit; but on the other hand, it cannot be diminished by exportation, without the act of the bank; and the transfer of credit answers every use of coin in trade, and prevents also its waste in circulation.

CHAP. XXXVIII. Coin is liable to constant vicissitudes. Its denomination may be changed by an act of power, and its real weight may be diminished in circulation. But when it is locked up, all these inconveniences are prevented. Bank-money, therefore; being the value of the coin locked up, is constantly the same: whereas all coin which circulates is liable to variations; consequently, these variations are relative to the coin which circulates, and not to the bank-money. The difference between the one and the other is called *agio*.

CHAP. XXXIX. Many have imagined the treasure of the bank of Amsterdam to be immense;

because no body can ever take any thing from it, and that it is constantly receiving new augmentations: but the policy of the bank itself destroys this supposition, and shows plainly, that the sum locked up never can exceed what is absolutely necessary for circulating the trade of the city.

It is true, no person can go to the bank and demand to have the amount of his written credit paid him in coin. But were the written credits to exceed the uses found for them, the value of such bank-money would diminish; consequently, the value of the circulating coin would increase, which is the same thing. Now as this would prove a great discredit to the bank, they employ a set of cashiers or brokers to keep the balance even. Their business is to buy and sell bank-credit with current coin, and to these the bank gives credit. When there is a demand for bank-credit, the cashiers sell it for coin, and both parties going to the bank, a new credit is written, or the cashier's credit is transferred to the buyer. When, on the other hand, coin is demanded for bank-credit, the cashiers pay for it with coin which the bank lends them; and for their repayment, they transfer to the bank the credit they have bought with it. This needs a little explanation. Suppose one to have credit in bank for a thousand guilders, which he wants to send away in coin. He goes to the cashier and sells his thousand guilders of bank-credit: the bank lends this thousand guilders to the cashier, and the man who sells the credit gets the coin, and makes a transfer of the credit in favor of the cashier.

But as he owes this sum to the bank, he transfers this credit to the bank itself, in payment of the thousand guilders borrowed; and then the bank may expunge it, if they please, from their books; because it is due to themselves. Thus although no money can be demanded of the bank by one who has credit, they can give the money to a third party who does it for them.

PART III. *Of Exchange.*

CHAP. I. **F**OREIGN circulation is carried on by bills of exchange.

When reciprocal debts are contracted by different countries, the creditors in both take payment at home for the bills they draw to the order of those who pay; and they again indorse the bills to their creditors abroad.

In this contract four parties concur: the domestic and foreign creditors; the domestic and foreign debtors. This operation can extend no farther than to the amount of reciprocal and equal debts, if there be a balance owing upon one side, this balance must be paid in value, either in money or merchandize. Now as a debt is much easier discharged by compensation than by payment, merchants endeavour to profit of this compensation, but as every one endeavours alike when there is a balance on one side, it operates upon the whole of the exchange, and every one must bear his share of the expence of paying it.

If London should owe a balance to the world, after compensating all that the world owes to her, every London-debtor to the world will wish to compensate; consequently, he will look out for one who is creditor to the world: but this search betrays the secret, and shows that he is the demander; upon which the other avails himself of his situation, and refuses to compensate without profit. Hence the secrecy said to be requisite in this branch of trade. It is requisite to the trader only, whose interest is concerned; because whatever one set of merchants in a place wish to conceal, another set have constantly an interest to divulge. The interest of the state consists in preserving an equality of profit and loss among them all; and in facilitating to them the paying and receiving the balances due upon the total of all their transactions. The loss of the nation is upon the balance due by the country; the expense of paying the balance, which is the price of exchange, is only a relative loss to some of her subjects, and a relative gain to others.

The attention, therefore, of a statesman in what regards exchange, is, *1mo*, To take care that the true par between the value of the national money and the money of other nations, shall be as much as possible proportional to the quantity of metal contained in each.

2do, To remove domestic inconveniences in paying with the metals, or national coin, every unavoidable balance.

3tio, To hinder the expense of acquitting a small

balance from occasioning a loss on the compensation of reciprocal debts.

And, 4^{to}, When he finds an inconvenience in allowing the metals or coin to go out of the country, he must assist in having the balance paid in the way of credit.

CHAP. II. The best method for determining exactly the true and intrinsic value of the metals, coin, or money, in which the balance due to or from a foreign nation, is to be paid, is to compare the respective value of fine bullion with the respective denominations of the coin in the two places exchanging; and to state the difference only, as the price paid for the exchange. To render this more practicable, a proposal for rendering all mint-weights more determinate is set forth in a note.

CHAP. III. When upon the whole of a nation's trade with the rest of the world, a balance is due, it must be paid, either in intrinsic value, which totally discharges it, or by giving security for it, and paying interest until the charge can be obtained. We consider in this chapter the methods of discharging it.

A statesman is the best judge when his people ought to pay with bullion, and when with credit. If he approves of their paying with bullion, that is, with gold and silver, he should render the exportation of the metals as easy as possible. If a duty be laid upon coinage, he need not be afraid that any one will send off the coin, as long as bullion can be found; and when this runs short, if he does not chuse that his coin should go out, he must lend his assistance in

paying with credit. If he finds it against his interest either to pay in one way or in the other, he must put a stop to the trade which creates the balance : for while such trade is permitted , he will find it beyond his power to prevent the payment of that balance in the most hurtful way possible to his country.

I here observe , that in countries unacquainted with trade, and in others where the whole external commerce is carried on by strangers , a good expedient for cutting off such hurtful branches of traffic is to lay all the restraints possible on the exportation of the metals , in order to promote the exportation of what the country can offer in return. But when trade and industry are established, these restrictions cease to be useful ; because merchants then find a profit upon exporting domestic productions, which they never can have upon exporting an intrinsic value.

A statesman, therefore, should conduct his operations according to the situation of his country. If foreign trade be unprofitable, cut it off as much as possible, and lay every restraint upon the exportation of coin. If it be profitable , lay no restrictions on payments , because you are sure you will gain upon the whole. And if, in any particular case, you incline to keep your coin at home, mortgage your country, and pay with your credit.

If, when you are obliged to check foreign trade, and lay prohibitions on the exportation of coin, exchange is found to rise to a great height against you, yet will this exchange produce no national

loss: it will be paid within the country by those who consume foreign commodities, to those who are at the trouble and expense of transacting the balance.

CHAP. IV. Here I demonstrate what before I had in a manner taken for granted, viz. that the price of exchange is neither a national loss, or a national gain; but whether it be favorable or unfavorable, it produces an instability in the profits upon trade, and should therefore be kept at par by all possible methods. I also show how exchange is favorable to exportation, when the balance is against a country, and how the exchange is unfavorable in that respect in proportion as the balance is for that country: and as whatever exchange is gained by exporters is lost by importers, and *vice versa*, some have concluded, that an unfavorable balance does of itself destroy its own pernicious effects, and sets the balance even. I endeavour to disprove this proposition, by showing how the importers are indemnified, as to their loss by the exchange, from the additional price they get for their foreign commodities at home; whereas the exporters cannot raise their prices abroad; because foreign competition will not permit them. So that in one case the wrong balance hurts the rich consumer at home, who can bear the loss; and in the other, the right balance hurts the poor manufacturer, who cannot. Hence I conclude, that it is greatly for the interest of a trading state to keep exchange, at all times, as nearly at par as possible.

That this is a practicable scheme, I prove by a matter of fact, and by an experiment made in France

by a late minister; where, upon a certain occasion, the exchange having risen to a great height against France, he immediately brought it to par, by ordering bills upon Holland to be furnished at that rate, to those who should demand them; and by taking upon himself the expense of sending the money paid for such bills, to the place upon which they were drawn.

I observe, however, that such operations can only be recommended to statesman who preside over the interests of flourishing trading nations; because in proportion as they are benefited by facilitating the payment of the casual balances due by them from time to time, in so far is a prodigal nation hurt, by facilitating the dissipation of their property, and by contriving a ready method of transferring it to foreigners.

CHAP. V. When a nation owes a balance, after all the payments they have been able to make, either in coin, bullion, bills, or merchandize, it is evident, that what remains can only be satisfied by obtaining credit for it, at the expense of mortgaging the country and paying interest for the remaining balance. When this, however, happens to be the case, it involves the nation-debtor in a multitude of expensive operations conducted by exchangers, who constantly find a profit in carrying them on, though at a very great loss to individuals within the country. To prevent this inconvenience, I propose, that the statesman should take upon himself the obtaining of credit abroad, for the balance due by the country he governs; and that the expense incurred by this

operation should be defrayed by the public, whereby every individual within the state will contribute his share towards maintaining an uniformity in the profits upon trade, and supporting the stability of commerce, from the regularity of the course of exchange at all times. This operation resembles very much another of which we have already spoken in treating of banks of circulation upon mortgage. There we recommended the payment of foreign balances as a proper branch of bank-administration: here we recommend it to a statesman to interpose voluntarily between his subjects and their foreign creditors. This is the best method of supporting commerce, when it happens accidentally to fall under the discouragement of an unfavorable balance.

PART IV. *Of Public Credit.*

CHAP. I. **T**HE credit of a state resembles, in most things, that of an individual: they differ however in this, that when a private man contracts a debt, he himself is answerable for it. When a state contracts a debt, those who contract the obligation in the name of the state are not responsible for it. Hence it happens, that private people are commonly more anxious about paying their debts than statesmen are who administer for the public. Another difference is, that public debts do not so much affect the prosperity of a state as private debts do that of the debtor. The interest of a private debtor is simple

and uncompounded; that of a state is so complex, that the debts they owe, *when due to citizens*, are, on the whole, rather advantageous than burdensome: they produce a new branch of circulation among individuals, but take nothing from the general patrimony.

In deducing the principles of public credit, we must suppose it the established maxim in the state to adhere to the faith of their engagements; and that a permanent fund is appropriated for the payment of the interest of all the money borrowed: a liberty must be supposed, at the same time, to redeem the obligation by adequate payment; and also an easy transfer of the capital from hand to hand, to indemnify every creditor for the loss of his capital, which is not demandable from the state, as the case commonly is in private securities.

The consequence of the swelling of public debts, is, to occasion a proportional augmentation of contributions out of private property. The consequence of this again, is, to produce a vibration in the balance of domestic wealth. This creates a monied interest, which swells in proportion as public debts increase; and which may swell to so great a height as to transfer the income of a whole nation from the nominal proprietors to the public creditors.

A statesman, therefore, ought carefully to attend to the spirit of the nation he governs, before he gives way to a regular and systematical augmentation of public debts. In monarchies, the proprietors of lands may bear for a while the temporary diminutions of their annual income, though they will not

easily be made to subscribe to a plan which evidently tends to deprive them of all they have, and to transfer their power and property to a set of men whom they have always considered as their inferiors.

In monarchies, therefore, a great increase of public debts will more probably bring on a national bankruptcy, than in governments which participate of the republican form.

The consequences, therefore, of the swelling of public debts may be, either, *1mo*, To disturb the tranquillity of the state, by an attempt to transfer the property of it from the real possessors to a new created monied interest: or,

2do, If a systematical plan of borrowing upon solid security be not laid down, it may mechanically draw on a general bankruptcy: or,

3tio, If debts be allowed to swell beyond due bounds, so as to hurt the interest of the great body of the proprietors, the state may be engaged to adopt the fatal expedient of a sponge: or,

4to, If the spirit of the people prove compatible with the system of borrowing and supporting public credit to the utmost extent, then the whole income of the nation will remain in perpetual fluctuation, passing from one set of creditors to another, the statesman still retaining the administration of it for their use: or,

5to, If the debts contracted become the property of foreigners, these will either remove into the country where their funds are, or the income of the whole will be converted into a foreign tribute.

CHAP. II. While public expense was defrayed from treasures, public credit was a thing unknown. While supplied from rapine and extortion, it never could exist. During the simplicity of ancient manners, when there was neither industry or circulation, credit was unnecessary: the coin was more than sufficient to serve every purpose of alienation.

When trade and industry began to make a progress in Europe, in the Hans towns, and in the republics of Genoa and Venice, the consequences of their credit were soon felt by Princes, who awkwardly began to imitate their example; first, by borrowing money upon mortgages of their lands and principalities; and afterwards, by imposing taxes and selling them for what they could get to a most rapacious set of men, the tax-gatherers. This spread oppression, and this again soon brought the Prince to poverty.

Taxes, however, once established in this violent method, and upon urgent occasions, came, in time, to be improved, and formed a large fund, which now serves as a solid basis for public credit.

CHAP. III. While taxes were only appropriated for a time, for the repayment of the debts contracted by a state, the attention both of the state and of the lenders was totally fixed upon the discharge of the capitals: but in proportion as money increased, in consequence of the whole system of modern political economy, the lenders formed to themselves a new point of view, viz. the acquisition of a permanent interest arising from a transferable capital.

In order to make this change of policy from borrowing with an intention to repay the capital, to borrowing with an intention to pay a perpetual interest, the more sensible, I have traced in this chapter the progress of the first, by a review of the plan of public credit in England until the end of the last century.

Here I analyze briefly the sentiments of Dr. Davenant, and compare them with those established in our days, when the latter policy has taken place; and upon the whole I determine, that the difference in the system of public credit then and at present, has proceeded principally from the difference in the state of circulation, and from the expedients now fallen upon for increasing the quantity of money, in proportion to the uses found for it.

CHAP. IV. I then compare the state of public credit in France, during the administration of Cardinal de Richlieu, with that of England after the revolution. Here I endeavour to point out the influence which the different forms of government have upon the stability of public credit, both in contracting and in paying off public debts.

In France, the power of the Prince furnishes many expedients for paying off capitals, which had been borrowed at an exorbitant interest in times of public distress.

In England, the limited power of the crown, and the responsibility of ministers for their exercise of it, is a great security to those who lend money to the state; and consequently, proves a very great advantage in contracting debts upon reasonable terms.

The longer the two states subsist, the greater will the advantage be found in favor of that which adheres the most strictly to the faith of its public engagements.

When the credit of France and England are compared together, the difference between them is most remarkable. The strict adherence to the faith of public engagements has established, in England, so nice and scrupulous a credit, that the smallest deviation from its principles may prove fatal to the whole system. The credit of France, on the other hand, has been accustomed to a rougher usage; and the frequent acts of power, to the prejudice of creditors, rather occasion a temporary damp than a total destruction of their credit for the future. Such acts of power, however, in critical circumstances, prove extremely hurtful; and the advantage of a well established credit will, in all probability, either open the eyes of that nation to their own interest, or bring calamities upon them, which now appear little to be feared, in their present situation.

CHAP. V. This chapter contains a short sketch of the plan of public credit, as carried on in Great Britain, from the end of the last century, to the conclusion of the peace in 1763. I here enumerate the principal operations, calculated for enlarging the fund of British circulation, by engaging the bank of England to turn into money the discredited bills and tallies of the exchequer. I have pointed out the principle which circumscribes this power in the bank within certain limits. I have

traced the progress and fluctuations of interest of money; which have constantly been in proportion to the demand for borrowing or lending in the market at the time. I have mentioned the rise of the sinking fund, and the use which has been made of it. I have endeavoured to explain the methods of borrowing by *premium*, and have pointed out the inconvenience attending that plan, as long as the principal view of diminishing a nation's debt is confined to expedients for lowering the interest of the capital. I have given a progressive state of the augmentation of the debts of Great Britain at the end of every war; to which I have subjoined a short state of the nation at the last peace.

I conclude my chapter, by assigning reasons for the present low state of public credit in Great Britain; which has been principally owing to the large sums of borrowed money invested in the funds before the peace, upon the prospect of a sudden rise in their price, on the return of public tranquillity. This rise would, undoubtedly, have happened; had it not been obstructed by the necessity which the nominal stockholders were put to, of bringing their funds to market, in order to answer the demands of those from whom they had borrowed what they had invested in stock: and until this operation be completed, that is, until the funds of Great Britain become vested in the real proprietors of them, the state of public credit will constantly be undetermined.

CHAP. VI. Having giving a short sketch of the

present state of public credit in England, I endeavour, in this chapter, to extract, from the best private authorities to which I could have access, a parallel view of the affairs of France, so far as relates to its revenues, taxes, and debts, at the peace 1763.

By the revenue of France, I here understand, not only what comes clear and nett into the King's coffers, but also what is farther levied upon his people. The parallel therefore will not hold between the revenue of France and that of England, as represented in the preceding chapter, without attending to this difference.

The net revenue of England charged with all its debts and expence of government, we have said to amount to 10 213 000 *l.* The gross revenue of France, on the other hand, appears to amount to 24 740 834 *l.* sterling.

But if from this be deducted that part which never enters the royal treasure, and which is expended in levying the revenue, and in appropriations for particular perpetual expences, to the amount of 6 815 111 *l.* sterling, there will remain of net income, paid into the King's coffers, and charged with all the debts and expence of government, only 17 925 723 *l.* sterling.

If from this sum we deduct the total amount of the net revenue of Great Britain, (10 213 000 *l.* sterling) the remaining sum of 7 712 723 *l.* sterling, will show the excess of the French revenue above that of England.

The

The foregoing sum of 17 925 723 *l.* sterling, arises from the following branches :

1^{mo}, Those which compose the King's ordinary revenue; which, at the peace 1763, amounted to 12 546 666 *l.* sterling, burdened with the payment of 2 022 222 *l.* sterling of interest of the debts charged upon it.

2^{do}, The extraordinary taxes established for a limited time, after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. These amount to 2 326 133 *l.* and are totally appropriated for the payment of capitals, and interest upon them, incurred during the late wars, according to the principles of public credit in practice in England, during the reign of K. William and Q. Anne: and so soon as this fund has cleared the charges upon it, it is to cease, being no permanent branch of revenue.

3^{tio}, The extraordinary revenue raised on account of the last war. This amounts to 3 052 923 *l.* sterling, and consists of the second and third twentieth penny, granted for a very limited time, and appropriated, as the former branch, for discharging the debts lately contracted. The sum of these three branches made the total of the 17 925 723 *l.* paid in to the King's treasury, and burdened with all the public debts.

If we therefore suppose the two last branches of French revenue to be continued until all the debts charged upon them are paid, then we shall find the state of that kingdom reduced to the King's ordinary revenue of 12 546 666 *l.*; from which however must be deducted at least one half of the capitation.

This half amounts to 1 182 222 *l.* sterling, and is so burdensome, that its continuance will be impossible. The revenue therefore will be reduced to 11 364 444 *l.* sterling, charged with 2 022 454 *l.* sterling, interest of debts; of which indeed 711 111 *l.* are annuities upon lives, and must therefore be extinguished in time.

According to this view, the revenue of France will be 11 364 444 *l.* sterling, charged with the annual payment of 2 022 222 *l.* interest of debts: and the revenue of Great Britain is 10 213 000 *l.* charged with the annual sum of 4 860 000 *l.* interest of debts.

What remains free for France is 9 342 222 *l.* sterling; and for England, 5 353 000 *l.*

But out of this free revenue of France must be deducted the permanent articles of expense charged upon the ordinary revenue, exclusive of the interest of debts already deducted. These articles amount to the sum of 8 468 889 *l.* which being deducted from 9 342 222 *l.* leaves a free balance of no more than 873 333 *l.*

On the other hand, if we suppose the net amount of the revenue of Great Britain, after paying the interest of its debts, to be, as above, 5 353 000 *l.*; and if the expense of the current service of the year, including the civil list, be supposed to amount to 4 800 000 *l.* sterling, as it nearly did, before the commencement of last war, there will remain of free balance 553 000 *l.**

* But if the current annual expense should not exceed 3 600 000 *l.* or 4 400 000 *l.* including the civil list, which is nearly the present estimate, we may then add 400 000 *l.* to the free balance, and state it at 950 000 *l.* in round numbers.

From all which we may conclude, that, abstracting from extraordinary supplies for extraordinary exigencies, the revenue of both nations is pretty nearly in proportion to their current expense; and, therefore, their respective powers, when engaged in war, will be in proportion to their credit at the time.

CHAP. VII. In comparing the credit of the two nations, two things enter into consideration. First, the confidence of the world, in the solidity of their respective public faith. This I take to be totally in favor of the British nation. The second is, the solidity and extent of the funds, which are to be provided in security of the sums to be borrowed upon future emergencies. These resources, in France, we have seen to consist in their dixièmes, vingtièmes, double capitation, and extraordinary impositions upon the clergy, and other bodies politic; taxes so burdensome in their nature, and so contrary to the spirit of the French nation, that it is hardly possible they ever can be made so permanent as to answer any other purpose than a short temporary appropriation.

The true resources of France are confined to those taxes upon consumption above enumerated, which do not enter into the ordinary revenue, and which are now imposed and appropriated only for a time. When these taxes become free, they may no doubt be rendered perpetual, and appropriated for a future fund of credit.

On the side of Great Britain, the case is different. The greatest part of her revenue is already

perpetual ; and the only two branches of annual grants, the land-tax and malt-duty, are not so excessively burdensome, nor so repugnant to the genius of the people, as to render the raising of them at all precarious. And were this nation once to adopt the system of raising money, in time of peace, sufficient to defray the charges of government, the sinking fund would prove a resource for the future, far above any thing that France can boast of.

CHAP. VIII. Having by this short sketch of the state of credit in Great Britain and France, prepared a sort of canvass for our farther reasoning, I proceed to apply principles to some combinations, which might be formed concerning the consequences of an overstretched credit.

In proportion as credit is used for borrowing money to be sent abroad, either a supply of currency must be provided for filling up the void, or alienation, trade, industry, &c. must suffer a check.

And even if money should be borrowed to be spent at home, an additional quantity of it must be added to circulation; because this new expense of the state will require it.

Every fund of property may be converted into money, with the assistance of credit, providing the statesman lends his hand to the operation: and the fundamental principle for supporting credit of all kinds, is, to provide every one with money who has property to pledge for it.

When money is borrowed by a state, to be

spent abroad, the loan must either be made in coin, or in paper. If in the first, it is exported; because coin is the money of the world: if in paper, it must either be converted into coin, and exported, or it must be remitted by bills, drawn upon countries debtors to England, for example; or, in the last place, it must be paid in the way of credit, by constituting England debtor to the Continent for it. When it is paid by bills drawn upon countries, debtors to England, then the consequence of such a loan is to convert the balance of trade into a capital in the public funds.

In whatever way money is borrowed by a state, whether from natives, or foreigners, the consequences are the same. The operation of a favorable balance of trade will transfer what is owing to foreigners in favor of natives; and a wrong balance of trade will transfer the property of natives to foreigners.

If no check be put to the augmentation of public debts, if they be allowed constantly to accumulate, and if the spirit of a nation can patiently submit to the natural consequences of such a plan, it must end in this, that all property, that is income, will be swallowed up by taxes; and these will be transferred to the creditors, the state retaining the administration of the revenue.

The state, in that case, will always consider those who enjoy the national income as the body of proprietors. This income will continue the same, and the real proprietors will pay the taxes imposed; which may be mortgaged again to a new

set of men who will retain the denomination of creditors; until by swallowing up the former, they slip into their places, and become the body of proprietors in their turn, and thus perpetuate the circle.

CHAP. IX. But as a thousand accidents may put an end to public credit, before such intricate revolutions can be accomplished, the consequence must be a bankruptcy. This may either happen by a deliberate act of government, or from the natural consequences proceeding from an over-stretched credit.

I here endeavour to show, that it is impossible to form a supposition of circumstances, in which a deliberate act of bankruptcy can be a prudent measure. The only end that could be proposed to be attained thereby, would be, to relieve those who are oppressed by taxes. But a sudden abolition of taxes would have the effect of ruining the landed interest, as well as all the manufacturing classes. Sudden revolutions are constantly pernicious; and no revolution can be so sudden as that of a bankruptcy. If such a revolution should happen, from circumstances which can neither be foreseen or prevented, the best expedient would still be, to adhere, as much as possible, to the faith of public engagements; because no expedient would be so productive of good consequences, in such a calamitous situation.

While the debts of a nation are due to its subjects, and while there remains any balance due in favor of the nation, no increase of debts can *necessarily* bring on a bankruptcy. It is a contradiction to

suppose that a nation can become bankrupt to itself. But when, on the general state of payments between a nation and the world, there is found an annual balance due, which cannot be compensated either in the way of payment, or in the way of credit, then indeed a bankruptcy becomes unavoidable.

From this reasoning we may conclude, that the method of determining the exact extent of public credit, is to keep a watchful eye upon the increase of debts due to foreigners, and to compare these with the favorable balance upon the trade of the nation. When those debts and this balance begin to draw near to an equality, if part of the capital of the public debts be not immediately paid off, by an augmentation upon public contributions, the infallible consequence will be a state-bankruptcy.

CHAP. X. The first requisite for contracting public debts, is to establish a fund for fulfilling public engagements. This procures the confidence of the lender. The next is, to establish an extensive plan of credit at home, which may be sufficient at all times to keep circulation full.

When, from the effects of borrowing, too great sums are, from time to time, drawn out of circulation, the void must speedily be filled up. If this be neglected, taxes will not be paid, as has been often observed: besides, if money be allowed to become too scarce, in proportion to the demand for it, interest will rise, and borrowing will become proportionally more burdensome to the state in general.

Foreign expence frequently drains the fund of circulation at home : hence a multitude of inconveniences arise. To prevent these, I suggest a new scheme of borrowing, by opening subscriptions in foreign countries where the interest is annually to be paid. This being to be remitted by the country borrowing, a statesman may, with the greater ease, obviate the inconveniences which might arise to circulation from such remittances.

In this chapter, I endeavour to prove by new arguments and illustrations, that national distress is more owing to a scanty circulation, than to circumscribed property; and a statesman who neglects to employ every method for keeping up the circulating equivalent within the state he governs, to the full proportion of all the uses found for it, fails in the most essential requisite for promoting the prosperity of his people, and the establishment of his own credit.

Having pointed out the methods of contracting debts, I proceed to the method of paying them. This may be accomplished in six different ways, by the help of a sinking fund; which,

1^{mo}, May be applied annually, to the discharge of certain capitals, at the option of the state. Or,

2^{do}, According to a certain rule, to determine the preference.

3^{tio}, By appropriating the fund, for the payment of a proportional part of the whole outstanding capital. Or,

4^{to}, By reducing the interest of the capitals. Or,

5^{to}, By converting the whole of the capitals into

determinate annuities, proportionate to the extent of the sinking fund. Or,

6to, By the means of lotteries, where the state may gain what gamesters are willing to lose.

I point out the advantages and inconveniences of every plan. The first five expedients are too plain to require a recapitulation. The sixth amounts briefly to a supposition, that the interest of the public debts is brought, by a proper chain of administration, to a lower rate than in any other part of Europe. In this situation, accidental circumstances will occasion (as at present) fluctuations in the price of the stocks. When they fall below par, let government open subscriptions for lotteries, to be paid in stock at the market price. Subscriptions also might be opened, and the old capitals might be received at the market price, and constituted a-new at the current interest, with a small premium above the rate at the time. By such means, the sum of the old capitals would be reduced, and a small benefit would accrue to the subscribers. Then, upon the rise of the stocks, the interest on these subscriptions might be reduced again; from which a double benefit would result; the price of stocks would be supported on one hand, and the capitals of the public debts would be reduced on the other.

C H A P. XIV.

*Recapitulation of the Fifth Book.
Of Taxes.*

INTROD. **H**AVING already explained the effect of taxes upon domestic circulation; it now remains to investigate the principles by which they are to be imposed on their proper objects.

CHAP. I. I divide taxes into proportional, which affect consumption, or, more properly, what may be called expense; cumulative, which affect property; and personal, which consist in personal service. These I explain by giving examples of each.

CHAP. II. Proportional taxes may be so imposed as to affect almost every expense of living, and as all expense should arise from income, not from stock, the first principle of taxation, is, to confine all impositions to income only: whatever affects a capital is oppressive and unjust. But as in all expense there is alienation, although in all alienation expense is not implied, the best method to avoid the mistake of taxing stock instead of income, is, to impose the tax in such a manner as to affect the consumers only; in which case, whoever buys to sell again will draw the tax completely back.

CHAP. III. In this chapter, I fully explain the operation of drawing back proportional taxes.

When the commodities charged with such taxes are either not consumed by purchasers, or by the

industrious classes, they are constantly drawn back, except so far as the consumption made by the latter is an article of superfluity.

Hence I conclude, that the price of *labor* is raised by proportional taxes, in proportion to industry only, though the price of the *commodity taxed* be raised in proportion to the tax. Consequently, the more taxes are found to increase the price of labor, the more we may conclude in favor of the industry of the manufacturing classes: and the more they bring into the exchequer, the more we may conclude in favor of the ease and opulence of those who consume the objects of such taxes.

CHAP. IV. The proper object of cumulative taxes, is the large possessions of the higher classes of a people, which can bear a diminution in favor of the state, without danger of encroaching upon their necessary or easy subsistence. It is not so when they are laid upon the lower classes; because these are either composed of the industrious, or of beggars. The first should be enabled to draw back from the rich, what they advance for the public service. The latter have nothing to give; to tax them is but adding to their misery, without relieving the wants of the state.

The great advantages of proportional taxes over the cumulative, may be reduced to three.

1^{mo}, The proportion between the tax and the object taxed is determinate.

2^{do}, The proportion may be known to every body.

3^{tio}, The time of paying the tax is regular and

gradual; because in paying for the commodity you pay for the tax, and your liberty in buying such commodities is unrestrained; consequently, the expense is supposed to be in proportion to what your income can afford. Whereas in the cumulative taxes, it is, first, hardly possible to preserve the proportion between the tax and the ease of a person's circumstances. In the second place, it is impossible for the state to ascertain exactly that proportion. And in the last place, the demand for the tax is made at a time when people are often unprepared.

CHAP. V. The principal inconveniences alledged against proportional taxes, are, 1. That they raise prices: 2. Discourage consumption: and 3. That they are oppressive and expensive in the collection. These inconveniences are more apparent than real, as will appear from what follows.

1^{mo}, A proportional tax, rightly imposed, and properly levied, will undoubtedly raise the price of the objects taxed; but it will only consequentially raise the price of the labor of the industrious man who pays it; because he will draw it back in proportion only to his diligence and frugality.

The price of labor is *regulated* by demand, and is *influenced* only by proportional taxes.

2^{do}, As to discouraging consumption, if taxes raise prices, this circumstance proves the increase of consumption; because if consumption were to diminish, taxes would not be paid, and prices would fall of course, even to the detriment of the industrious. These are always the consequences of proportional taxes, when wrong imposed.

3tio, As to the expense and oppression in levying them, these inconveniences are, in a great measure, in proportion to the disposition of the people to defraud the public : for when they are fairly paid, and honestly collected, proportional taxes are little more expensive, and infinitely less oppressive than any other. I conclude my chapter by some observations drawn from the practice of different countries, which point out a method of avoiding both the oppression and the expense of levying proportional taxes.

CHAP. VI. All taxes are paid out of the circulating money of a country; consequently, they cannot exceed a certain proportion of that sum. It is not, therefore, from the value of the property, or the quantity of consumption, that any one can form a guess of the probable amount of taxes, so much as from the easy and expeditious circulation, which facilitates alienation and sale.

Were taxes, indeed, paid in kind, they might bear a proportion to fruits and labor; but then they would diminish the fund of subsistence: whereas they now draw a share of that quantity of money which circulates through the hands of every individual.

The great difference between cumulative and proportional taxes, consists in this. That in the first, he who pays them cannot draw them back in proportion to his industry; in the last, he may: but so far as any one of an industrious class proves idle or extravagant, every proportional tax will affect his daily profits, as every cumulative tax

will affect the income of a fund already acquired. This deduction of principles is of great use in imposing taxes; because it points out the method of giving to many cumulative taxes usually imposed on the lower classes, all the advantages of those of the proportional kind.

CHAP. VII. Taxes ought to be imposed for the benefit of the public, not of private people: and while that object is fulfilled, taxes are beneficial in every respect. When they are properly levied, they only abridge unnecessary private expense: when they are properly applied by the state, they advance improvement every where; and those who have fortunes already acquired, will be brought to contribute to the ease of the lower classes.

Thus by the help of cumulative and proportional taxes, rightly imposed, and rightly expended, circulation is greatly increased; industry is advanced; the public good is augmented, not diminished; and the burden of payments becomes so equally proportioned, as not to be felt in any degree sufficient to overbalance the advantages resulting from the general system.

CHAP. VIII. Having said that cumulative taxes affect the income of funds already acquired, I observe, that this income proceeds from moveable or immoveable property. The first of which will constantly avoid the grasp of every statesman who attempts to lay a tax upon it. Cumulative taxes, therefore, if carried to their utmost extent, may absorb the whole income of *immoveable property*; but of that only.

Proportional taxes, again, have been said to affect the superfluity of those who consume the objects of them; consequently, if every thing which is consumed were first to suffer an alienation for money, a proportional tax might be imposed upon it.

The method, therefore, of carrying proportional taxes to their utmost extent, is, to draw to market every thing consumable; and insensibly to raise the tax upon it, so high as to absorb, as much as possible, the whole superfluity of the consumers.

Taxes being carried to that height, the state will become proprietors of the whole income of the immoveable funds, and the industrious classes alone will augment their wealth, in proportion to their frugality.

From this general principle it appears, that for the establishment of proportional taxes, consumption is requisite, together with alienation; consequently, where alienation takes place without consumption, as in the sale of lands, and other immoveable subjects, a proportional tax cannot be, properly, imposed. And also where consumption takes place without alienation, as when the fruits of the earth are consumed by those who raise them, proportional taxes cannot, with any propriety, be levied. Farther,

As taxes do not bear a proportion to effects, but to circulation, it follows, that they can only be raised, properly, upon alienation by sale. Many examples however may be found of proportional taxes, imposed in different countries,

where neither sale or even alienation takes place.

These I observe to be the worst kind of proportional taxes, and the most oppressive to those who pay them.

From the principle that taxes are in proportion to circulation, and not in proportion to consumption, we discover the reason why of old they were so difficult to be raised. Consumption then went on as now, in many respects, in proportion to the number of inhabitants; but circulation, that is, alienation by sale, bore no proportion to it.

The effect of every increase in circulation is to swell the amount of taxes; and when they are extensively imposed in a country of industry, the whole currency is thereby made to flow through the coffers of the public, as the blood of the human body flows through the heart, and is by that diffused through every member.

CHAP. IX. I next examine the consequences of a total abolition of taxes, the better to discover the effects which such an alteration would produce, first, upon the prosperity of the whole community; and next, upon that of the principal classes of inhabitants, which compose it. These I reduce to three.

1^{mo}, Those who administer government, and who are maintained from the amount of taxes.

An abolition of them, with respect to this numerous class, would draw consequences along with it, directly destructive to their interest, and, consequently, prejudicial to that of all the industrious classes who supply their consumption.

2^{do},

2do, With respect to the second class, which I suppose to be composed of the industrious part of the people, I observe, that an abolition of taxes must proportionally imply a diminution of circulation; this would produce a proportional diminution upon alienation; consequently, would interrupt the industry of many, and thereby throw them into a hurtful competition among themselves for subsistence. And as it has been proved, that the industrious classes pay no taxes, as matters stand, providing they be diligent and frugal, they consequently would *gain* nothing, and must *lose* a great deal by the abolition of them.

3tio, In the third class I comprehend those whom we have hitherto considered as the opulent and idle consumers. Of this category the proprietors of land form a considerable branch. They, we have said, draw back no part, either of the cumulative or proportional taxes, which affect them; but although they be deprived of that immediate indemnification, competent to the industrious, they reap, in another way, advantages which more than compensate all the burden laid upon them. These proceed from the consequences of that spirit of industry which is diffused over the whole people; in consequence of which, their lands are improved, the produce of them is readily disposed of, and what proves superfluous for domestic consumption meets with a ready market abroad, and thereby supports the value of all productions within the country.

It may be asked, then, where the burden of taxes

falls, since every class of inhabitants seems to gain some advantage by them?

I answer, that they imply no burden when rightly imposed. The augmentation of industry, in consequence of the increase of circulation, provides a fund of well employed time, which, converted into money, is more than sufficient to pay all the taxes not immediately affecting the income of solid property; and the constant improvement of this, in consequence of the former, is more than sufficient to indemnify the land-proprietors.

Taxes, in this light, resemble the expense laid out upon new establishments for improvement; because in their consequences they augment the prosperity and ease of the whole people, not by being levied, but by being properly applied, as is farther explained in the next chapter.

CHAP. X. Here I examine whether taxes be a spur to industry, as some pretend.

The doubt concerning this point has arisen from what daily experience has shown, that nations become industrious in proportion to the taxes they pay. It is not very evident, that the *payment* of a tax by any person should enable him to discharge it with more facility, unless it be from the profit he reaps in drawing it back from others, with an additional profit to himself. But it is palpable that the amount of taxes being properly *expended* by a state, will increase circulation, and give fresh encouragements to industry of every kind.

I close this chapter with a short representation of the nature of ancient and modern circulation, accompanied with observations upon their respective effects in rendering mankind industrious.

CHAP. XI. Of all cumulative taxes, that laid upon land-property produces the greatest amount, with the least oppression to the contributors. This leads me into a particular inquiry into the nature of the land-tax, as it is established in Great Britain, and in France.

To render a land-tax equal and easily born, the imposition ought to be preceded by a fair valuation of every article of revenue intended to be taxed, and no other income, but that proceeding from an immoveable fund of property, ought to be affected by it. From this I am led to disapprove of the method of assessment established in England by the land-tax; and also of blending a tax upon solid property, with an equal imposition upon personal estates, which we have shown to be of a nature incompatible with cumulative taxation.

The defects of this kind of imposition in France (where it is called the *taille*) are different. There the rents of lands, which are the proper object of every land-tax, are frequently withdrawn from under the influence of it, in consequence of the privileges enjoyed by the higher classes, which are exempted from the *taille*. The consequence is, that the French land-tax falls upon that part of the lower classes who are employed in the cultivation of the soil. From this proceeds a double inconvenience.

If those who cultivate are proprietors, their portions are, commonly, very small, and a land-tax which would be light to a considerable proprietor, is quite intolerable to those who draw little more from their portion than what is necessary for their own subsistence. If those who cultivate are lessees to the more considerable proprietors, the burden falls

upon them independently of the land-rent, which ought naturally to bear it.

As a proof that this is a true representation of the matter, I review the Maréchal de Vauban's scheme for new modelling the system of French taxation: and from the intolerable oppression which would follow the execution of it, we may judge of the present state of taxes in a nation where that scheme was intended as a considerable alleviation of their burden.

Nothing but the establishment of industry and extensive credit, with a substitution of proportional taxes, instead of the many cumulative ones, imposed on the lower classes in France, can ever produce a facility in paying the considerable impositions laid upon that nation.

CHAP. XII. The most proper method of imposing a land-tax is, without doubt, to confine the imposition to the rent of lands only, and to lay it on in proportion to them. But how is it to be expected that ever such a plan can take place in a nation where the proprietors of land govern the state? In France, the power of the King has never been able to establish a tax upon the rent of lands, for any longer duration than that of a foreign war. In a neighbouring nation, it has now been established for the greatest part of a century. Were it there to become perpetual, it might be converted into a new domain, or it might prove a fund for discharging, at once, a very great part of the national debt.

When taxes are imposed, it is of great consequence to establish a right administration of them. The easiest method for a state, is to give them in farm; and this was the general practice every where, on the

first establishment of taxes. But here no general rule can be laid down.

Cumulative taxes are better administered by commissioners, than let out in farm. The operation of levying them is simple; but when they are farmed, the lower classes of the people are apt to be oppressed. When farms are properly established, an open management of them is absolutely requisite: from this new improvements naturally arise, which give to the farm almost every advantage of the management by commissioners. This improvement is, to divide the profits upon the farm between the state and the farmers: a plan put in execution in France not many years ago.

No question whatever appears more difficult to resolve, than that of ascertaining the fund out of which taxes ought to be paid. Through the whole course of this inquiry, I have endeavoured to show, that the real fund of taxes is the money circulating among the inhabitants, either in consequence of sale, or of payments. In order to expose this question in a new light, I have commented upon two passages of Davenant, where he estimates this fund from the quantity of national consumption.

From this he is led to compute the yearly taxable expense of every man in England at 8 *l.* sterling; when perhaps the circulation of money through the hands of many may not be twenty shillings: whereas, according to my theory, it is these twenty shillings only that can be laid under any taxation whatever.

I thought this method of comparing the result of Davenant's reasoning with mine, might better serve

to support the latter than any other I could contrive.

The last question proposed in this chapter is no more than a hint to show, that a proportional tax, laid upon meat and drink, is the most proper equivalent for a land-tax; because those who purchase their subsistence with money are, according to the principles of the first book, those who consume that part of the fruits of the earth which is equivalent to the land rent. If this be arbitrarily laid under an imposition, by a pound rate, or otherwise, the proper drawback, if any be allowed, should be from a tax laid upon those who consume that part of the earth's produce which belongs to the landlords.

I have now concluded this inquiry, according to the plan I at first proposed. It is the fruit of eighteen years close, though agreeable application; interrupted only by many intervals of bad health, and many strokes of adverse fortune.

It never was, till lately, my intention to offer to the public, during my life, what I had composed purely for my own instruction and amusement. But upon comparing my sentiments in several points with those of the generality of my friends, they have been found so widely different, that I was thought in duty bound to my country, to submit them to the criticism of the public.

To this I have the more willingly submitted, as I thereby shall pursue my first intention in taking my pen; which was, to clear up my ideas on his subject. And since I can now draw no farther knowledge from my own inquiries, I must expect it from the criticisms of those who may think it worth their while to animadvert upon my notions.

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E I N I S.

A T A B L E O F C O I N S,

Showing the Quantity of Fine Metal contained in them.

The number of grains of fine metal in every coin is sought for in the regulations of the mint of the country where it is coined, and is expressed in the grains in use in that mint: from that weight it is converted into those of other countries, according to the following proportions: 3840 Troy-grains, 4676.35 Paris-grains, 5192.8 Holland-aces or grains, and 4649.66 Colonia-grains, are supposed to be equal weights; and the coins in the table are converted according to those proportions.

Table of Coins, reduced to Grains of Fine Metal, according to the Troy, Paris, Colonia, and Holland-weights.					Gold Coins.				Silver Coins.			
	Troy.	Paris.	Colonia.	Holland.	Troy.	Paris.	Colonia.	Holland.	Troy.	Paris.	Colonia.	Holland.
English Coins.	1 A Guinea by statute	118.651	144.46	143.65	160.45	429.68	529.2	520.2	581.			
	2 A Crown by statute	-	-	-	-	85.935	104.65	104.	116.2			
	3 A Shilling by statute	-	-	-	-	1718.7	2093.	2080.8	2324.1			
	4 A Silver Pound sterling by statute 1601	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
	5 A Gold Pound sterling by statute 1728	113.	137.61	136.8	152.8	1639.38	1996.4	1984.7	2216.			
	6 A Silver Pound sterling in currency = 20/65 lib. troy	-	-	-	-	1638.5	1995.3	1983.7	2215.7			
	7 A Silver Pound sterl. at the proportion of gold to silver as 1 to 14 1/2	113.	137.61	136.8	152.8	1718.7	2093.	2080.8	2324.1			
	8 A Gold Pound sterling at the same proportion as 1 to 14 1/2	118.4	144.18	143.34	160.11	1678.6	2044.2	2032.2	2269.9			
	9 A Pound sterling at the mean proportion in gold and in silver	115.769	140.98	140.16	156.55	81.961	99.8	99.	110.82			
	10 A Shilling current = 1/65 of a pound troy	-	-	-	-	1804.6	2197.6	2184.8	2440.3			
	11 A Guinea in silver, or 21 shillings standard weight	-	-	-	-	1720.4	2095.1	2082.8	2326.4			
	12 A Guinea at the proportion of 1 to 14 1/2, worth in silver	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
	13 A Pound troy; or 12 ounces English weight	5760.	7019.2	6973.5	7789.2	-	-	-	-			
French Coins.	1 A Louis d'or	113.27	137.94	137.13	153.17	-	-	-	-			
	2 A Crown of six livres	-	-	-	-	409.94	499.22	496.3	554.3			
	3 A Crown of three ditto	-	-	-	-	204.97	249.61	248.15	277.1			
	4 A Livre	-	-	-	-	68.34	83.23	82.74	92.42			
	5 A Louisd'or, or 24 livres in silver	-	-	-	-	1639.7	1996.9	1985.2	2217.4			
	6 A Marc of Paris weight, fine gold or silver	3783.87	4608.	4581.1	5116.9	3783.87	4608.	4581.1	5116.9			
	7 A Marc of gold coin effective weight, in fine	3398.3	4138.5	4114.3	4593.4	-	-	-	-			
	8 A Marc of silver coin effective weight, in fine	-	-	-	-	3402.3	4143.4	4119.2	4600.9			
German Coins.	1 A Carolin legal weight	115.45	140.6	139.78	156.12	-	-	-	-			
	2 A Ducat of the Empire ditto	52.8	64.37	64.	71.48	-	-	-	-			
	3 A Florin of Convention	-	-	-	-	179.73	218.87	217.6	243.			
	4 A Dollar of Convention	-	-	-	-	269.59	328.31	326.4	364.5			
	5 A Dollar of Exchange, the Carolin = 9 flor. 42 kreutzers	17.85	21.74	21.615	24.14	-	-	-	-			
	6 A Florin current = 1/11 of a Carolin	10.54	12.84	12.77	14.26	-	-	-	-			
	7 A Carolin in silver at the proportion of 1 to 14 1/2	-	-	-	-	1674.	2038.6	2026.8	2263.8			
Dutch Coins.	1 A Dutch Ducat	51.76	63.	62.67	70.	-	-	-	-			
	2 A Florin in silver	-	-	-	-	148.	180.3	179.2	200.21			

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